December 18, 2014
The Congressional Budget Office has released a report, Transitioning to Alternative Structures for Housing Finance. This report
examines various mechanisms that policymakers could use to attract more private capital to the secondary mortgage market. The report also addresses how those mechanisms could be combined in different ways to help the market make the transition to a new structure during the coming decade. CBO analyzed transition paths to four alternative structures that involve choices about whether the government would continue to guarantee payment on mortgages and MBSs and, if so, what form and prices those guarantees would have. Under those different structures, the government’s activities would range from providing full or partial guarantees for a large share of the mortgage market to playing a minimal role in a largely private market (except perhaps during a financial crisis). Any transition to a new type of secondary market would also require decisions about what to do with the existing operations, guarantee obligations, and investment holdings of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. (1, footnotes omitted)
The report has three key findings:
December 17, 2014
The New York City Independent Budget Office issued an estimate of the cost of providing “free legal representation to individuals with incomes at or below 125 percent of the federal poverty level who are facing eviction and foreclosure proceedings in court . . ..” (1) The IBO nets the cost of this proposal against the potential savings that the City would reap by reducing admissions to homeless shelters. The IBO concludes that this proposal would have a net cost of roughly 100 million to 200 million dollars.
The IBO notes that “there are benefits to reducing evictions that extend beyond the city’s budget, such as the potential for reducing turnovers of rent-regulated apartments, which would slow rent increases for those units, as well as avoiding the long term physical and mental health consequences associated with homelessness.” (1-2)
Seems to me that this is money well spent in 21st century New York City. Market forces are such that landlords can frequently raise rents significantly whenever a tenant leaves. Unscrupulous landlords harass their tenants in a variety of ways in order to encourage them to leave sooner. This might be done through the abuse of legal process, with a landlord trying to evict a tenant multiple times when the tenant has not violated the terms of the lease. Or it might be done through improperly maintaining the property, for instance, cutting off the water repeatedly. In either case, though, tenants are being subject to a lot of illegal behavior in this hot real estate market.
Housing court is a mess for both tenants and landlords, but typically only landlords have lawyers to help them navigate it. This proposal would even the field a bit. Mayor de Blasio’s affordable housing goals would be greatly augmented by this proposal.
Perhaps housing court reform should also be put on the table so that these cases are adjudicated equitably, but that is a topic for another day . . ..
December 16, 2014
Jeff Lederman, Sabeel Rahman and I submitted a comment on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s proposed policy on No-Action Letters. Basically,
This is a comment on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (the “Bureau”) proposed Policy on No-Action Letters (the “Policy”). The Policy is a step in the right direction, but a more robust Policy could better help the Bureau achieve its statutory purposes.
The Bureau recognizes that there are situations in which consumer financial service businesses (“Businesses”) are uncertain as to the applicability of laws and rules related to new financial products (“Products”); how regulatory provisions might be applied to their Products; and what potential enforcement actions could be brought against them by regulatory agencies for noncompliance. Businesses could therefore benefit from the issuance of a No-Action Letter to reduce that uncertainty.
There is very little scholarly literature on the use of No-Action Letters by administrative agencies. In the absence of comprehensive studies, it is hard to precisely determine how to allocate agency resources to informal guidance as opposed to other types of regulatory action. Notwithstanding this, an agency should attempt to determine the optimal amount of its resources that should be devoted to informal guidance as opposed to the alternatives and then refine that initial estimate as experience dictates.
A rapidly changing field like consumer finance can benefit from the availability of quick and informal feedback for Businesses so long as the process is properly designed. Because the Policy would use a relatively small amount of Bureau resources compared to other types of regulatory action, a well-designed No-Action Letter Policy would be a win-win-win for Businesses, for the Bureau and for consumers.
December 12, 2014
Bob Hockett has posted ‘We Don’t Follow, We Lead': How New York City Will Save Mortgage Loans by Condemning Them to SSRN. The abstract reads,
This brief invited essay lays out in summary form the eminent domain plan for securitized underwater mortgage loans that the author has been advocating and helping to implement for some years now. It does so with particular attention in this case to New York City, which is now actively considering the plan. The essay’s first part addresses the plan’s necessity. Its second part lays out the plan’s basic mechanics. The third part then systematically addresses and dispatches the battery of remarkably weak legal and policy arguments commonly proffered by opponents of the plan.
Hockett has been advocating this plan for some time in the face of concerted opposition from the financial industry. One industry argument that I have found to be over the top is that lenders will refuse to lend in communities that employ eminent domain to address the foreclosure crisis. Hockett writes,
Another policy argument made by some members of the securitization industry is that using eminent domain to purchase loans will dry up the sources of mortgage credit, rendering the American dream of homeownership unattainable. The financial services industry and its legislative supporters have made this kind of claim against regulatory and consumer protection proposals emerging from national, state, or municipal legislatures.
One problem with this argument is that private credit has not flowed to non-wealthy mortgage borrowers since the crash. Federal lenders and guarantors are nearly the only game in town, and they are likely to remain so until the underwater PLS loan logjam is cleared.
Another problem with the credit withdrawal argument is that it characterizes a benefit as a burden. The housing bubble was, like most of the more devastating bubbles through history, the upshot of an over-extension of credit. Lenders extended excess credit through reverse redlining and other predatory lending practices perpetrated or aided and abetted by participants in the securitization industry itself. Hence the securitization industry’s warning that credit might not be overextended in the future is a warning of something that might well be desirable. (142-43, footnotes omitted)
Given that lenders always rush to lend to countries that have recently defaulted on their sovereign debt, I don’t find the credit withdrawal argument to be particularly convincing here. But it may succeed in convincing some local governments not to proceed with their eminent domain strategies. I do hope, however, that at least one locality will follow through during the current foreclosure crisis. That way, we will at least have a proof of concept for the next foreclosure crisis.
December 11, 2014
The Federal Housing Finance Agency has ordered Fannie and Freddie to begin making contributions to the Housing Trust Fund and to the Capital Magnet Fund. These two funds were created pursuant to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, the same statute that authorized placing the two companies in conservatorship. In 2008, FHFA Acting Director DeMarco suspended payments into the two funds because the two companies were being bailed out by the federal government. Now that the two companies are on firmer financial footing, the FHFA has lifted the suspension. The suspension will go back into effect for a company if it has to make a draw from Treasury under the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement, that is if the company does not have enough excess monies to make the payments into the two funds from its own income.
This action is not so surprising, given Watt’s past statements. It does, however, have some interesting implications. In terms of the GSE shareholder litigation, these allocations reduce the enterprises’ capital by a not insignificant amount; if shareholders were to win one of their lawsuits, monies placed in these two funds would be unavailable to them. In terms of housing finance reform, this action signals that the companies have moved beyond their crisis stage into a more stable one. It also emphasizes that the FHFA can take big steps on its own when it comes to housing finance reform, notwithstanding Congressional gridlock. All in all, it feels like the beginning of a new stage in the lives of the two companies.
The FHFA has issued an Interim Final Rule and Request for Comments relating to the payments into the two funds. The rule “implements a statutory prohibition against the Enterprises passing the cost of such allocations through to the originators of loans they purchase or securitize.” (1) Comments are due 30 days after the interim final rule is published in the Federal Register.
December 10, 2014
Albert Alex Zevelev has posted Regulating Mortgage Leverage: Fire Sales, Foreclosure Spirals and Pecuniary Externalities to SSRN. The abstract reads,
The US housing boom was accompanied by a rise in mortgage leverage. The subsequent bust was accompanied by a rise in foreclosure. This paper introduces a dynamic general equilibrium model to study how leverage and foreclosure affect house prices. The model shows how foreclosure sales, through their effect on housing supply, amplify and propagate house price drops. A calibration to match the bust shows consumption and housing need to be sufficiently complementary to fit the data. Since leverage plays a key role in foreclosure, a regulator can reduce systemic risk by placing a cap on leverage. Counterfactual experiments show that in a world with less leverage, the same economic shock leads to less foreclosure and less severe, shorter busts in house prices. A 90% cap on loan-to-value ratios in 2006 predicts house prices would have fallen 12% rather than 18% as in the data. The regulator faces a trade-off in that less leverage means less housing for constrained households, but also fewer foreclosures and less severe busts in house prices. A regulator with reasonable preference parameters would choose a cap of 95%.
This is pretty important stuff as it attempts to model the impact of different LTV ratios on prices and foreclosure rates. Now Zevelev is not the first to see these interactions, but it is important to model how consumer finance regulation (for instance, loan to value ratios) can impact systemic risk. This is particularly important because many commentators downplay that relationship.
I am not in a position to evaluate the model in this paper, but its conclusion is certainly right: “Leverage makes our economy fragile by increasing the risk of default. It is clear that
foreclosure has many externalities and they are quantitatively significant. Since borrowers
and lenders do not fully internalize these externalities, there is a case for regulating mortgage leverage.” (31)