August 10, 2016
- Quantitative Easing: The Challenge for Households Long-Term Savings and Financial Security, Christian Thimann, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5976, 6, 2016
- Wage Flexibility and Employment Fluctuations: Evidence from the Housing Sector, Jorn Steffen Pischke, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11418, 7, 2016
- Managerial Myopia and the Mortgage Meltdown, Adam Kolasinski & Nan Yang
- How to Price Swaps in Your Head- An Interest Rate Swap & Asset Swap Primer, Nicholas Burgess
August 9, 2016
- California governor, Jerry Brown, proposed a new bill which will potentially mandate housing developers to dedicate 20% of their housing units as affordable housing in the state of California. This shift, if approved, will have a great impact on the Bay Area and act as one of California’s most significant housing policy changes.
- The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development allocated 5.4 million dollars to help individuals in low-income areas receive job training so that they can become self-sufficient and lead greater lives without government assistance.
August 5, 2016
NYU’s Furman Center and Citi have released their joint Report on Homeownership & Opportunity in New York City. It opens,
In New York City, the notoriously high costs of rental housing are well documented. But becoming a homeowner in the New York City real estate market is also a considerable challenge for low- to middle-income households. Households earning less than $114,000 face a severely constrained supply of homeownership opportunities in New York City.
This report seeks to shed light on the extreme variation in homeownership rates among New Yorkers and quantify the homeownership options that exist at different income levels. We do this by analyzing 2014 home sales prices and examining the potential purchasing power of households at various income levels in New York City, as well as in the nearby counties of Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester.
We use five income categories for this analysis—Low-Income, Moderate-Income, Middle-Income, NYC-Middle-Income, and High-Income. These income bands are based on percentages of Area Median Family Income (AMFI) for the New York City metropolitan statistical area established by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) and are based on data from the 2006-2010 American Community Survey. This report includes an additional middle-income band (NYC-Middle-Income), given that affordable housing programs in New York City serve households up to 165 percent of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) area median income (AMI). (3)
You’re all wondering, of course, what NYC-Middle Income is, so the report provides the following explanation of the income categories:
“Low-Income” households have an annual income of $34,000 or less, or 50 percent of AMFI;
“Moderate-Income” households have an annual income between $34,001-$55,000, or 50 percent to less than 80 percent of AMFI;
“Middle-Income” households have an annual income of $55,001-$83,000, or 80 percent to less than 120 percent of AMFI;
“NYC-Middle-Income” households have an annual income of $83,001-$114,000, or 120 percent to less than 165 of AMFI; and
“High-Income” households have an annual income above $114,001, or 165 percent of AMFI or greater. (3, emphasis added)
The report finds that
the purchasing power of most New York City households is limited, largely due to growing housing prices and stagnating incomes since 1990. In addition, while New York City had a relatively low share of homeowners compared to the U.S. in 2014, it was disproportionately low for Low-Income and Moderate-Income households relative to their U.S. counterparts.
The vast majority of home sales in New York City in 2014 were at prices unaffordable to Low-Income and Moderate-Income households, which comprised 51 percent of New York City households. Of the nine percent of sales in the city affordable to these households, three percent were affordable to Low-Income households and an additional six percent were affordable to Moderate-Income households. Home sales with prices that were affordable to Low-Income and Moderate-Income households in 2014 were, for the most part, concentrated outside of Manhattan.
Prospects for homeownership were not much better for Middle-Income households. In 2014, Middle-Income households, which comprise 15 percent of New York City households, could afford an additional 13 percent of sales (based on a total purchase price of up to $364,000), leaving 78 percent of sales out of reach for households with incomes of less than $83,000 annually. Less than half of sales in 2014 (42%) were affordable to 77 percent of New York households, including those characterized as NYC-Middle-Income.
Moving outside of New York City does not necessarily improve a New York City household’s potential to buy a home. In Westchester County, only two percent of sales were affordable to New York City Low-Income and Moderate-Income homebuyers combined in 2014. In Nassau County, only 24 percent of sales were affordable to New York City Low-Income, Moderate-Income, and Middle-Income homebuyers in 2014. In Suffolk County, 42 percent of sales were affordable to New York City Low-Income, Moderate-Income, and Middle-Income households. (4)
New Yorkers, and a lot of non-New Yorkers, are going to eat up the graphs in this report (what IS the median sales price in Brooklyn?!?), so it is worth a read for the real estate obsessed (yes, you). But it also has policy implications about the housing stock of the City and the surrounding region. The report itself does not make any policy recommendations, but it offers a stark reminder of how important rental housing policy is to any effort to maintain socio-economic diversity in the City.
- President Obama has signed a housing reform bill that will open the door for welfare recipients to use federal rent vouchers to purchase manufactured homes and become homeowners.
- Mortgage giant Freddie Mac reported net income of $993 million for the second quarter, down sharply from the same period of 2015.
- The increase in borrowing to pay for school combined with slow repayment rates could be widening the gap between the haves and the have-nots, researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York wrote in a blog post on Monday.
August 4, 2016
The Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Division of Housing Mission & Goals has issued its report on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Single-Family Guarantee Fees in 2015. Guarantee fees (also known as g-fees) are another one of those incredibly technical subjects that actually have a major impact on the housing market. The g-fee is baked into the cost of the mortgage, so the higher the g-fee, the higher the mortgage’s Annual Percentage Rate. Consumer groups and housing trade associations have called upon the FHFA to lower the g-fee to make mortgage credit even cheaper that it is now. This report gives reason to think that the FHFA won’t do that.
The report provides some background on guarantee fees, for the uninitiated:
Guarantee fees are intended to cover the credit risk and other costs that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac incur when they acquire single-family loans from lenders. Loans are acquired through two methods. A lender may exchange a group of loans for a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac guaranteed mortgage-backed security (MBS), which may then be sold by the lender into the secondary market to recoup funds to make more loans to borrowers. Alternatively, a lender may deliver loans to an Enterprise in return for a cash payment. Larger lenders tend to exchange loans for MBS, while smaller lenders tend to sell loans for cash and these loans are later bundled by the Enterprises into MBS.
While the private holders of MBS assume market risk (the risk that the price of the security may fall due to changes in interest rates), the Enterprises assume the credit risk on the loans. The Enterprises charge a guarantee fee in exchange for providing this guarantee, which covers administrative costs, projected credit losses from borrower defaults over the life of the loans, and the cost of holding capital to protect against projected credit losses that could occur during stressful macroeconomic conditions. Investors are willing to pay a higher price for Enterprise MBS due to their guarantee of principal and interest. The higher value of the MBS leads to lower interest rates for borrowers.
There are two types of guarantee fees: ongoing and upfront. Ongoing fees are collected each month over the life of a loan. Upfront fees are one-time payments made by lenders upon loan delivery to an Enterprise. Fannie Mae refers to upfront fees as “loan level pricing adjustments,” while Freddie Mac refers to them as “delivery fees.” Both ongoing and upfront fees compensate the Enterprises for the costs of providing the guarantee. Ongoing fees are based primarily on the product type, such as a 30-year fixed rate or a 15-year fixed rate loan. Upfront fees are used to price for specific risk attributes such as the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and credit score.
Ongoing fees are set by the Enterprises with lenders that exchange loans for MBS, while those fees are embedded in the price offered to lenders that sell loans for cash. In contrast to ongoing fees, the upfront fees are publicly posted on each Enterprise’s website. Upfront fees are paid by the lender at the time of loan delivery to an Enterprise, and those charges are typically rolled into a borrower’s interest rate in the same manner as ongoing fees.
Under the existing protocols of the Enterprises’ conservatorships, FHFA requires that each Enterprise seek FHFA approval for any proposed change in upfront fees. The upfront fees assessed by the two Enterprises generally are in alignment. (2-3)
The report finds that “The average single-family guarantee fee increased by two basis points in 2015 to 59 basis points. This stability is consistent with FHFA’s April 2015 determination that the fees adequately reflected the credit risk of new acquisitions after years of sharp fee increases. During the five year period from 2011 to 2015, fees had more than doubled from 26 basis points to 59 basis points.” (1)
At bottom, your position on the right g-fee level reflects your views about the appropriate role of the government in the housing finance market. If you favor lowering the g-fee, you want to further subsidize homeownership through cheaper mortgage credit, but you risk a taxpayer bailout.
If you favor raising it, you want to to reduce the government’s footprint in the housing finance market, but you risk rationing credit to those who could use it responsibly.
From this report, it looks like today’s FHFA thinks that it has the balance between those two views in some kind of equilibrium.