Solving Complexity in Consumer Credit

Kathleen Engel posted Can Consumer Law Solve the Problem of Complexity in U.S. Consumer Credit Products? to SSRN. The abstract reads,

People like to know and understand the total cost of credit products they are considering. They also like to know and understand products’ terms and features. Given these preferences, issuers of credit should market products with transparent features and simple pricing. That is not the case. In fact, over the last few decades we have seen a plethora of complex terms in products such as mortgage loans, credit cards, and prepaid debit cards.

As credit products have become ever more complex, consumers have more choices and can select products that satisfy their particular needs and preferences. No longer are borrowers limited to a 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage. If they know they will be moving in a few years, a 3-year fixed-rate mortgage with a low interest rate that converts to a 27-year adjustable rate mortgage based on the LIBOR might be the right product for them. However, for borrowers who do not understand the complexities of a 3-27 mortgage loan, the low, initial interest rate could be a costly lure. Confusion is commonplace. In one study giving consumers a choice between two credit cards that varied only in terms of the annual fee and the interest rate, forty percent of the participants chose the more expensive card.

One would expect that consumers, who cannot decipher terms and calculate the cost of complex products, would turn to those with easy-to-understand terms. There are some simple products on the market. Instead, consumers often misperceive that the more complex products are less expensive than the simple ones. They, thus, shun the products that would be in their best interest.

In this paper, I explain why borrowers make sub-optimal choices when selecting credit products. I then analyze whether extant laws could be used to address obfuscating complexity. I ultimately conclude that policy-makers should look to extra-legal remedies to protect consumers against exploitative complexity.

I find those “extra-legal remedies” to be the most interesting part of this paper. Engel writes,

The approach I find most appealing is to use digital technology to help consumers make decisions. A software program would act like an agent, helping consumers determine what they could afford, what product would best meet their needs, and, lastly, would generate bids from providers of the product. Several goals motivate this idea: (1) the approach is preventative; (2) it does not require the courts to interpret vague standards; (3) it is less costly than litigation; (4) it protects unsophisticated consumers without requiring them to become sophisticated; and (5) it permits consumers to “pull” the information they need to select a product, rather than having issuers “push” hundreds of pages of information to them on multiple products. (24-25)

The paper does not explore how consumers would access this “choice agent,” but it is certainly an idea worth exploring. As some of my recent posts suggest, it is hard to rationally regulate for the entire population of consumers as they are a heterogeneous bunch. But it is important that we keep trying. Engel’s paper has some interesting ideas that are worth pursuing further.

Regulating Rationally for Consumers

Alan Schwartz has posted Regulating for Rationality to SSRN. The abstract reads,

Traditional consumer protection law responds with various forms of disclosure to market imperfections that are the consequence of consumers being imperfectly informed or unsophisticated. This regulation assumes that consumers can rationally act on the information that it is disclosure’s goal to produce. Experimental results in psychology and behavorial economics question this rationality premise. The numerous reasoning defects consumers exhibit in the experiments would vitiate disclosure solutions if those defects also presented in markets. To assume that consumers behave as badly in markets as they do in the lab implies new regulatory responses. This Essay sets out the novel and difficult challenges that such “regulating for rationality” — intervening to cure or to overcome cognitive error — poses for regulators. Much of the novelty exists because the contracting choices of rational and irrational consumers often are observationally equivalent: both consumer types prefer the same contracts. Hence, the regulator seldom can infer from contract terms themselves that reasoning errors produced those terms. Rather, the regulator needs a theory of cognitive function that would permit him to predict when actual consumers would make the mistakes that laboratory subjects make: that is, to know which fraction of observed contracts are the product of bias rather than rational choice.

The difficulties exist because the psychologists lack such a theory. Hence, cognitive based regulatory interventions often are poorly grounded. A particular concern is that consumers suffer from numerous biases, and not every consumer suffers from the same ones. Current theory cannot tell how these biases interact within the person and how markets aggregate differing biased consumer preferences. The Essay then makes three further claims. First, regulating for rationality should be more evidence based than regulating for traditional market imperfections: in the absence of a theory the regulator needs to see what actual people do. Second, when the facts are unobtainable or ambiguous regulators should assume that bias did not affect the consumer’s contracting choice because the assumption is autonomy preserving, administerable and coherent. Third, disclosure regulation can ameliorate some reasoning errors. Hence, abandoning disclosure strategies in favor of substantive regulation sometimes would be premature.

This essay adds to a growing literature that challenges the ability of regulators to effectively incorporate the lessons of behavioral economics into consumer protection regimes. I take no position at this time on the particular claims of this essay, but I certainly think that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should grapple with this growing body of literature. The only thing worse than no consumer protection regime at all, would be one that was designed all wrong.

Tall Mortgage Tales

Todd Zywicki has posted The Behavioral Law and Economics of Fixed-Rate Mortgages (and Other Just-So Stories) to SSRN. The article contains

SPOILER ALERT!

a spoof, in order to make a larger point.

The abstract reads,

A major cause of the recent financial crisis was the traditional American mortgage, which is distinctive for the following features: it is a thirty-year, self-amortizing loan with an unlimited right to prepay. The United States is unique in the world for standardizing on a mortgage product with these features. Yet not only have a majority of the foreclosures that occurred during the financial crisis been fixed-rate mortgages, the fixed-interest-rate characteristics have undermined efforts by the Federal Reserve and government to assist recovery of the housing market. Moreover, the long fixed-rate term and ability to refinance are highly expensive and suboptimal features for many consumers. Nevertheless, many consumers persist in purchasing this mortgage. Drawing on the methodology of behavioral law and economics, this article provides rationalizations for how behavioral law and economics can explain the persistence of a product that is so harmful to many consumers and to the economy at large. The article then draws conclusions about what this analysis means for the behavioral law and economics research program generally and for the use of behavioral law and economics in government policymaking.

 I have a lot to say about this article but I don’t want to ruin it for you!  Suffice it to say, the article is a provocative critique of behavioral law and economics. Those of us who hope to see a healthy mortgage market develop would do well to take this critique seriously — even if you end up rejecting its broader implications.

Paternalism or Consumer Protection?

Adam Smith (not that one) and Todd Zywicki have posted Behavior, Paternalism, and Policy: Evaluating Consumer Financial Protection to SSRN. It opens,

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is one of the most powerful and least accountable regulatory agencies in American history. Immune from budgetary oversight by Congress and headed by a single director whom the president cannot remove except under special circumstances, the agency wields unconstrained, vaguely defined powers to regulate virtually every consumer and small business credit product in America In part, the CFPB has justified its ongoing intervention into financial credit markets based on a prior belief in the inability of consumers to competently weigh their decisions. This belief is founded on research conducted in the area of behavioral economics, which shows that people are prone to a variety of errors in their decision-making.

Beginning with the seminal work of Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman and his coauthor Amos Tversky, behavioral economics has identified numerous purported behavioral “anomalies” through extensive laboratory investigation. Anomalies (or behavioral biases) are defined as observed behavioral deviations from the predictions of neoclassical economic theory, where it is assumed that people rationally optimize according to a given set of information and constraints. Behavioral economists have sought to explain the sources of such anomalous choices by identifying and cataloging a variety of cognitive limitations and psychological biases.

Building on these findings, behavioral theorists have exported their research into the policy realm. This program, led by such luminaries as Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein—and known as behavioral law and economics (BLE)—applies the insights gleaned from studies of human behavior to improve existing institutions by designing rules to compensate for (or take advantage of) behavioral biases. Starting from the premise that observed choices are inconsistent with neoclassical theory, behavioral economists argue that intervention is necessary to generate desirable outcomes for consumers who would otherwise make poor choices. (3-4, citation omitted)

As regular readers of this blog know, I am generally a fan of the CFPB. I recommend this paper to those who want the CFPB to be an effective tool of government. The paper critiques the CFPB in a variety of ways. I find a number of them convincing and one key one to be incredibly wrongheaded.

Convincing

  • The CFPB must avoid “confirmation bias” in its decision-making and its evidence-based analyses. (7)
  • The CFPB’s behavioral law and economics approach needs “a complementary behavioral political economy framework” to apply to the CFPB itself as a political actor. (39)
  • The CFPB should account for the ways that its actions might drive consumers to worse choices than they would face in the absence of heavy regulation of the credit markets. The paper gives illegal loan sharking as an example of a possible worse choice.
  • The CFPB would benefit from “‘adversarial review’ by a body of experts housed elsewhere in the Federal Reserve.” (40) This seems like a reasonable way to ensure that the CFPB both maintains its independence and avoids the echo chamber effect that an agency with one director (as opposed to an agency led by a bipartisan commission) might suffer from.

Wrongheaded

It amazes me that in 2014, commentators could say — “autonomous consumer choice should receive greater priority. Regulatory bodies inevitably will have an effect on the services firms choose to offer” — without addressing the negative impact of the unfettered consumer choices of the Subprime Boom that were a factor in the Subprime Bust. (39) We have not even finished with the foreclosure crisis that was the inevitable result of that boom and bust cycle. Yet law and economics scholars are already bemoaning the reduction of consumer choice caused by the regulatorily-favored Qualified Mortgage without also considering the Wild West atmosphere that characterized the mortgage market in the early 2000s. The regulatory state may not be able to craft a perfect credit market but the unfettered market failed to do so as well.

This paper does not take the full range of possible market structures (from heavy regulation to no regulation) seriously and so it is seriously flawed. It also cherry picks its facts and scholarly support at points. That being said, it does offer some trenchant comments and criticisms about the CFPB as currently structured and is therefore worth a read.

Should CFPB Be a Nudge?

Cass Sunstein, until recently the Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, has posted an early draft of  Nudges.gov:  Behavioral Economics and Regulation.  While it touches on real estate finance only indirectly, it provides a nice follow up to yesterday’s post on financial education.  Sunstein writes that it “It is clear that behavioral findings are having a large impact on regulation, law, and public policy all over the world . . ..” (2)  For the purposes of residential mortgage regulation it is worth restating some of the central findings of behavioral research:

  • Default rules often have a large effect on social outcomes. (3)
  • Procrastination can have significant adverse effects. (3)
  • When people are informed of the benefits or risks of engaging in certain actions, they are far more likely to act in accordance  with that information if they are simultaneously provided with clear, explicit information about how to do so. (4)
  • People are influenced by how information is presented or “framed.” (4)
  • Information that is vivid and salient usually has a larger impact on behavior than information that is statistical and abstract. (4)
  • People display loss aversion; they may well dislike losses more than they like corresponding gains. (5)
  • In multiple domains, individual behavior is greatly influenced by the perceived behavior of other people. (5)
  • In many domains, people show unrealistic optimism. (6)
  • People often use heuristics, or mental shortcuts, when assessing risks. (7)
  • People sometimes do not make judgments on the basis of expected value, and they may neglect or disregard the issue of  probability, especially when strong emotions are triggered. (7)

Sunstein tentatively concludes — although I would certainly state it more strongly — “it would be possible to think that at least some behavioral market failures justify more coercive forms of paternalism.” (10)