Temporary Interest Rate Buydowns

photo by Tobias Baur

I was quoted in This Strategy to Cut Mortgage Rates is Becoming Popular in Bay Area — but There are Pitfalls in the San Francisco Chronicle (paywall). It opens,

When first-time buyers Rachel Shatto and Randy Nelson purchased a home in Oakland in May, they negotiated an interest rate buydown that effectively lowered their mortgage rate, and thus their monthly payment, for the first two years.

Although the seller made a lump-sum payment for the short-term rate decrease at closing, they increased their purchase price to compensate for it. This temporary rate buydown left them with more cash to pay for repairs and improvements the first couple of years, Shatto said.

Both temporary buydowns, which effectively lower the rate for one to three years, and permanent ones, which reduce it for the life of the loan, have become more popular since interest rates started soaring last year.

In June, 2.8% of 30-year fixed-rate loans funded by Freddie Mac had temporary buydowns, up from near zero a year ago but down from a peak of 7.6% in December 2022, shortly after rates spiked above 7% for the first time in more than two decades. After dipping as low as 6.14% in February, they surged above 7% again in August and now stand at 7.18%.

Buydowns are most common on new homes. When rates rise, builders frequently offer temporary or permanent buydowns as one of several incentives buyers can choose from.

A survey of builders in August asked what has been the most effective way to get buyers off the sidelines. The No. 1 answer, cited by 69% of respondents, was mortgage-rate buydowns, said Ali Wolf, chief economist with Zonda, a new-home data and consulting firm that did the survey. Only 22% said price cuts.

“When they lower prices, buyers already under contract at a higher price tend to cancel their contracts and it becomes a vicious cycle,” Wolf said.

Landsea Homes is offering buydowns on select homes in select communities including the newly opened Alameda Marina. “We are only able to offer them on homes that we can deliver within 30 to 60 days,” said Josh Santos, Landsea’s Northern California division president. “I’d say 75% of our buyers in the last 60 days” chose buydowns in lieu of other incentives such as options, upgrades or homeowners association dues.

Some sellers are also offering them on existing homes that have been sitting for a while.

Whether they make sense for buyers depends on myriad factors including their overall finances, the cost versus savings, how long they plan to stay in the home, whether they spend or invest their monthly savings, who’s actually paying for them, and future interest rates, the last of which is unknowable.

Borrowers should make sure they understand how buydowns work, the potential pitfalls and other ways to save money on a mortgage.

How permanent buydowns work

A permanent rate buydown is fairly straightforward. The buyer pays fees, called discount points, to reduce the interest rate — and therefore the monthly payment — forever.

One discount point equals 1% of the loan amount. To lower the note rate by 1 percentage point, a buyer today might pay around three points to four points. This cost can vary widely depending on the day, the lender and other factors, said Westin Miller, branch manager with Pinnacle Home Loans in Santa Rosa.

To figure out how long it would take for your monthly savings to equal the points paid, divide the total upfront fee by your monthly mortgage payment (or plug the numbers into an online mortgage discount points calculator).

Suppose a buyer can permanently lower the rate on a $700,000 mortgage to 6.5% from 7.5% by paying three points, or $21,000. That would lower the monthly payment by about $470 a month.

Divide $21,000 by $470 you get 36 months, which is the breakeven point. A borrower who kept the loan for more than three years would come out ahead. The longer it was kept, the bigger the benefit.

If a buyer knew for sure that rates were coming down soon, it might be better to take the higher rate with no points and refinance when rates drop, although refinancers will generally have to pay some closing costs again.

“If you are going to sell or refinance in a few years, paying points doesn’t make sense,” said Jeff Ostrowski, a Bankrate analyst.

Some buyers get permanent buydowns because they need a lower rate to qualify for a loan, said Jason Barnes, mortgage sales supervisor with U.S. Bank in Campbell.

Buyers pay for permanent buydowns, but in a slow market they might be able to negotiate a credit from the seller at closing to help pay for it.

How temporary buydowns work

With a temporary buydown, the borrower typically takes out a 30-year fixed-rate loan but makes payments based on a lower interest rate during the first one, two or three years in exchange for a one-time payment that is deposited into an escrow account at closing.

The upfront payment is about equal to the interest savings during the discount period.

During this period, the borrower makes payments at the lower rate and the mortgage servicer draws from the account to make up the difference. At the end of the discount period, the borrower makes the full payment.

Suppose the note rate is 7.5%. With a 1/0 buydown, the buyer makes payments based on a 6.5% rate the first year and 7.5% in years two through 30.

With a 2/1 buydown the borrower pays at 5.5% the first year, 6.5% the second year and 7.5% in all remaining years.

Three-year buydowns are available but not too popular because of the steep price.

The borrower generally must qualify for the loan based on the note rate stated in the loan agreement, in this case 7.5%.

Most lenders require sellers to pay for temporary buydowns, meaning the cost comes out of their proceeds at closing. If the buyer has no choice between a true seller-paid buydown and a lower price, there’s little reason not to take the buydown.

In competitive situations, buyers might need to increase their purchase price to cover some or all of the buydown payment, in which case they’re paying for it indirectly. Here the cost/benefit analysis gets more complicated.

A real-life example

When Shatto and Nelson bought their “cute little 1927 Tudor revival” in Oakland, they took out a 30-year loan with a 2/1 buydown from LaSalle Mortgage, Shatto said. They’re paying based on a rate of 4.125% for the first year, 5.125% the second and 6.125% thereafter.

Over the first two years, the buydown will save them $15,470 in interest, which was the cost of the buydown.

Although the seller paid for the buydown, the buyers paid a higher price to compensate, said their agent Lindsay Ferlin of Red Oak Realty.

Did they make a good deal? Here’s one way to look at it.

They paid $866,000 and, with a 20% down payment, and borrowed $692,800. Had they not used a buydown and paid $15,470 less, they would have borrowed $680,424 with 20% down.

With the higher loan amount, they’d repay an extra $27,071 over 30 years — consisting of $14,695 in interest and $12,376 in principal. But during the first two years, they’d save a total of $15,470, and most people don’t keep a mortgage for 30 years.

“Outside of a few cases, this does not have a significant economic benefit for borrowers,” said David Reiss, a professor of real estate law at Brooklyn Law School. “It’s a little bit of smoke and mirrors. I don’t think it improves their financial condition other than in a few cases where you have a low income in the present and expect it to grow significantly after a couple of years.”

The Economics of Housing Supply


chart by Smallman12q

Housing economists Edward L. Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko have posted The Economic Implications of Housing Supply to SSRN (behind a paywall but you can find a slightly older version of the paper here). The abstract reads,

In this essay, we review the basic economics of housing supply and the functioning of US housing markets to better understand the distribution of home prices, household wealth and the spatial distribution of people across markets. We employ a cost-based approach to gauge whether a housing market is delivering appropriately priced units. Specifically, we investigate whether market prices (roughly) equal the costs of producing the housing unit. If so, the market is well-functioning in the sense that it efficiently delivers housing units at their production cost. Of course, poorer households still may have very high housing cost burdens that society may wish to address via transfers. But if housing prices are above this cost in a given area, then the housing market is not functioning well – and housing is too expensive for all households in the market, not just for poorer ones. The gap between price and production cost can be understood as a regulatory tax, which might be efficiently incorporating the negative externalities of new production, but typical estimates find that the implicit tax is far higher than most reasonable estimates of those externalities.

The paper’s conclusions, while a bit technical for a lay audience, are worth highlighting:

When housing supply is highly regulated in a certain area, housing prices are higher and population growth is smaller relative to the level of demand. While most of America has experienced little growth in housing wealth over the past 30 years, the older, richer buyers in America’s most regulated areas have experienced significant increases in housing equity. The regulation of America’s most productive places seems to have led labor to locate in places where wages and prices are lower, reducing America’s overall economic output in the process.

Advocates of land use restrictions emphasize the negative externalities of building. Certainly, new construction can lead to more crowded schools and roads, and it is costly to create new infrastructure to lower congestion. Hence, the optimal tax on new building is positive, not zero. However, there is as yet no consensus about the overall welfare implications of heightened land use controls. Any model-based assessment inevitably relies on various assumptions about the different aspects of regulation and how they are valued in agents’ utility functions.

Empirical investigations of the local costs and benefits of restricting building generally conclude that the negative externalities are not nearly large enough to justify the costs of regulation. Adding the costs from substitute building in other markets generally strengthens this conclusion, as Glaeser and Kahn (2010) show that America restricts building more in places that have lower carbon emissions per household. If California’s restrictions induce more building in Texas and Arizona, then their net environmental could be negative in aggregate. If restrictions on building limit an efficient geographical reallocation of labor, then estimates based on local externalities would miss this effect, too.

If the welfare and output gains from reducing regulation of housing construction are large, then why don’t we see more policy interventions to permit more building in markets such as San Francisco? The great challenge facing attempts to loosen local housing restrictions is that existing homeowners do not want more affordable homes: they want the value of their asset to cost more, not less. They also may not like the idea that new housing will bring in more people, including those from different socio-economic groups.

There have been some attempts at the state level to soften severe local land use restrictions, but they have not been successful. Massachusetts is particularly instructive because it has used both top-down regulatory reform and incentives to encourage local building. Massachusetts Chapter 40B provides builders with a tool to bypass local rules. If developers are building enough formally-defined affordable units in unaffordable areas, they can bypass local zoning rules. Yet localities still are able to find tools to limit local construction, and the cost of providing price-controlled affordable units lowers the incentive for developers to build. It is difficult to assess the overall impact of 40B, especially since both builder and community often face incentives to avoid building “affordable” units. Standard game theoretic arguments suggest that 40B should never itself be used, but rather work primarily by changing the fallback option of the developer. Massachusetts has also tried to create stronger incentives for local building with Chapters 40R and 40S. These parts of their law allow for transfers to the localities themselves, so builders are not capturing all the benefits. Even so, the Boston market and other high cost areas in the state have not seen meaningful surges in new housing development.

This suggests that more fiscal resources will be needed to convince local residents to bear the costs arising from new development. On purely efficiency grounds, one could argue that the federal government provide sufficient resources, but the political economy of the median taxpayer in the nation effectively transferring resources to much wealthier residents of metropolitan areas like San Francisco seems challenging to say the least. However daunting the task, the potential benefits look to be large enough that economists and policymakers should keep trying to devise a workable policy intervention. (19-20)