Mortgages from the Shadows

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Realtor.com quoted me in ‘Shadow Banks’ Are on the Rise for Home Loans: Should We Be Afraid? It opens,

Where do home buyers go for a mortgage? To a bank, of course—or at least that’s what many might think. Yet a new force has taken over home financing, called “shadow banks.” So what are these non-banks exactly, and should we run for the hills?

In a nutshell, these are the less conventional places that don’t provide savings accounts, only loans to buy homes. They include companies like Quicken Loans, which is one of the nation’s largest mortgage providers, Caliber, and loanDepot.com.

But they can also be companies run by wealthy individuals using their personal fortunes to finance loans and then pocketing monthly interest payments, according to the Wall Street Journal. Or they could be funded by private equity, which is financed by pooled investor cash.

And, as a group, they’re no longer operating on the fringes of the housing industry. Instead, shadow banks “have overtaken U.S. commercial banks, to grab a record slice” of the market,” according to a recent housing report by ATTOM Data Solutions.

This group of nontraditional lenders now accounts for 48.3% of mortgages in 2016—compared to just 23.4% in 2008, according to the ATTOM report.

“The big banks got burned by the financial crisis, so they’ve become much more hesitant to make loans that are even close to being risky,” says Daren Blomquist, senior vice president at ATTOM.

These mortgage makers are very appealing to buyers without a 20%—or even 10%—down payment and therefore have trouble getting a loan from a regular old bank, says Blomquist. This might make sense for first-time buyers, or folks who have gone through a foreclosure.

But are they right for everyone? And, more to the point: Are they harbingers of the risky loaning behavior that help bring on the U.S. housing collapse?

Could shadow banks lead to another housing crisis?

As a group, these lenders are not subject to the same level of governmental scrutiny, regulations, and fees that drove many traditional financial institutions, like banks, out of the space after the housing bust. But they still come under a significant amount of federal oversight.

In short, regular banks retreated, so shadow banks moved in. What’s wrong with that?

As market media site Seeking Alpha has pointed out, shadow banks are “some of the same characters that played leading roles [in the last housing crisis].”

Not all experts believe we should be overly worried.

“While it’s true that so-called shadow banks played roles in the last housing crisis … the market itself is very different,” says David Reiss, a professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School and editor of REFinBlog.com.

For one, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, passed in 2010 in response to the housing meltdown of 2008, changed how all lenders—banks, shadow banks, and otherwise—make loans, to better ensure there isn’t another housing bust.

Another big difference: Lenders are now documenting the income of borrowers to make sure these new homeowners can afford to make their monthly payments.

“There’s no evidence out there that non-banks are lending in any sort of imprudent way and/or hurting consumers,” Guy Cecala, publisher and CEO of Inside Mortgage Finance, tells realtor.com®. “In fact, most non-banks are more competitive than banks when it comes to mortgage interest rates and fees.”

“But they don’t have the same level of capital [such as cash], assets, or liquidity as banks do,” he says.

What to consider before getting a shadow bank loan

Borrowers should just take care to tread carefully and examine the terms and conditions of the financing before signing on the dotted line, says Mark Greene, a longtime mortgage lender based in Hackensack, NJ.

He recommends looking for red flags like adjustable rate change terms, prepayment penalties, and other hidden fees.

Good ol’ common sense will come in handy too.

“If your loan is coming from a fishy-sounding company like Two Brothers Fly-by-Night Hard Money-Lenders, Inc., you may want to dig a bit deeper, to figure out what kind of lender it really is,” says law professor Reiss.

REFinBlog has been nominated for the second year in a row for The Expert Institute’s Best Legal Blog Competition in the Education Category. Please vote here if you like what you read.

Jumbo Mortgage Deals Ahead

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The Wall Street Journal quoted me in Attention, Jumbo-Mortgage Shoppers: Deals Ahead (behind paywall). It opens,

With more lenders offering jumbo loans, borrowers have more bargaining power to negotiate the best terms.

During the first quarter of this year, 20.3% of all first mortgages originated were jumbo loans, according to Guy Cecala, CEO and publisher of trade publication Inside Mortgage Finance. That’s up from 18.9% last year and 5.5% in 2009, just after the financial crisis.

“At the end of the day, it’s all just supply and demand for capital,” says Doug Lebda, founder and CEO of LendingTree, an online financing marketplace. “Over 60% of people still don’t think they can shop for loans—even rich people. But everything is negotiable.”

Since only a small percentage of jumbo loans are sold to investors, the “vast majority are winding up on bank balance sheets,” according to Michael Fratantoni, chief economist of the Mortgage Bankers Association. But because these loans are held in a lender’s portfolio and aren’t subject to the guidelines of investors purchasing them—as opposed to conforming loans, which must comply with hard-and-fast parameters established by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—terms and underwriting standards vary widely.

“Borrowers may find more flexibility with lenders that keep mortgages on their own books,” says David Reiss, a Brooklyn Law School professor who specializes in real estate. “These lenders can usually take a more individualized approach to underwriting than a lender that sells its mortgages off to be securitized with a whole bunch of other mortgages.”

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Here are a few things to consider when negotiating a jumbo loan:

Prepare before applying. “Jumbo lenders are focusing on borrowers with good credit and resources,” said Brooklyn Law School’s Mr. Reiss. Before applying, borrowers should clean up their credit report and keep debt in check. Lenders look at total debt-to-income ratio and overall credit to determine how strong a buyer is; the stronger the buyer, the more the negotiating power.

Create a relationship. “If you’re a substantial borrower with a substantial relationship with a bank—one of our wealth clients—the guidelines might get a bit more flexible,” saysPeter Boomer, executive vice president of PNC Mortgage, a division of PNC Bank NA.

Don’t hesitate to negotiate. “They are the customer, and the lender is not doing them a favor,” says Mr. Lebda, of LendingTree. “People are ecstatic when they get approved for a mortgage, but they actually need to think about it the other way—that the lender should be ecstatic for giving them a loan.”

The Road to Securitization

Miguel Segoviano et al. of the IMF released a helpful Working Paper, Securitization:  Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead (also on SSRN). It opens,

Like most forms of financial innovation, there are cost and benefits associated with the securitization of cash flows. From a conceptual perspective, a sound and efficient market for securitization can be supportive of the financial system and broader economy in various ways such as lowering funding costs and improving the capital utilization of financial institutions—benefits which may be passed onto borrowers; helping issuers and investors diversify risk; and transforming pools of illiquid assets into tradable securities, thus stimulating the flow of credit—an issue of particular relevance for some European countries. However, these features need to be weighed against the potential costs, including the risk that securitization contributes to excessive credit growth in and outside of the formal banking system; principal-agent problems that amplify perverse incentives; the complexity and opaqueness of certain products which make efficient pricing problematic; and the heavy reliance of the industry on credit ratings. (3)

The authors identify lessons learned from the financial crisis as well as impediments to a renewed securitization market. They conclude with a set of policy recommendations.

I recommend this paper as a good overview. I particularly like that it looks beyond the United States market, although it does spend plenty of time looking at the history and structure of the U.S. market. The recommendations tend to be pretty reasonable, but not particularly innovative — implement Dodd-Frank-like requirements in non-U.S. jurisdictions; de-emphasize the role of NRSRO credit ratings; increase transparency and decrease needless complexity throughout the industry; modernize land record regimes, etc.

It is surely hard to get your hands around the global securitization industry, but it is important that we try to. Securitization is here to stay. We should manage its risks the best that we can.