Gorsuch and the CFPB

photo provided byUnited States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Judge Gorsuch

Bankrate.com quoted me in Supreme Court Pick Could Spell Trouble for the CFPB. It opens,

President Donald Trump’s first Supreme Court pick has been identified as the “most natural successor” to the late Justice Antonin Scalia, whom he would replace.

Neil Gorsuch, 49, a judge on the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver, is said to share many of Scalia’s beliefs and his judicial philosophy. That could tip the high court back toward the 5-4 conservative split it held during controversial cases prior to Scalia’s death, although Justice Anthony Kennedy will remain a liberal swing vote on certain social issues before the court.

Gorsuch’s big judicial decisions have favored religious freedom over government regulation and state’s rights over the power of the federal government.

But how might that impact consumers or their wallets directly?

“I think with a judge like Gorsuch, you can see there probably will be a tendency in that direction to dissuade innovation,” says David Reiss, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School and the academic program director for the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship.

That could mean the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, whose unique management structure a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit last fall called unconstitutional, could face an obstacle on the bench should the legal fight over its construction ever reach the Supreme Court.

Judge Brett Kavanaugh, who wrote the majority opinion for the D.C. circuit panel, said because this independent agency is headed by a director whom the president cannot fire at will – and not, say, a set of commissioners like other agencies within the government – it is a threat to individual liberty.

“In short, when measured in terms of unilateral power, the director of the CFPB is the single most powerful official in the entire U.S. government, other than the president,” Kavanaugh wrote. “In essence, the director is the president of consumer finance.”

How Gorsuch May Rule

Supporters of the bureau are trying to get a hearing before the full U.S. Court of Appeals, but the issue could well wind up in front of the U.S. Supreme Court – that is if Congress doesn’t take action first.

Legal scholars say should Gorsuch win Senate confirmation he is unlikely to look favorably on the bureau’s structure.

Indeed, Gorsuch is likely to “echo the views of Judge Kavanaugh,” Melissa Malpass, senior legal editor for consumer regulatory finance at Thompson Reuters Practical Law, said in an email.

“Judge Gorsuch, through recent decisions, has expressed his disfavor with permitting government agencies to not only determine what the law is, but also to interpret and re-interpret the law as they see fit, often based on the political climate,” Malpass says.

If the Supreme Court were to uphold the Kavanaugh ruling, it “may, in effect, destroy the CFPB as we know it, and that will have an effect on consumers,” Reiss says.

Not everyone, though, thinks restructuring the CFPB as a commission-led agency like the Federal Communications Commission, for example, would be bad for consumers.

Gorsuch’s Path to the High Court

Democrats, still stung over the Senate’s refusal to consider Merrick Garland, then-President Barack Obama’s pick to succeed Scalia, could try to block Gorsuch’s nomination. Under current Senate rules, at least eight Democrats will need to cross the aisle to prevent a filibuster of the appointment.

Gorsuch, who was confirmed for his current post in 2006 by Senate voice vote, has won widespread acclaim in Republican circles. He also received a vote of confidence from a former Obama administration official.

“I think the Democrats are going to ask questions to determine if the nominee is outside what they call the political mainstream,” Reiss says. “We know this battle will be a brutal one, almost definitely because of the treatment of Merrick Garland’s nomination under the Obama administration.”

SCOTUS Upholds Disparate Impact

Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs

The United States Supreme Court held today that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs et al. v. The Inclusive Communities Project Inc., (No 13-1371). The conventional wisdom had been that the Court was going to hold that the Fair Housing Act “does not create disparate-impact liability”  (in the words of Justice Alito’s dissent at page 2).

I found it striking the extent to which Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, relied on the history of residential segregation in the United States. For those of us steeped in the history of housing in America, this history is pretty much standard, but it takes on a lot of meaning when it is restated in a Supreme Court opinion. The opinion reads,

De jure residential segregation by race was declared unconstitutional almost a century ago, but its vestiges remain today, intertwined with the country’s economic and social life. Some segregated housing patterns can be traced to conditions that arose in the mid-20th century. Rapid urbanization, concomitant with the rise of suburban developments accessible by car, led many white families to leave the inner cities. This often left minority families concentrated in the center of the Nation’s cities. During this time, various practices were followed, sometimes with governmental support, to encourage and maintain the separation of the races: Racially restrictive covenants prevented the conveyance of property to minorities; steering by real-estate agents led potential buyers to consider homes in racially homogenous areas; and discriminatory lending practices, often referred to as redlining, precluded minority families from purchasing homes in affluent areas. By the 1960’s, these policies, practices, and prejudices had created many predominantly black inner cities surrounded by mostly white suburbs.

The mid-1960’s was a period of considerable social unrest; and, in response, President Lyndon Johnson established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, commonly known as the Kerner Commission. After extensive factfinding the Commission identified residential segregation and unequal housing and economic conditions in the inner cities as significant, underlying causes of the social unrest. The Commission found that “[n]early two-thirds of all nonwhite families living in the central cities today live in neighborhoods marked by substandard housing and general urban blight.” The Commission further found that both open and covert racial discrimination prevented black families from obtaining better housing and moving to integrated communities. The Commission concluded that “[o]ur Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white— separate and unequal.” To reverse “[t]his deepening racial division,” it recommended enactment of “a comprehensive and enforceable open-occupancy law making it an offense to discriminate in the sale or rental of any housing . . . on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin.”

In April 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee, and the Nation faced a new urgency to resolve the social unrest in the inner cities. Congress responded by adopting the Kerner Commission’s recommendation and passing the Fair Housing Act. (5-6, citations omitted)

This straightforward acknowledgment of the history of racial discrimination in America may be the most powerful part of this opinion.

Running CERCLA around FIRREA

Law360 quoted me in High Court Environmental Ruling Could Clear Air For Banks (behind a paywall). The article reads in part,

A recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling that a federal environmental law does not preempt state statutes of repose has inspired banks and other targets of Wall Street enforcers to test the decision’s power to finally fend off lingering financial crisis-era cases on timeliness grounds.

The high court on June 9 found that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act could not extend the 10-year statute of repose in a North Carolina environmental cleanup suit in the in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger case. Although the decision pertained to a case outside of the financial realm, attorneys say it could limit the ability of federal financial regulators to bring claims on behalf of failed financial institutions under two of their favored tools: the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act.

That’s because the defendants in those cases, including banks but others as well, will now be able to argue that regulators like the National Credit Union Administration, the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. missed their chance to bring claims on behalf of institutions in receivership.

Given the Supreme Court’s interpretation, the regulators may be on shaky ground.

“The government is going to have a much more difficult time sustaining the arguments it’s been making after CTS,” said Jeffrey B. Wall, a partner with Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and a former assistant solicitor general.

In its CTS ruling, the Supreme Court found that CERCLA does not preempt state statutes of repose like the one in North Carolina, citing CERCLA’s exclusive use of the phrase “statute of limitations.”

Statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are distinct enough terms in their usage that it’s proper to conclude that Congress didn’t intend to preempt statutes of repose when it crafted CERCLA, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said in the majority opinion. The justice cited a 1982 congressional report on CERCLA that recommended repealing state statutes of limitations and statutes of repose but acknowledged that they were not equivalent.

According to a memo released June 10 by Sullivan & Cromwell, both FIRREA and HERA are susceptible to similar readings by courts.

Both statutes include extenders that allow government agencies suing on behalf of failed financial institutions to move beyond statutes of limitations on state law claims. However, much like CERCLA, both say nothing about extending statutes of repose, the memo said.

And that could make a major difference for a large number of defendants trying to fend off claims from the FDIC, NCUA and FHFA, Wall said.

*    *    *

The CTS ruling is likely to play out in cases brought by financial regulators in smaller cases over losses incurred by failed financial institutions using FIRREA and HERA. But FIRREA has also become a favored tool in the U.S. Department of Justice’s big game hunts against ratings agency Standard & Poor’s and Bank of America.

Because those cases are largely predicated on federal claims, the CTS case is unlikely to be a help for those institutions, according to Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.

“I don’t read it as having an extension on the higher-profile FIRREA cases,” he said.

But even if CTS is limited to state law claims brought by financial regulators, that could have a major impact given the sheer number of cases the FDIC, NCUA and FHFA bring.