Redefault Risk After the Mortgage Crisis

 

A tower filled with shredded U.S. currency in the lobby of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

Paul Calem et al. of the Phillie Fed posted Redefault Risk in the Aftermath of the Mortgage Crisis: Why Did Modifications Improve More Than Self-Cures? The abstract reads,

This paper examines the redefault rate of mortgages that were selected for modification during 2008–2011, compared with that of similarly situated self-cured mortgages during the same period. We find that while the performance of both modified and self-cured loans improved dramatically over this period, the decline in the redefault rate for modified loans was substantially larger, and we attribute this difference to a few key factors. First, the repayment terms provided by modifications became increasingly generous, including the more frequent offering of principal reduction, resulting in greater financial relief to borrowers. Second, the later modifications also benefited from improving economic conditions — modification became more effective as unemployment rates declined and home prices recovered. Third, we find that the difference in redefault rate improvement between modified loans and self-cured loans is not fully explained by observable risk and economic variables. We attribute this residual difference to the servicers’ learning process — so-called learning by doing. Early in the mortgage crisis, many servicers had limited experience selecting the best borrowers for modification. As modification activity increased, lenders became more adept at screening borrowers for modification eligibility and in selecting appropriate modification terms.

The big question, of course, is what does this all tell us about preparing for the next crisis? That crisis, no doubt, won’t be a repeat of the last one. But it will likely rhyme with it enough — falling home prices, increasing defaults — that we can draw some lessons. One is that we did not use principal reductions fast enough to make a big difference in how the crisis played out. There were a lot of reason for this, some legit and some not. But if it is good public policy overall, we should set up mechanisms to deploy principal reduction early in the next crisis so that we do not need to navigate all of the arguments about moral hazard while knee deep in it.

Mortgage Servicing Since The Financial Crisis

photo by Dan Brown

Standard & Poors issued a report, A Decade After The Financial Crisis, What’s The New Normal For Residential Mortgage Servicing? It provides a good overview of how this hidden infrastructure of the mortgage market is functioning after it emerged from the crucible of the subprime and foreclosure crises. It reads, in part,

Ten years after the start of the financial crisis, residential mortgage servicing is finally settling into a new sense of normal. Before the crisis, mortgage servicing was a fairly static business. Traditional prime servicers had low delinquency rates, regulatory requirements rarely changed, and servicing systems were focused on core functions such as payment processing, investor accounting, escrow management, and customer service. Subprime was a specific market with specialty servicers, which used high-touch collection practices rather than the low-touch model prime servicers used. Workout options for delinquent borrowers mainly included repayment plans or extensions. And though servicers completed some modifications, short sales, and deeds in lieu of foreclosure, these were exceptions to the normal course of business.

Today, residential mortgage servicing involves complex regulation, increased mandatory workout options, and multiple layers of internal control functions. Over the past 10 years servicers have had to not only modify their processes, but also hire more employees and enhance their technology infrastructure and internal controls to support those new processes. As a result, servicing mortgage loans has become less profitable, which has caused loan servicers to consolidate and has created a barrier to entry for new servicers. While the industry expects reduced regulatory requirements under the Trump administration and delinquency rates to continue to fall, we do not foresee servicers reverting to pre-crisis operational processes. Instead, we expect states to maintain, and in some cases enhance, their regulatory requirements to fill the gap for any lifted or reduced at the federal level. Additionally, most mortgage loan servicers have already invested in new processes and technology, and despite the cost to support these and adapt to any additional requirements, we do not expect them to strip back the controls that have become their new normal. (2/10, citation omitted)

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As The Economy Improves, Delinquency Rates Have Become More Stable

Total delinquency rates have only just begun returning to around pre-crisis levels as the economy–and borrowers’ abilities to make their mortgage payments–has improved (see charts 1 and 2). Lower delinquency rates can also be attributed to delinquent accounts moving through the default management process, either becoming reperforming loans after modifications or through liquidation. New regulatory requirements have also extended workout timelines for delinquent accounts. In 2010, one year after 90-plus delinquency rates hit a high point, the percentage of prime and subprime loans in foreclosure actually surpassed the percentage that were more than 90 days delinquent–a trend that continued until 2013 for prime loans and 2014 for subprime loans. But since the end of 2014, all delinquency buckets have remained fairly stable, with overall delinquency rates for prime loans down to slightly over 4% for 2016 from a peak of just over 8% in 2009. Overall delinquency rates for subprime loans have fluctuated more since the peak at 29% in 2009. (2/10)

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Modifications Now Make Up About Half Of Loan Workout Strategies

Government agencies and government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) developed new formal modification programs beginning in 2008 to address the rising delinquency and foreclosure rates. The largest of these programs was HAMP, launched in March 2009. While HAMP was required for banks accepting funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), all servicers were allowed to participate. These programs required that servicers exhaust all loss mitigation options before completing foreclosure. This requirement, and the fact that servicers started receiving incentives to complete modifications, spurred the increase in modifications. (4/10)

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Foreclosure Timelines Have Become Longer

As the number of loans in foreclosure rose during the financial crisis, the requirements associated with the foreclosure process grew. As a result, the time it took to complete the foreclosure process increased to almost 475 days in 2016 from more than 160 days in 2007–an increase of almost 200%. While this is not a weighted average and therefore not adjusted for states with smaller or larger foreclosure portfolios, which could skew the average, the data show longer timelines across all states. And even though the percentage of loans in foreclosure has decreased in recent years (to 1% and 9% by the end of 2016 for prime and subprime, respectively, from peaks of 3% in 2010 and 13% in 2011) the time it takes to complete a foreclosure has still not lessened (6/10)

The Future of Mortgage Default

photo by Diane BassfordThe Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has shared its Principles for the Future of Loss Mitigation. It opens,

This document outlines four principles, Accessibility, Affordability, Sustainability, and Transparency, that provide a framework for discussion about the future of loss mitigation as the nation moves beyond the housing and economic crisis that began in 2007. As the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) is phased out, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is considering the lessons learned from HAMP while looking forward to the continuing loss mitigation needs of consumers in a post-HAMP world. These principles build on, but are distinct from, the backdrop of the Bureau’s mortgage servicing rules and its supervisory and enforcement authority. This document does not establish binding legal requirements. These principles are intended to complement ongoing discussions among industry, consumer groups and policymakers on the development of loss mitigation programs that span the full spectrum of both home retention options such as forbearance, repayment plans and modifications, and home disposition options such as short sales and deeds-in-lieu.

The future environment of mortgage default is expected to look very different than it did during the crisis. Underwriting based on the ability to repay rule is already resulting in fewer defaults. Mortgage investors have recognized the value of resolving delinquencies early when defaults do occur. Mortgage servicers have developed systems and processes for working with borrowers in default. The CFPB’s mortgage servicing rules have established clear guardrails for early intervention, dual tracking, and customer communication; however, they do not require loss mitigation options beyond those offered by the investor nor do they define every element of loss mitigation execution.

Yet, even with an improved horizon and regulatory guardrails, there is ample opportunity for consumer harm if loss mitigation programs evolve without incorporating key learnings from the crisis. While there is broad agreement within the industry on the high level principles, determining how they translate into programs is more nuanced. Further development of these principles and their implementation is necessary to prevent less desirable consumer outcomes and to ensure the continuance of appropriate consumer protections.

The CFPB concludes,

The CFPB believes these principles are flexible enough to encompass a range of approaches to loss mitigation, recognizing the legitimate interests of consumers, investors and servicers. One of the lessons of HAMP is that loss mitigation that is good for consumers is usually good for investors, as well. The CFPB therefore seeks to engage all stakeholders in a discussion of the principles for future loss mitigation.

I have no beef with this set of principles as far as it goes, but I am concerned that it does not explicitly include a discussion of the role of state court foreclosures in loss mitigation. As this blog has well documented, homeowners are facing Kafkaesque, outrageous, even hellish, behavior by servicers in state foreclosure actions. Even if the federal government cannot address state law issues directly, these issues should be included as part of the discussion of the problems that homeowners face when their mortgages go into default.

Reiss on Lawsky’s Departure from DFS

Bloomberg interviewed me for Lawsky Leaving After $3 Billion in Fines Makes a Mark. The article reads in part,

When Ocwen Financial Corp. (OCN) shares soared on the news that regulator Benjamin Lawsky, who’s probing the company, will step down, Bill Miller shrugged.

The next head of New York’s Department of Financial Services will probably be as aggressive as Lawsky, continuing the uncertainty for Ocwen, said Miller, who runs the $2.2 billion Legg Mason Opportunity Trust. (LMOPX) Lawsky’s investigations of nonbank mortgage servicers such as Ocwen have caused their shares to plunge.

“Ocwen has been rallying on the view that with him gone that will lift the burden, but I would be surprised if the next person didn’t at least follow through in the way Lawsky was going to,” said Miller, whose fund, which invests in Nationstar Mortgage Holdings Inc., has gained an annual 38 percent since 2011.

In three years as New York’s financial watchdog, Lawsky extracted more than $3 billion in fines from global banks, called for the firing of executives and questioned whether the lightly regulated nonbank servicers are properly handling modifications and defaults. As the department’s first superintendent, Lawsky hired experienced lawyers from the New York Attorney General’s office, creating a strong enforcement culture that will continue after he’s gone, said Kathryn Judge, an associate professor focusing on financial institutions at Columbia University Law School.

“Similar to what we saw Eliot Spitzer doing as attorney general, being in New York allowed Lawsky to step in where federal regulators hadn’t,” Judge said. “By stepping into this role at a formative stage for the regulator, he created a footprint. That legacy will survive.”

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The superintendent’s work has reflected favorably on the governor, said David Reiss, a professor who specializes in real estate and consumer protection at Brooklyn Law School. That will encourage Cuomo to select a successor who’s equally dynamic, Reiss said.

Cuomo will want to build on Lawsky’s record of protecting homeowners from improper foreclosures and holding mortgage servicers accountable, said Reiss.

Chief of staff Anthony Albanese, general counsel Daniel Alter, and capital markets division head Maria Filipakis are among the top people that Lawsky brought to the department. One of them may be in a position to replace him, according to a lawyer who has had extensive dealings with the superintendent. The lawyer asked not to be named because he’s not authorized to speak publicly about the matter.

The successor will have to focus more on regulation and finding answers to the issues the department uncovered with nonbank servicers and insurers, said Eric Dinallo, who served as New York’s superintendent of insurance from 2007 to 2009.

“Each superintendent or commissioner wants to put their unique stamp on the agency,” he said.

Foreclosure Prevention: The Real McCoy

Patricia McCoy has posted Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis (also on SSRN). In the early 2000s, Pat was one of the first legal scholars to identify predatory behaviors in the secondary mortgage market. These behaviors resulted in homeowners being saddled with expensive loans that they had trouble paying off. As many unaffordable mortgages work themselves through the system, Pat has now turned her attention to the other end of the life cycle of many an abusive mortgage — foreclosure.

The article opens,

Since housing prices fell nationwide in 2007, triggering the financial crisis, the U.S. housing market has struggled to dispose of the huge ensuing inventory of foreclosed homes. In January 2013, 1.47 million homes were listed for sale. Another 2.3 million homes that were not yet on the market—the so-called “shadow inventory”—were in foreclosure, held as real estate owned or encumbered by seriously delinquent loans. Discouragingly, the size of the shadow inventory has not changed significantly since January 2009.

Reducing the shadow inventory is key to stabilizing home prices. One way to trim it is to accelerate the sale of foreclosed homes, thereby increasing the outflow on the back-end. Another way is to prevent homes from entering the shadow inventory to begin with, through loss mitigation methods designed to keep struggling borrowers in their homes. Not all distressed borrowers can avoid losing their homes, but in appropriate cases—where modifications can increase investors’ return compared to foreclosure and the borrowers can afford the new payments—loan modifications can be a winning proposition for all. (725)

The article then evaluates the various theories that are meant to explain the barriers to the loan modification and determines “that servicer compensation together with the high cost of loan workouts, accounting standards, and junior liens are the biggest impediments to efficient levels of loan modifications.” (726) It identifies “three pressing reasons to care about what the real barriers to foreclosure prevention are. First, foreclosures that could have been avoided inflict enormous, needless losses on borrowers, investors, and society at large. Second, overcoming artificial barriers to foreclosure prevention will result in loan modifications with higher rates of success. Finally, knowing what to fix is necessary to identify the right policy solution.” (726)

It seems to me that the federal government dealt with foreclosures much more effectively in the Great Depression, with the creation of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation. In our crisis, we have muddled through and have failed to systematically deal with the foreclosure crisis. McCoy’s article does a real service in identifying what we have done wrong this time around. No doubt, we will have another foreclosure crisis at some point in our future. It is worth our while to identify the impediments to effective foreclosure prevention strategies so we can act more effectively when the time comes.

Unhampered and HAMPered Mortgage Modifications

The National Consumer Law Center has issued a thorough report, At a Crossroads:  Lessons from the Home Affordable Modification Program  (HAMP), which also provides some guidance for the way forward after we get past the foreclosure crisis.  The authors summarize their findings as follows:

The government’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) is our starting point. HAMP has reached more homeowners, and successfully modified more home loans, than any program in history. Created by the federal government in early 2009 as a temporary program in response to the foreclosure crisis, HAMP provided additional financial incentives to servicers and investors to modify mortgages at risk of ending in foreclosure. The result has been affordable, sustainable loan modifications that keep borrowers in their homes and maximize returns to investors. But HAMP fell short of its goals, which were inadequate to the scope of the crisis. HAMP has been justly criticized for its lack of transparency and its failure to provide for effective enforcement. (3)

Not pulling punches, the report squarely places responsibility for its failure on “one root cause: massive servicer noncompliance. Almost every official evaluation of HAMP has noted widespread servicer noncompliance and the concurrent failure of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to engage in meaningful enforcement.” (4)  Given that millions more foreclosures are on the horizon, this failure must be rooted out.

The report identifies five principles for effective loan modification standards:

  1. Loan modification evaluations should be standardized, universally applicable to all loans and servicers, and mandatory for all loans before the foreclosure process can go forward.
  2. Loan modification terms must be affordable, fair, and sustainable.
  3. Hardship must be defined to reflect the range of challenges homeowners face.
  4. Transparency and accountability throughout the loan modification process are essential.
  5. Homeowners must be protected from servicers’ noncompliance. Good rules on paper are not enough. (4)

I am intrigued by some of the particular proposals, although I am not sure how they actually work in practice.  For instance, the report states that “Provisions Must Be Made for Homeowners with Junior Liens and Others for Whom a Thirty-One Percent Monthly Mortgage Payment Is Not Affordable.” (58) At what point must we say that a particular situation is untenable?  The report also proposes that “A Servicer’s Violation of Servicing Standards Should Constitute a Defense to a Foreclosure.” (63) While this would no doubt be great for current homeowners, it would also be a radical role change for the foreclosure process.  If this idea gets any traction, it will be interesting to see the industry critique.