The Hispanic Homeownership Gap

 

 

 

photo by Gabriel Santana

Freddie Mac’s latest Economic & Housing Research Insight asks Will the Hispanic Homeownership Gap Persist? It opens,

This is the American story.

A wave of immigrants arrives in the U.S. Perhaps they’re escaping religious or political persecution. Perhaps a drought or famine has driven them from their homes. Perhaps they simply want to try their luck in the land of opportunity.

They face new challenges in America. Often they arrive with few resources. And everything about them sets them apart—their religions, their languages, their cultures, their foods, their appearances. They are not always welcomed. They frequently face discrimination in housing, jobs, education, and more. But over time, they plant their roots in American soil. They become part of the tapestry that is America. And they thrive.

This is the story of the Germans and Italians and many other ethnic groups that poured into the U.S. a century ago.

Today’s immigrants come, for the most part, from Latin America and Asia instead of Europe. Hispanics comprise by far the largest share of the current wave. Over the last 50 years, more than 30 million Hispanics migrated to the U.S. And these Hispanics face many of the same challenges as earlier European immigrants.

Homeownership provides a key measure of transition from a newly-arrived immigrant to an established resident. Many immigrants arrive without the financial resources needed to purchase a home. In addition, the unfamiliarity and complexity of the U.S. housing and mortgage finance systems pose obstacles to homeownership. As a result, homeownership rates start low for new immigrants but rise over time.

The homeownership rate among Hispanics in the U.S.—a population that includes new immigrants, long-standing citizens, and everything in between— stands around 45 percent, more than 20 percentage points lower than the rate among non-Hispanic whites. Much of this homeownership gap can be traced to differences in age, income, education and other factors associated with homeownership.

Will the Hispanic homeownership gap close over time, as it did for the European immigrants of a century ago? Or will a significant gap stubbornly persist, as it has for African-Americans? (1-2)

It concludes,

Census projections of future age distributions suggest that the age differences of Whites and Hispanics will be reduced by six percent (0.7 years) by 2025 and 12 percent (1.2 years) by 2035. If these projections are realized, the White/Hispanic homeownership gap is likely to narrow by 20 percent (five percentage points) by 2035. The Census projections include both current residents and future immigrants, and averaging the characteristics of these two groups of Hispanics tends to mask the relatively-rapid growth in homeownership among the current residents.

It is important to remember that about 13 percent of the White/Hispanic homeownership gap cannot be traced to population characteristics such as age and income. The explanation for this residual gap is unclear, although some of it may be due to wealth gaps and discrimination. (12)

Researchers at the Urban Institute have documented the importance of the Hispanic homeownership rate to the housing market more generally. It is worthwhile for policymakers to focus on it as well.

Fair Lending Fade-out

open-book-fade

Bloomberg BNA quoted me in In 2017, Look for Pullback on Fair Lending Enforcement (behind a paywall). It opens,

Expect a pullback in fair lending enforcement in 2017, and especially less focus on disparate impact discrimination as the Trump administration takes office.

That’s the assessment of banking attorneys and others weighing the role of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Justice Department in the uncertain year ahead.

Although a recent court ruling raises questions about CFPB Director Richard Cordray’s tenure, several said they expect the CFPB to be less assertive no matter who heads the agency.

Meanwhile, new leadership at the Justice Department and HUD means that disparate impact claims—allegations of discriminatory effect, without regard to subjective intent—will get less attention than in recent years.

David Reiss, professor of law at Brooklyn Law School in Brooklyn, N.Y., summed up the assessment of several interviewed by Bloomberg BNA on the picture ahead for 2017.

“I would guess that disparate impact won’t be a priority for the Trump administration,” Reiss said.

New Leadership Ahead

In November, Trump said he’ll nominate Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) as attorney general. The president-elect also Dec. 5 named Ben Carson, the former director of pediatric neurosurgery at Johns Hopkins, as his candidate to lead HUD.

Alan S. Kaplinsky, a partner in Philadelphia who leads the consumer financial services practice at Ballard Spahr, said he doesn’t expect Sessions “to be a strong advocate for pushing the legal envelope on fair lending issues.”

And Carson might not use what some have called an “enforcement by litigation” approach to housing policy, according to Joseph Pigg, the American Bankers Association’s senior vice president for mortgage finance.

“Returning to a more normal enforcement regime should be a positive for borrowers and lenders alike,” Pigg told Bloomberg BNA. HUD spokesman Brian Sullivan declined to comment on the fair-lending outlook at HUD.

A Well-Known Unknown

Carson, a well-known physician and education reform advocate, took on an even higher profile by entering the 2016 White House race. But on lending, housing and other matters likely to come before him should he take the helm at HUD, Carson’s record is sparse.

One exception is a July 23, 2015, opinion piece in the Washington Times, where Carson criticized HUD’s Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing rule. Although HUD has a distinct regulation that governs disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act, the AFFH rule has a different focus. The regulation, drawn from language in the Fair Housing Act itself, lays out a new process that HUD says “promotes housing choice and fosters inclusive communities free from housing discrimination.”

Carson criticized the AFFH rule, saying it would inject too much government decision-making into local housing policy. The rule, issued in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in a major 2015 case on disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act, might actually frustrate efforts to develop new housing, he said.

Reiss predicted that Carson will either try to get rid of the AFFH rule, or decide not to enforce it. But he also said Carson’s stance on the regulation probably is somewhat nuanced.

“He’s acknowledged the history of redlining, restrictive covenants, and other problems,” Reiss told Bloomberg BNA. “He doesn’t seem to be denying a history of structural racism in the housing market. He seems to be saying the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing rule goes too far.”

What If . . . Fannie and Freddie Imploded?

photo by US HUD

So, I was spending some quality time with the Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of the Inspector General’s most recent Semiannual Report to the Congress. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) is the regulator of Fannie and Freddie as well as their conservator. Essentially, the FHFA calls all of the shots for the two companies.

It got me to wondering, does the Office of the Inspector General really have a handle on whether Fannie and Freddie are in good shape or not? The report opens with a Snapshot of OIG Accomplishments. The Snapshot contains the following categories:

  • OIG Investigations Monetary Results
  • Judicial Actions
  • Hotline Contacts
  • Audit and Evaluation Reports Issued
  • White Papers Issued
  • Office of Compliance and Special Projects Reports Issued
  • Nonmonetary Recommendations Made
  • Regulations Reviewed
  • Responses to Requests Under the Freedom of Information Act

As I read through the report, I had the distinct feeling that I had got lost among the trees of bureaucratic oversight and had lost sight of the contours of the Frannie forest.

I want to know one thing — are the two companies solvent and will they be solvent for the foreseeable future? The OIG’s Snapshot is pretty backward facing and focuses on a lot of pretty minor issues, like counting hotline contacts, instead of focusing on the fundamentals.

I know, I know — if we can measure something, then we want to share it with the world, but the Snapshot actually decreases my faith that OIG and FHFA are taking care of the entire forest and not just a few of the trees they were able to measure.

That being said, the report does get  to some of the important issues later on. It acknowledges that

Since September 2008, FHFA has administered two conservatorships of unprecedented scope and undeterminable duration. Under HERA,the Agency’s actions as conservator are not subject to judicial review or intervention, nor are they subject to procedural safeguards that are ordinarily applicable to regulatory activities such as rulemaking. As conservator of the Enterprises, FHFA exercises control over trillions of dollars in assets and billions of dollars in revenue, and makes business and policy decisions that influence and impact the entire mortgage finance industry. For reasons of efficiency, concordant goals with the Enterprises, and operational savings, FHFA has determined to delegate revocable authority for general corporate governance and day-to-day matters to the Enterprises’ boards of directors and executive management. (10)

The OIG clearly understands what is at stake in the conservatorships. But as I read the remainder of the report, I did not see sufficient emphasis on the range of risks that Fannie and Freddie face, such as hedging risk and operational risk. Hopefully, someone at the FHFA is paying sufficient attention to the range of risks the two companies face. If not, we can expect a new type of crisis down the pike.

Failure to Refinance

photo by GotCredit

Benjamin Keys, Devin Pope and Jaren Pope have recently had their Failure to Refinance paper accepted in the Journal of Financial Economics.  A version of the paper can be found on SSRN. This academic paper has a lot of relevance to many a homeowner. The abstract reads,

Households that fail to refinance their mortgage when interest rates decline can lose out on substantial savings. Based on a large random sample of outstanding U.S. mortgages in December of 2010, we estimate that approximately 20% of households for whom refinancing would be optimal and who appeared unconstrained to do so, had not taken advantage of the lower rates. We estimate the present-discounted cost to the median household who fails to refinance to be approximately $11,500, making this a particularly large consumer financial mistake. To shed light on possible mechanisms and corroborate our main findings, we also provide results from a mail campaign targeted at a sample of homeowners that could benefit from refinancing.

 The authors conclude,

Our results suggest the presence of information barriers regarding the potential benefits and costs of refinancing. Expanding and developing partnerships with certified housing counseling agencies to offer more targeted and in-depth workshops and counseling surrounding the refinancing decision is a potential direction for policy to alleviate these barriers for the population most in need of financial education.

In addition, the magnitude of the financial mistakes that households make suggest that psychological factors such as procrastination, trust, and the inability to understand complex decisions are likely barriers to refinancing. One policy that has been suggested to overcome the need for active household participation would require mortgages to have fixed interest rates that adjust downward automatically when rates decline To the extent that it is undesirable to reward only those households that are able to overcome the computational and behavioral barriers of the refinance process, policies such as an automatically-refinancing mortgage may be beneficial. Although an automatically-refinancing mortgage contract would be more expensive up-front for all borrowers in equilibrium, it would remove the cross-subsidization in the current mortgage finance system, where savvier homeowners who use their refinancing option when rates decline are subsidized by those households who fail to do so. (20, citation omitted)

I have heard a number of proposals that call for automatically refinancing mortgages. Such a mortgage product would shake up the mortgage market in its current form and require a transition period to figure out how it should be priced. But the net result would certainly benefit homeowners in the aggregate.

Thursday’s Advocacy & Think Tank Round-Up

  • Enterprise Community Partners’ latest blog post in the Spotlight on HOME Investment Partnership series highlights the experience of 22 year old Lani, a single mother of two boy’s, who was able to transition from homelessness to stability with the help of Project Independence, a program administered by Adobe Services in Alameda California, partially funded by HOME.  Enterprise is highlighting the effectiveness of the program because deep budget cuts threaten to reverse the success of HOME.
  • The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) released a letter sent to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) expressing concerns that the recently implemented Know Before You Owe/Truth in Lending Act/Real Estate Settlement Procedures Acts (TILA/RESPA) regulations are causing widespread market disruptions in the mortgage industry, and that lenders are worried about mistakes and potential liability – causing a decline in loan approval rates and ultimately liquidity.  The CFPB’s Director, Corday, issued a letter in response, acknowledging that the new rules will require extensive operational adjustment and stating: “examiners will be squarely focused on whether companies have made good faith efforts to come into compliance” and that initial examinations will be “corrective and diagnostic, rather than punitive.”
  • The National Association of Realtors (NAR)’s Pending Home Sales Index (a forward looking index) is down slightly for November, the fourth straight monthly decline.  Year over year the metric is up, for the 15th straight month. According to NAR the decline is attributable to tight inventory and rising home prices.
  • NAR’s RealtorMag predicts the top cities for first time homebuyers in 2016, among the contenders are Orlando, Florida; DeMoines, Iowa; and Banton Rouge, Louisiana.

Loose Credit. Plummeting Prices.

"Durdach Bros Miller Lite pic4" by MobiusDaXter

Christopher Palmer has posted Why Did So Many Subprime Borrowers Default During the Crisis: Loose Credit or Plummeting Prices? to SSRN. While this is a technical paper, it is clear from the title that it addresses an important question. If it can help us get to the root causes of the foreclosure crisis, it is worth considering. The abstract reads,

The surge in subprime mortgage defaults during the Great Recession triggered trillions of dollars of losses in the financial sector and accounted for more than 50% of foreclosures at the height of the crisis. In particular, subprime mortgages originated in 2006-2007 were three times more likely to default within three years than mortgages originated in 2003-2004.

In the ensuing years of debate, many have argued that this pattern across cohorts represents a deterioration in lending standards over time. I confirm this important channel empirically and quantify the relative importance of an alternative hypothesis: later cohorts defaulted at higher rates in large part because house price declines left them more likely to have negative equity.

Using comprehensive loan-level data that includes much of the recovery period, I find that changing borrower and loan characteristics can explain up to 40% of the difference in cohort default rates, with the remaining heterogeneity across cohorts caused by local house-price declines. To account for the endogeneity of prices — especially that price declines themselves could have been caused by subprime lending — I instrument for house price changes with long-run regional variation in house-price cyclicality.

Control-function results confirm that price declines unrelated to the credit expansion causally explain the majority of the disparity in cohort performance. Counterfactual simulations show that if 2006 borrowers had faced the price paths that the average 2003 borrower did, their annual default rate would have dropped from 12% to 5.6%.

Ok, ok — this is hyper-technical! The implications, however, are important: “These results imply that a) tighter subprime lending standards would have muted the increase in defaults, but b) even the relatively “responsible” subprime mortgages of 2003–2004 were sensitive to significant property value declines.” (40) It concludes that, “In reality, cohort outcomes are driven by both vintage effects (i.e. characteristics bottled into the contracts at origination) and path dependency in that exposure to economic conditions affect cohorts differently depending on their history.” (40)

So, the bottom line is that loose credit and plummeting prices were both causes of the defaults during the crisis. Mortgage underwriters and policymakers are on notice that they need to account for both of them in order to be prepared for the next crisis. This paper’s contribution is that it has quantified the relative impact of each of those causes.

 

 

Thursday’s Advocacy & Think Tank Round-Up

  • Citylab finds that urban farmers and real estate developers are teaming up in an unlikely alliance to create housing which incorporates on site food production, the latest in trendy, locavore hip.
  • Enterprise Community Partners has launched a national sign on letter to oppose Cuts, lift spending caps and restore funding to the Home Investment Partnership Program (HOME). HOME, according to Enterprise, is “the only Federal Housing Program exclusively focused on providing states and localities flexible gap financing for affordable housing development” for the low and very low income populations (seniors, the disabled, etc.)
  • New York Times editorial argues that the relief promised to homeowners facing foreclosure only materialized for banks, who unloaded toxic loans on the government, and private equity firms, who are now purchasing loans back from the government, at a discount and continuing  to foreclose.
  • National Association of Realtors finds that most Zombie homes (think unoccupied – long term vacancy) are not foreclosures but owned free and clear of mortgages.