Mortgage Servicing Since The Financial Crisis

photo by Dan Brown

Standard & Poors issued a report, A Decade After The Financial Crisis, What’s The New Normal For Residential Mortgage Servicing? It provides a good overview of how this hidden infrastructure of the mortgage market is functioning after it emerged from the crucible of the subprime and foreclosure crises. It reads, in part,

Ten years after the start of the financial crisis, residential mortgage servicing is finally settling into a new sense of normal. Before the crisis, mortgage servicing was a fairly static business. Traditional prime servicers had low delinquency rates, regulatory requirements rarely changed, and servicing systems were focused on core functions such as payment processing, investor accounting, escrow management, and customer service. Subprime was a specific market with specialty servicers, which used high-touch collection practices rather than the low-touch model prime servicers used. Workout options for delinquent borrowers mainly included repayment plans or extensions. And though servicers completed some modifications, short sales, and deeds in lieu of foreclosure, these were exceptions to the normal course of business.

Today, residential mortgage servicing involves complex regulation, increased mandatory workout options, and multiple layers of internal control functions. Over the past 10 years servicers have had to not only modify their processes, but also hire more employees and enhance their technology infrastructure and internal controls to support those new processes. As a result, servicing mortgage loans has become less profitable, which has caused loan servicers to consolidate and has created a barrier to entry for new servicers. While the industry expects reduced regulatory requirements under the Trump administration and delinquency rates to continue to fall, we do not foresee servicers reverting to pre-crisis operational processes. Instead, we expect states to maintain, and in some cases enhance, their regulatory requirements to fill the gap for any lifted or reduced at the federal level. Additionally, most mortgage loan servicers have already invested in new processes and technology, and despite the cost to support these and adapt to any additional requirements, we do not expect them to strip back the controls that have become their new normal. (2/10, citation omitted)

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As The Economy Improves, Delinquency Rates Have Become More Stable

Total delinquency rates have only just begun returning to around pre-crisis levels as the economy–and borrowers’ abilities to make their mortgage payments–has improved (see charts 1 and 2). Lower delinquency rates can also be attributed to delinquent accounts moving through the default management process, either becoming reperforming loans after modifications or through liquidation. New regulatory requirements have also extended workout timelines for delinquent accounts. In 2010, one year after 90-plus delinquency rates hit a high point, the percentage of prime and subprime loans in foreclosure actually surpassed the percentage that were more than 90 days delinquent–a trend that continued until 2013 for prime loans and 2014 for subprime loans. But since the end of 2014, all delinquency buckets have remained fairly stable, with overall delinquency rates for prime loans down to slightly over 4% for 2016 from a peak of just over 8% in 2009. Overall delinquency rates for subprime loans have fluctuated more since the peak at 29% in 2009. (2/10)

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Modifications Now Make Up About Half Of Loan Workout Strategies

Government agencies and government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) developed new formal modification programs beginning in 2008 to address the rising delinquency and foreclosure rates. The largest of these programs was HAMP, launched in March 2009. While HAMP was required for banks accepting funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), all servicers were allowed to participate. These programs required that servicers exhaust all loss mitigation options before completing foreclosure. This requirement, and the fact that servicers started receiving incentives to complete modifications, spurred the increase in modifications. (4/10)

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Foreclosure Timelines Have Become Longer

As the number of loans in foreclosure rose during the financial crisis, the requirements associated with the foreclosure process grew. As a result, the time it took to complete the foreclosure process increased to almost 475 days in 2016 from more than 160 days in 2007–an increase of almost 200%. While this is not a weighted average and therefore not adjusted for states with smaller or larger foreclosure portfolios, which could skew the average, the data show longer timelines across all states. And even though the percentage of loans in foreclosure has decreased in recent years (to 1% and 9% by the end of 2016 for prime and subprime, respectively, from peaks of 3% in 2010 and 13% in 2011) the time it takes to complete a foreclosure has still not lessened (6/10)

Trump and The Housing Market

photo by Gage Skidmore

President-Elect Trump

TheStreet.com quoted me in 5 Ways the Trump Administration Could Impact the 2017 U.S. Housing Market. It opens,

Yes, President-elect Donald Trump may have chosen Ben Carson to lead the Department of Housing and Urban Development, but as the U.S. housing market revs its engines as 2016 draws to a close, an army of homeowners, real estate professionals and economists are focused on cheering on a potentially rosy market in 2017.

And with good reason.

According to the S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller Indices released on November 29, U.S. housing prices rose, on average, by 5.5% from September, 2015 to September, 2016. Some U.S. regions showed double-digit growth for the time period – Seattle, saw an 11.0% year-over-year price increase, followed by Portland, Ore. with 10.9% and Denver with an 8.7% increase, according to the index.

The data point to further growth next year, experts say.

“The new peak set by the S&P Case-Shiller CoreLogic National Index will be seen as marking a shift from the housing recovery to the hoped-for start of a new advance,” notes David M. Blitzer, chairman of the index committee at S&P Dow Jones Indices. “While seven of the 20 cities previously reached new post-recession peaks, those that experienced the biggest booms — Miami, Tampa, Phoenix and Las Vegas — remain well below their all-time highs. Other housing indicators are also giving positive signals: sales of existing and new homes are rising and housing starts at an annual rate of 1.3 million units are at a post-recession peak.”

But there are question marks heading into the new year for the housing market. The surprise election of Donald Trump as president has industry professionals openly wondering how a new Washington regime will impact the real estate sector, one way or another.

For instance, Dave Norris, chief revenue officer of loanDepot, a retail mortgage lender located in Orange County, Calif., says dismantling the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, encouraging higher interest rates, and broadening consumer credit are potential scenario shifters for the housing market in the early stages of a Trump presidency.

Other experts contacted by TheStreet agree with Norris and say change is coming to the housing market, and it may be more radical than expected. To illustrate that point, here are five key takeaways from market experts on how a Trump presidency will shape the 2017 U.S. real estate sector.

Expect higher interest rates – The new administration will likely lead to higher interest rates, which will compress home and investment property values, says Allen Shayanfekr, chief executive officer of Sharestates, an online crowd-funding platform for real estate financing. “Specifically, loans are calculated through debt service coverage ratios and a borrower’s ability to make their payments,” Shayanfekr says. “Higher interest rates mean larger monthly payments and in turn, lower loan amount qualifications. If lenders tighten up, it will restrict the buyer market, causing either a plateau in market values or possibility a decrease depending on the margin of increased rates.”

Housing reform will also impact home purchase costs – Trump’s effect on interest rates will likely depress housing prices in some ways, says David Reiss, professor of law at Brooklyn Law School. “That’s because the higher the monthly cost of a mortgage, the lower the price that the seller can get,” he notes. Reiss cites housing reform as a good example. “Housing finance reform will increase interest rates,” he says. “Republicans have made it very clear that they want to reduce the role of the federal government in the housing market in order to reduce the likelihood that taxpayers will be on the hook for another bailout. If they succeed, this will likely raise interest rates because the federal government’s involvement in the mortgage market tends to push interest rates down.”

The Jumbo/Conforming Spread

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Standard & Poor’s issued a research report, What Drives the Variation Between Conforming and Jumbo Mortgage Rates? It opens,

What drives the variation between the conforming and jumbo mortgage rates for the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) product offered in the U.S. residential housing market? While credit and interest rate risk are the main factors at play, S&P Global Ratings explores how these risks relate to capital market execution and whether this relationship translates into additional liquidity risk. In our study, we compare the historical spreads between the two average note rates over time, and we also examine the impact of certain loan credit characteristics. Our data indicate that the rate difference grows in periods for which the opportunity for securitization declines as a viable exit strategy for lenders. (1)

My main takeaways from the report are that (1) the decrease in securitization since the financial crisis has contributed to a wider spread between jumbo and conforming mortgages; (2) the high guaranty fee for conforming mortgages pushes down the spread between jumbo and conforming mortgages; and (3) the credit box appears to be loosening a bit, which should mean that jumbos will become available to more than the “super-prime” slice of the market.

Divvying up The Mortgage Market

photo by Evan-Amos

S&P Capital IQ has posted some Structured Finance Research: The Conforming Loan Limit And Its Effect On The U.S. Private­-Label Mortgage Market. It contains interesting thoughts on how a stabilized secondary mortgage market should be split between government-backed and private-label securitizations. More particularly, it finds that

  • The U.S. private­-label mortgage market has failed to recapture the market share that it ceded to the agency [Fannie & Freddie] market after the financial crisis of 2007–2009.
  • Partly because of changes in underwriting requirements, the private­-label market is synonymous with jumbo collateral: loans that exceed the conforming loan limit set by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
  • As a result, the conforming limit now acts as a gateway, controlling how much financing and securitization volume is accommodated by the agency channel relative to that of the private­-label market. (1)

It notes, “As rising home prices restore the historical relationship between the conforming limit and median home price, it will be interesting to see if there is a corresponding return to the pre­-2003 market share split between agency and private­-label securitization.” (Id.)

S&P further explains that

For the last 10 years, the conforming limit (which herein excludes dwellings with more than one unit) has remained at $417,000. Historically, the ratio of the median new home sale price to the conforming loan limit has been near 50%. When the housing market crashed, the ratio dropped to near 40%. However, the recovering housing market is restoring the historical relationship. Because the conforming loan limit acts as mechanism to regulate the market share breakdown between the private­-label and agency markets, it is likely to be a determinant in the future growth of the struggling private­-label sector.

Private-Label/Agency Market Share

Prior to 2003, the market share of the agency sector was a bit greater than 80%, with the remainder being private­-label issuance. After 2008, however, the agency share rose to over 95%. So while a new equilibrium appears to have been achieved, it is one in which a good deal of market share has been shifted away from the private-­label market and absorbed by the agencies. While the general market consensus seems to be that the private­-label share might not reach 2005–2007 levels again, the question remains as to when (if at all) the private­-label mortgage market will recover to the levels of issuance prior to 2003.” (1-2, chart omitted)

Implicit in all of this is that the pre-2003 state of affairs reflects some kind of natural state of equilibrium. This ignores the fact the national mortgage market has always been one that the government has shaped. While it is worth considering what balance between government and private-label securitization is best, historical precedent in itself is an insufficient guide.

I would rather focus on fundamentals. Should the government subsidize residential mortgages? How much exposure should the government have to credit risk? How much credit risk can the private sector handle? Should the government incentivize the origination of mortgage products (like the 30 year FRM) that private-label investors might not find so attractive? I care about the answers to these questions a whole lot more than I care about how the secondary mortgage market was divvied up one or two decades ago.

Economic Factors That Affect Housing Prices

photo by TaxRebate.org.uk

S&P has posted a paper on Economic Factors That Affect Housing Prices. This is, of course, an important topic, albeit one that is an art as well as a science. While S&P undertook this analysis more for mortgage-backed securities investors than for anyone else, it certainly is of use to the rest of us. The paper opens,

The U.S. domestic housing market has experienced a 23% price increase since the beginning of the housing recovery in 2011. Many local housing markets are now close to or above their peak levels of 2006, which leads us to investigate whether the pace of home price appreciation (HPA) can continue at its current pace. In this paper, we (1) examine the economic factors that influence HPA and (2) forecast HPA for numerous geographic regions assuming various economic conditions over the next five years. While the aggregate national pattern in housing prices is an important reference, we need to examine housing prices at a more granular geographic level in order to understand regional housing market dynamics and learn how these are affected by local macroeconomic factors. This paper demonstrates that several economic variables are needed to predict average home price movements for each of 48 different U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).

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Factors that influence HPA can be difficult to predict. Therefore, residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) investors frequently use a range of HPA projections to estimate their potential bond returns. With that in mind, for each MSA, we considered five separate hypothetical economic scenarios, ranging from an “Upside” forecast to an extreme “Stress 3” case. Interestingly, our Stress 3 case forecasts a 28% decline in HPI at the national level over the next five years, which corresponds roughly to the decline experienced in the last recession. Our “base case” scenario leads to forecasts at the national level of a 26% increase in HPI over five years. This represents what we believe to be the most likely economic forecast. (1-2)

S&P’s key findings include:

  • Movement in HPA is primarily influenced by up to five variables, depending on the MSA: housing affordability, changes in shadow inventory, the unemployment rate, the TED spread [a measure of distress in the credit markets], and population growth.
  • HPA in many MSAs has momentum, meaning that it depends on its level in the previous quarter of observation.
  • The mortgage rate generally appears to have little predictive power in connection with home prices.
  • Chicago, Houston, Boston, and San Francisco are projected to appreciate at a greater pace (45%, 40%, 27%, and 36%, respectively) than the 26% forecast for the nation as a whole over the next five years, and New York at a slower pace (21%). Columbus led all MSAs with a projected five-year HPA of 50%.
  • Under our most pessimistic (Stress 3) scenario, Chicago is forecast to experience a greater decline in HPI (34%) over the next five years than the nation as a whole (29%), while New York, Boston, Houston, and San Francisco are projected to experience declines that are less severe than that of the nation (19%, 3%, 17%, and 16%, respectively). Markets that have been vulnerable in the past (Las Vegas, Phoenix, and Riverside) are projected to experience the greatest five-year declines under our Stress 3 scenario (66%, 68%, and 68%). The markets that show the greatest movements are the most sensitive to the five factors and frequently show the greatest upside and downside. (2-3, emphasis in the original)

I found the first and third bullet points to be the most interesting, as many pundits weigh in on the factors that affect housing prices. It will be interesting to see if further research confirms S&P’s findings.

Monday’s Adjudication Roundup

Frannie v. Private-Label Smackdown

Eric Armstrong

S&P posted a report, Historical Data Show That Agency Mortgage Loans Are Likely to Perform Significantly Better Than Comparable Non-Agency Loans. The overview notes,

  • We examined the default frequencies of both agency and non-­agency mortgage loans originated from 1999­-2008.
  • As expected, default rates for both agencies and non-­agencies were higher for crisis-­era vintages relative to pre­-crisis vintages.
  • The loan characteristics that were the most significant predictors of default were FICO scores, debt­-to­-income (DTI) ratios, and loan­-to­-value (LTV) ratios.
  • Agency loans performed substantially better than non­agency loans for all vintages examined. The default rate of agency loans was approximately 30%-­65% that for comparable non-­agency loans, whether analyzed via stratification or through a logistic regression framework. (1)

This is not so surprising, but it is interesting to see the relative performance of Frannie (Fannie & Freddie) and Private-Label loans quantified and it is worth thinking through the implications of this disparity.

S&P was able to do this analysis because Fannie and Freddie released their “loan-level, historical performance data” to the public in order to both increase transparency and to encourage private capital to return to the secondary mortgage market. (1) Given that the two companies have transferred significant credit risk to third parties in the last few years, this is a useful exercise for potential investors, regulators and policymakers.

It is unclear to me that this historical data gives us much insight into future performance of either Frannie or Private-Label securities because so much has changed since the 2000s. Dodd-Frank enacted the Qualified Mortgage, Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage regimes for the primary and secondary mortgage market and they have fundamentally changed the nature of Private-Label securities. And the fact that Fannie and Freddie are now in conservatorship has changed how they do business in very significant ways just as much. So, yes, old Frannie mortgages are likely to perform better, but what about new ones?