Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- Barclays PLC urged the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on Monday to reverse class certification in a shareholder suit alleging misrepresentations related to the bank’s dark pool, arguing that the district court judge who granted cert. improperly refused to hear Barclays’ evidence.
- Mortgage borrowers who say Wells Fargo failed to disclose property insurance proceeds that might’ve been available to pay off their loans told a California federal court Wednesday that the bank is employing a “scorched-earth” litigation strategy and is seeking to delay the class action at every turn.
- A New York state judge has tossed a suit alleging that Barclays Bank PLC and a defunct unit lied about the quality of the loans made up of $619 million in residential mortgage-backed securities, saying the claims were filed too late.
August 1, 2016 | Permalink | No Comments
July 28, 2016
Freddie and Fannie Nightmare Scenario
For a number of years, I have warned of the increased operational risk that results from leaving Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the limbo of their conservatorships. “Operational risk” refers to risks that a company faces from things like poor procedures, systems, policies and employee supervision.
The Inspector General of the Federal Housing Finance Agency has released three reports that address aspects of Fannie and Freddie’s operational risk (along with that of the Federal Home Loan Bank System). The three reports are:
- FHFA Failed to Consistently Deliver Timely Reports of Examination to the Enterprise Boards and Obtain Written Responses from the Boards Regarding Remediation of Supervisory Concerns Identified in those Reports
- FHFA’s Failure to Consistently Identify Specific Deficiencies and Their Root Causes in Its Reports of Examination Constrains the Ability of the Enterprise Boards to Exercise Effective Oversight of Management’s Remediation of Supervisory Concerns
- FHFA’s Inconsistent Practices in Assessing Enterprise Remediation of Serious Deficiencies and Weaknesses in its Tracking Systems Limit the Effectiveness of FHFA’s Supervision of the Enterprises
The last of the three reports notes,
As the regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (collectively, the Enterprises) and of the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) is tasked by statute to ensure that these entities operate safely and soundly so that they serve as a reliable source of liquidity and funding for housing finance and community investment. Examinations of its regulated entities are fundamental to FHFA’s supervisory mission.
FHFA has directed its Division of Enterprise Regulation (DER) to conduct supervisory activities of the Enterprises and its Division of Federal Home Loan Bank Regulation (DBR) to conduct these activities for the FHLBanks. When DER or DBR identifies a deficiency, it will classify the deficiency as a Matter Requiring Attention (MRA), a violation, or a recommendation. According to FHFA, MRAs are “the most serious supervisory matters.” FHFA requires the regulated entities to promptly remediate MRAs. Examiners are required to “check and document” the progress of MRA remediation.
In FHFA Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) 2016 Audit and Evaluation Plan, we explained our intent to focus our resources on programs and operations that pose the greatest financial, governance, and reputational risk to FHFA, the Enterprises, and the FHLBanks. One of the four areas we identified was FHFA’s rigor in its supervision of the Enterprises and the FHLBanks. According to FHFA, a key component of effective supervision is close oversight of efforts by an entity it regulates to correct identified supervisory concerns. This evaluation is one in a series of OIG reports that assess the robustness of FHFA’s policies, procedures, and practices governing its oversight of remediation of supervisory concerns by a regulated entity.
In this evaluation, we compared the MRA tracking systems used by two federal financial regulators and DBR to those used by the DER Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac examination teams. We found substantial weaknesses in DER’s tracking systems that limit significantly the utility of those systems as a tool to monitor the Enterprises’ efforts to remediate deficiencies giving rise to MRAs. We also reviewed a sample of open and closed MRAs issued to each Enterprise by DER to assess whether DER examiners performed independent assessments of the timeliness and adequacy of each Enterprise’s efforts to remediate the MRA. Our review found a lack of consistent independent analysis by DER examiners of the timeliness and adequacy of each Enterprise’s remedial efforts. (2)
My nightmare scenario is that Fannie and Freddie operations have slowly degraded as they have been left to linger in the limbo of conservatorship. This kind of degradation is not really observable from the outside and its effects are not known until something really bad happens. Maybe their hedging strategy is poorly designed, maybe their underwriting is allowed to become outdated, maybe too many employees lose their drive.
Eight years of conservatorship can do that to a company. When it happens, you can be sure that members of Congress will blame a whole host of people for this failure. But the blame will sit with Congress. Because Democrats and Republicans cannot come up with a reasonable compromise, we are left with two zombie organizations dominating our housing finance system.
Hopefully, I am wrong about this. Or maybe I am right about it but we dodge the bullet by some stroke of luck. But the longer we leave the two companies in this state, the more likely it is that things go bad and the taxpayer is left holding the bag once again.
July 28, 2016 | Permalink | No Comments
July 27, 2016
Regulating Small Lenders
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is often subject to a lot of criticism for imposing a heavy regulatory burden on small community banks and credit unions (together, community lenders). A recent Government Accountability Office report, Community Lenders Remain Active under New Rules, but CFPB Needs More Complete Plans for Reviewing Rules, undermines that critique.
The GAO did this report at the request of Representative Hensarling (R-TX), the Financial Services Committee Chair, who sought to understand the impact of various rules promulgated under Dodd-Frank on community lenders and their customers. The report studied the impact of mortgage servicing and regulatory capital rules on community lenders’ participation in the mortgage servicing market. (Mortgage servicing refers to the business of receiving monthly mortgage payments and providing other services relating to outstanding mortgages on behalf of the owner of the mortgage, which in some cases may also be the servicer itself).
The GAO found that community lenders “remained active in servicing mortgage loans under the” CFPB’s new mortgage-servicing rules. (n.p., front matter)
The report also described the small lender business model in some detail. Servicing activities
generated income and allowed them to maintain strong relationships with their customers. Some of these community lenders and industry associations noted that holding mortgage loans in portfolio and servicing these mortgage loans helped with overall profitability. For example, the servicing revenue can offset a reduction in income from originating loans when interest rates rise. Conversely, when interest rates decline, borrowers are more likely to prepay or refinance their mortgage loans, and servicing revenue may decline, while income from new mortgage loan originations might increase. (15)
Community lenders also claimed that ” they and their customers benefit from the close relationship maintained when these institutions service mortgages. . . . For example, representatives at one community bank told us that a customer who could not make a mortgage payment could meet directly with a bank representative to develop a payment plan.” (16)
We often romanticize the small lenders (think, Bailey Brothers’ Building and Loan) and demonize the big banks (think, The Big Short). This report shows that the little guy is doing okay under Dodd-Frank, at least when it comes to servicing. It remains to be seen whether borrowers in the aggregate are better off with small lenders and their personal touch, but we will leave that discussion for another day.
July 27, 2016 | Permalink | No Comments
July 26, 2016
Retiring with a Mortgage
MassMutual quoted me in Is it OK to Retire with a Mortgage? It opens,
The conventional wisdom is that you should pay off your mortgage before you retire. Yet, about 4.4 million retired homeowners still had a mortgage in 2011, according to an analysis of American Community Survey data by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). More than half of them spend 30 percent or more of their income on housing and related expenses, a percentage that may be uncomfortably high even for working homeowners.
Not having to put such a large percentage — or any percentage — of your retirement income toward a monthly mortgage payment in retirement will certainly make it easier to meet your other expenses. But is it really so bad to have a mortgage payment during retirement?
“The logic behind the rule of thumb is that your income will go down in retirement, so it would be helpful if your monthly expenses went down significantly as well,” said David Reiss, a law professor who specializes in real estate and consumer financial services at Brooklyn Law School in New York. But if your income from Social Security and a pension (if you have one), and to some extent your assets (the nest egg you plan to draw on for additional retirement income), will be sufficient to make your monthly mortgage payment and meet your other expenses in retirement, there is no real reason that you have to get rid of the mortgage, he said. The key is that keeping your mortgage during retirement should be part of a plan and not a response to a crisis.
More Homeowners are Retiring with a Mortgage
More homeowners retired with a mortgage in 2011 than a decade earlier, according to the CFPB’s analysis of U.S. census data.1 They’re less likely to have their homes paid off because they’re purchasing later in life, making smaller down payments and tapping equity for other purchases.1 In fact, 36.6 percent of homeowners ages 65 to 74 and 21.2 percent homeowners age 75 and older (some of whom may not be retired yet) had mortgages or home equity loans in 2010, according to the Federal Reserve. The median balance was $79,000 for the 65 to 74 age group, and $58,000 for the 75 and up age group.
The CFPB points out two problems with carrying a mortgage during retirement: less accumulated net wealth and the possibility of foreclosure if retirees can’t make their mortgage payments. Foreclosure is harder to recover from when you’re older because you may not be able to return to the workforce to compensate for the loss and because you’re more likely to have health problems or cognitive impairments, the CFPB said.1
Having less accumulated net wealth is a problem, especially if most of your wealth consists of your home equity, which is less liquid than stocks, bonds and cash. Foreclosure is a serious problem if it happens to you, but the odds are slim: even in the aftermath of the housing crisis, in 2011, foreclosure rates were only 2.55 percent for homeowners 65 to 74 and 3.19 percent for homeowners 75 and older.
Some retirement-age homeowners who haven’t paid off their mortgages undoubtedly would rather be debt free but couldn’t afford to retire their home loan sooner. But others might be putting the money that could have gone toward extra mortgage payments to a better use. (footnotes omitted)
July 26, 2016 | Permalink | No Comments





