REFinBlog

Editor: David Reiss
Cornell Law School

January 27, 2014

Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Holds that Successor Note Holder had Proper Authority to Initiate Foreclosure Under Texas State Law

By Karume James

Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Holds that Successor Note Holder had Proper Authority to Initiate Foreclosure Under Texas State Law

In Hall v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected a homeowner’s challenge to a foreclosure action finding that the note holder had proper authority to initiate the foreclosure and that the homeowner had filed an invalid restraining order to block the foreclosure.

In 2007, Raphael Hall (“Hall”) bought a home in Texas with a mortgage from First Magnus Financial Corporation (“First Magnus”). Two years later in 2009, MERS (the deed beneficiary), sold the mortgage to BAC Home Loans (“BAC”). By October 2010, Hall had fallen behind in his mortgage payments and received a default notice because he had an overdue amount on his mortgage. By June 2011, he was still in default on the mortgage and received a notice of a trustee sale and a scheduled foreclosure for August 2011 that was later delayed. In September 2011, Hall sought a restraining order in Texas state court to stop the foreclosure proceedings, but the foreclosure sale still proceeded on September 6, 2011 and Fannie Mae purchased Hall’s property. After the purchase, BAC removed the case from state court to federal district court and filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted BAC’s summary judgment motion and Hall appealed.

On appeal, Hall raised three particular issues related to two of his causes of action. The causes of action were for wrongful foreclosure and suit to quiet title and void substitute trustee’s deed. Hall’s first issue was that summary judgment was improper because the temporary restraining order he sought in state court voided the foreclosure sale and that the sale was therefore a wrongful foreclosure. However, the Fifth Circuit applied Texas state law and rejected this argument because it found that Hall’s restraining order was void under Texas state law and therefore could not have stopped the foreclosure sale.

Hall’s second argument was that BAC was not the note holder, in that MERS only transferred the property deed and not the not, and that BAC could not enforce the foreclosure on the note. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument as well because it found that under Texas state law, MERS had properly transferred its rights to BAC that allowed it to initiate a foreclosure action on Hall’s property. The Court therefore found that BAC had proper authority to initiate the foreclosure action.

Hall raised a final argument on appeal challenging the validity of the foreclosure notice because of an incorrect designation about BAC’s ownership status. However, the Court did not consider this argument because Hall raised it for the first time on appeal. As the Court rejected each of Hall’s arguments, the Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling against Hall.

January 27, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments

January 24, 2014

Preserving Low-Income Housing

By David Reiss

NYC Mayor De Blasio announced an aggressive goal of producing and preserving 200,000 units of affordable housing over the next ten years. New York City will need to be as creative as possible to achieve this goal and will need to look to all of the resources that it has at its disposal to achieve it. Enterprise Community Partners released Preserving Housing Credit Investment: The State of Housing Credit Properties and Lessons Learned for the Extended Use Period. This report looks at important component of a preservation agenda: Low-Income Housing Tax Credit buildings that “reach the end of their initial 15-year compliance period.” (4) The report presents data about LIHTC buildings during the 15-year “extended use period” that follow the compliance period

and shares how some state and local housing agencies around the country are addressing the post-Year 15 Housing Credit properties. While the condition of the Housing Credit portfolio at Year 15 is strong, as properties age into a second 15-year period of rent restrictions and beyond, the ability for some of those properties to be able to afford to make improvements while maintaining affordability is clearly a challenge. Some of these local best practices point to solutions demonstrating programmatic and regulatory flexibility, new resources as well as resyndication where appropriate. (4)

Across the nation, roughly 100,000 units of housing age out of the initial compliance period each year, so we are talking about a lot of housing.  New York has a significant portion of that housing stock. While these properties are in pretty good condition overall, the report found that

very limited financing choices exist throughout the extended use period for properties with modest recapitalization or capital improvement needs. Currently, the best choice seems to be a resyndication with a new Housing Credit allocation. However, the use of Housing Credits to preserve and extend the affordability of existing affordable housing competes with other Housing Credit properties, including public housing revitalization and new projects (both as adaptive reuse of existing buildings and new construction). The Housing Credit was created to address affordable housing needs that the private market could not effectively serve. It incentivized a public-private partnership that includes affordability for 30 years. In order to preserve this inventory, more investment will be required. Ensuring the physical and economic stability of these assets through their extended use periods will require innovative uses of limited public subsidy by states and municipalities. (5)

New York City will certainly want to plan for the modest recapitalization of its LIHTC properties as part of its affordable housing strategy. And it will be better to plan for it now than pay too much for deferred maintenance down the line.

January 24, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments

January 23, 2014

U.S. Dismissive of Frannie Suits

By David Reiss

The Federal Housing Finance Agency filed its motion to dismiss all the claims in Perry Capital v. Lew, D.D.C., No. 13-cv-01025, 1/17/14. I blogged about this case (and similar cases) when they were filed last summer. It is quite interesting to read the government’s side of the story now. Today’s post focuses on the federal government’s alternative narrative. Where the private investors describe an opportunistic and abusive government in their complaints, the FHFA’s brief describes the government as a white knight who rode in to save the day at the depth of the financial crisis:

The national crisis having eased, Plaintiffs now ask the Court to re-write the agreements that FHFA, on behalf of the Enterprises, and Treasury executed to stabilize the Enterprises and the national economy, pursuant to express congressional authority. Plaintiffs want to cherry-pick those aspects of the agreements that they like—namely, the unprecedented financial support from Treasury at a time when the Enterprises required billions of dollars in capital—and discard the parts they do not like—namely, the Third Amended PSPAs—now that over one hundred billion dollars of federal taxpayer capital infusions and commitments have allowed the Enterprises to remain in business and produce positive earnings, rather than being placed into mandatory receivership and then liquidation. Plaintiffs’ attempt to reward themselves, at the expense of federal taxpayers who risked and continue to risk billions of dollars to save the Enterprises from receivership and liquidation, directly contravenes the relevant statutory authorities as implemented by the unambiguous language of the PSPAs.

Plaintiffs’ charges of common law and APA violations have it exactly backwards: FHFA, on behalf of the Enterprises, has acted at all times consistent with the Enterprises’ contractual obligations and FHFA’s powers as Conservator and statutory successor to all rights of the Enterprises and their stockholders. The shareholder-Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are attempting through these cases to convince this Court, during the conservatorships, to give shareholders financial value that they are not owed under the terms of their stock certificates or statutes, and to ignore the rights of the Enterprises’ senior preferred stockholder, the U.S. Treasury. By doing so, Plaintiffs seek not only to undermine the purposes of conservatorship, but also the very statutory mission of the Enterprises in which they chose to invest. (4-5)

While I think that the investors raise some serious legal issues for the court to decide, the federal government’s narrative of the financial crisis jibes a whole lot more with my own than does the investors’. I argued last summer that the side that wins control of the narrative will have an advantage in the battle over the legal issues. I would say that the federal government has won this first round.

January 23, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments

January 22, 2014

S&P’s Fightin’ Words

By David Reiss

S&P filed a memorandum in support of its motion to compel discovery in the FIRREA case that the United States brought against S&P last year. S&P comes out fighting in this memorandum, arguing that the “lawsuit is retaliation for S&P’s decision to downgrade the credit rating of the United states in August 2011.” (1)

S&P argues that the “most obvious explanation” for the United States’ “decision to pursue a FIRREA action against S&P alone” among the major rating agencies “is apparent:”   “S&P alone among the major rating agencies downgraded the securities issued by the United States.” (17) This is not obvious to me, particularly given the various explanations for this disparate treatment that have appeared in outlets like the WSJ over the last couple of years. But it may be true nonetheless.

In any case, I do not find the “chronology of events relating to the downgrade and the commencement of this lawsuit” to provide “powerful evidence linking the two.” (17) The chronology ends with the following entries:

  • S&P’s downgrade of the United States occurred on Friday, August 5, 2011. That Sunday, August 7, Harold McGraw III, the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President of McGraw Hill (of which S&P was a unit), received a telephone message from a high-ranking official of the New York Federal Reserve Bank; when the call was returned, the official conveyed the personal displeasure of the Secretary of the Treasury with S&P’s rating action.
  • This was followed on Monday by a call to Mr. McGraw from the Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, in which Secretary Geithner stated that S&P had made a “huge error” for which it was “accountable.” He said that S&P had done “an enormous disservice to yourselves and your country,” that S&P’s conduct would be “looked at very carefully,” and that such behavior could not occur without a response.
  • The McClatchy Newspapers subsequently reported in a piece authored by Kevin G. Hall and Greg Gordon that while the United States’ original investigation included S&P and Moody’s, “[i]nvestigator interest in Moody’s apparently dropped off around the summer of 2011, about the same time S&P issued the historic downgrade of the United States’ creditworthiness because of mounting debt and deficits.” A source familiar with the investigations was quoted as stating: “After the U.S. downgrade, Moody’s is no longer part of this.”
  • In the year preceding S&P’s downgrade of the United States, two states, Mississippi and Connecticut, had initiated proceedings alleging deceptive practices based specifically on an alleged lack of independence. Each of those states named both Moody’s and S&P as defendants. After the downgrade, additional state lawsuits were commenced, with allegations nearly identical to those of the Connecticut and Mississippi complaints. Drafted after coordination and consultation with the U.S. Department of Justice, none of those lawsuits named Moody’s. (19, footnotes omitted)

This is surely no smoking gun and lots of dots remain to be connected.  How did DoJ get involved? Are the state Attorneys General in on the conspiracy? Why would DoJ stop an investigation of Moody’s to punish S&P? Sounds a bit like cutting off your nose to spite your face?

That being said, S&P might be right about the motivation for this suit and their allegations may be enough to win this motion to compel discovery. But whoever wins this round, this should be a fight worth watching.

January 22, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments

January 21, 2014

Shiller on Primitive Housing Finance

By David Reiss

Robert Shiller has posted Why Is Housing Finance Still Stuck in Such a Primitive Stage? The abstract for this brief discussion paper reads:

The institutions for financing owner-occupied housing have not progressed as they should, and the financial innovation that has followed the financial crisis of 2007-9 has not been focused on improving the risk management of individual homeowners. This paper lists a number of barriers to housing finance innovation, and in light of these barriers, the problems of some major innovations of the past and future: self-amortizing mortgages, price-level adjusted mortgages (PLAMs), shared appreciation mortgages (SAMs), housing partnerships, and continuous workout mortgages (CWMs). (1)

The paper is more of an outline than a fleshed out argument, but it has some interesting points (and not just because the author recently won a Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics).  They include

  • Shared appreciation mortgages (SAMs), which offered some risk management of home price appreciation, were offered by the Bank of Scotland and Bear Stearns in the 1990s, but acquired a damaged reputation with the boom in home prices. U.K. homeowners who took such mortgages, and lost out on the speculative gains, were so angered that they filed a class-action lawsuit against the issuers. The suit was dropped, but the reputation loss was permanent. (5)

  • There has been some questioning of the assumption that insuring homeowners against a decline in home value is a good thing. Sinai and Soulelis (2014) have written that the existing  mortgage institutions may be close to optimal given that people want to live in their house forever, or move to a similar house whose price is correlated with the present house, and so are perfectly hedged. But their paper cannot be exactly right, given the sense of distress that homeowners are experiencing who are underwater. They are more certainly not right about all homeowners, many of whom actually plan to sell their home when they retire. (5-6)

  • The difficulties in making improvements in mortgage institutions have to do with the complexity of the risk management problem, coupled with mistrust of institutional players. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, created by the Dodd-Frank Act and having authority over mortgages, among other things, seems oriented towards addressing complaints from the public, and has focused its attention so far on such things as unfair collection practices, bias against minorities, and excessive complexity of financial products being used to confuse customers. These are laudable concerns, but complaints that economists might register about the fundamental success of mortgage products to serve risk management well have not yet taken center stage. (6)

  • New Development economics, Karlan and Appel (2011), Bannerjee and Duflo (2012) has shown how carefully controlled experiments can reveal solid steps to take regarding new financial institutions for poverty reduction. The same methods could be used to improve mortgage institutions, as well as rental, leasing, partnership and cooperative institutions, in advanced countries. (7)

These are just brief thoughts. It will be interesting to see how Shiller develops them further.

January 21, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments

Ohio Court of Appeals Holds that Countrywide Home Loans has Standing to Bring a Foreclosure Action

By Karume James

On October 25, 2013, the Ohio Court of Appeals in Countrywide Home Loans v. Montgomery held that the Plaintiff had standing to initiate a foreclosure action since it was the party in interest at the time the suit was commenced.

In 2004, Robert Montgomery (“Montgomery”) bought a home in Ohio with a mortgage from Keybank. The mortgage was later bought by Countrywide Home Loans Inc. (“Countrywide”). In 2008, Countrywide filed a foreclosure action against Montgomery. At trial, Montgomery challenged Countrywide’s standing and claimed that it was not the real party in interest because it did not have title to the mortgage at the time the suit was commenced. The trial court later granted a motion for summary judgment by Countrywide.

In March 2012, Montgomery filed for bankruptcy protection and the foreclosure sale was briefly delayed, but was lifted in November 2012 after Countrywide filed a notice of relief. The trial court also denied Montgomery’s multiple motions to vacate the judgment. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment and denial of  Montgomery’s motions to vacate the judgment. The Court of Appeals found that Countrywide was the party in interest at the time the case was commenced. The Court further found that recent jurisdictional case law in Ohio did not apply to the case at bar since it only applied when there was a party, unlike Countrywide, who was not a party in interest at the time the action began. Since Countrywide held the note and mortgage at the time the foreclosure action commenced, it had standing to initiate the action, and the Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

January 21, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments

Florida Appeals Court Holds that Service Agent of Bank has Standing to Initiate Foreclosure Action

By Karume James

On October 13, 2013, the Florida District Court of Appeals in American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. v. Bednarek held that a servicing agent of a larger bank had standing to file a foreclosure action against a homeowner because it properly acquired the mortgage and was therefore the note holder and owner for the purposes of foreclosure.

On May 31, 2005, Lucy Bednarek (“Defendant”) bought a home with a mortgage from American Brokers Conduit  (“ABC”). On March 30, 2006, ABC sells the mortgage to Deutsche Bank’s servicing agent, AHMSI–Maryland (“AHMSI-M”). In September 2007, AHMSI-M brought a foreclosure action against Defendant and claimed that it was the owner and holder of the underlying promissory note. Separately, AHMSI-M was acquired by AHMSI (collectively “AHMSI”) in 2008 and the newly merged company continued the action by filing the original promissory note and mortgage in 2009. The trial court dismissed the case holding that AHMSI did not have standing to initiate the foreclosure action as it could not show that it was the owner and holder of the note and mortgage. However, the Florida Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling and held that AHMSI was the note owner and holder because ABC properly assigned the note to AHMSI prior to the start of the foreclosure action and therefore had standing to initiate the action.

 

January 21, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments