REFinBlog

Editor: David Reiss
Cornell Law School

December 26, 2013

Battle of the Mortgage Experts

By David Reiss

Judge Saris of the United States District Court (D. Mass.) issued a Memorandum and Order in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Residential Funding Company, et al., No. 11-30035-PBS (Dec. 9, 2013). The opinion addresses a battle of statistical experts over the proper way to sample some of the hundreds of thousands of mortgages at issue in this litigation.

Mass Mutual, the plaintiff, alleges that the defendants misrepresented material aspects of many of those mortgages. To prove this, Mass Mutual intends to “reunderwrite” about 3.5% of loans by reviewing the “original loan file to determine whether  it was originated in accordance with applicable standards.” (3) . More particularly, Mass Mutual alleged that

the defendants marketed the [RMBS] certificates with representations that the loans backing the securities were underwritten in accordance with prudent underwriting standards and the underlying properties were appraised in accordance with sound appraisal standards, in order to ensure that the borrower could repay the loan and to decrease the risk of default. Plaintiff asserts that the loans underlying each [loan pool] were, in reality, far riskier than represented. Plaintiff also alleges that the defendants knowingly reported false loan-to-value (“LTV”) ratios, and in the case of defendant HSBC, inaccurate owner-occupancy rates for underlying properties. The defendants deny that they made any material misrepresentations in the marketing and sale of the certificates. (4)

The Court stated that while the defendants had identified various methodological errors that would render the report of Mass Mutual’s expert unreliable, similar challenges had failed in four other RMBS litigations. The Court ultimately denied the defendants’ motion to exclude the opinions of the plaintiff’s expert.

A body of law about expert evaluation of misrepresentations in securitization is slowly developing as cases are moving from the motion to dismiss stage to the pretrial discovery phase. This will have broader significance than just securitization litigation, but I find it particularly interesting to watch experts attempt to reduce “questions of misrepresentation” regarding RMBS to yes/no answers. (15) Such attempts to quantify misrepresentation will be useful to resolve cases such as this but also to regulators and researchers down the line.

December 26, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments

December 24, 2013

Qualified Mortgages and The Community Reinvestment Act

By David Reiss

Regulators issued an Interagency Statement on Supervisory Approach for Qualified and Non-Qualified Mortgage Loans relating to the interaction between the QM rules and Community Reinvestment Act enforcement. This statement complements a similar rule issued in October that addressed the interaction between the QM rules and fair lending enforcement.

The statement acknowledges that lenders are still trying to figure out their way around the new mortgage rules (QM & ATR) that will go into effect in January. The agencies state that “the requirements of the Bureau’s Ability-to-Repay Rule and CRA are compatible. Accordingly, the agencies that conduct CRA evaluations do not anticipate that institutions’ decision to originate only QMs, absent other factors, would adversely affect their CRA evaluations.” (2)

This is important for lenders who intend to only originate plain vanilla QMs. There have been concerns that doing so may result in comparatively few mortgages being CRA-eligible. It seems eminently reasonable that lenders not find themselves between a CRA rock and a QM hard place if they decide to go the QM-only route. That being said, it will be important to continue to monitor whether low- and moderate-income neighborhoods are receiving sufficient amounts of mortgage credit. Given that major lenders are likely to originate non-QM products, this may not be a problem. But we will have to see how the non-QM sector develops next year before we can know for sure.

December 24, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments

Michigan Court Holds That Plaintiffs Were Not Subject to Double Liabilty on Their Debt and Thus Lacked Standing

By Ebube Okoli

The court in deciding Laues v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147912 ( E.D. Mich. Oct. 15, 2013) granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.

Plaintiffs Roy A. Laues and Kristin G. Laues (“the Laues”), preceded pro se, and filed a complaint claiming that the defendants fraudulently conveyed their property and improperly bifurcated their note and mortgage. The plaintiff’s sought to quiet title by extinguishing Defendants’ interest in the property. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). After considering the arguments the court ultimately granted the defendant’s motion.

Plaintiff alleged that MERS lacked authority to assign the mortgages, which would make the subsequent assignments invalid. MERS acted as nominee for lender AWL in assigning the mortgages. The court found that the plaintiffs were not a party to the assignment and as such was not threatened with double liability on the debt. Thus the court determined that they had no standing to challenge the assignment.

December 24, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments

Michigan Court Dismisses State Claims Against 13 Defendants – Including Wells Fargo

By Ebube Okoli

The court in deciding Berry v. Main St. Bank, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147915 ( E.D. Mich. 2013) granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff Erik Berry initiated this action against thirteen defendants, including Defendant Wells Fargo, in state court seeking to redress alleged improprieties in the foreclosure of his home. Wells Fargo filed a motion seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. The court ultimately granted Wells Fargo’s motion and dismissed this action without prejudice.

The court found significant portions of the plaintiff’s complaint and response were dedicated to challenging the validity of the note, mortgage, and assignment. Although plaintiff relied on case law from several states other than Michigan, the court construed the complaint as alleging that (1) the splitting of the note and mortgage rendered the assignment from MERS acting as nominee for Main Street Bank to Wells Fargo defective, (2) because the assignment was invalid, no record chain of title evidencing the assignment of the mortgage existed as required by Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.3204(3), and (3) this chain of title defect deprived Wells Fargo of the authority to initiate foreclosure proceedings. The court rejected these arguments.

Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss was ultimately granted and plaintiff’s claims were dismissed without prejudice.

December 24, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments

Michigan Court Dismisses MCPA & HOEPA Claims

By Ebube Okoli

The court in deciding Huff v. Fannie Mae, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148053 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 2013) granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff advanced a claim against defendants for quiet title (Count I) and alleged that defendants violated the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”) (Count II). In response plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Defendants asserted that all of the plaintiff’s claims should be barred either by res judicata or by the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Additionally, defendants argued that plaintiff’s quiet title claim; claims under the MCPA, and HOEPA lacked the factual allegations required for the court to find in plaintiff’s favor.

Plaintiff asserted that his complaint adequately plead claims against defendants for quiet title and violations of state and federal law. The court ultimately found that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

December 24, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments

Illinois Court Finds Statute of Limitation Barres TILA & Fraud Claims

By Ebube Okoli

The court in deciding Gater v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149872 (N.D. Ill. 2013) granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff alleged violations of Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, et seq. claim (Count I), and an Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Fraud Act), 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq. claim (Count II). Bank of America moved to dismiss the action.

The court found that the statute of limitations periods barred plaintiff’s claims, thus the court granted the motion to dismiss.

December 24, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments

Washington Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s State Consumer Protection Act Claim

By Ebube Okoli

The court in deciding Massey v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148402 (W.D. Wash. 2013) granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

Plaintiff Cindy T. Massey claimed that Northwest Trustee’s conduct in connection with the nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on her property violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”). Ms. Massey had not filed an opposition to Northwest Trustee’s motion for summary judgment. The court considered Northwest Trustee’s motion, all submissions filed in support, the applicable law, and the balance of the record. After considering the arguments, the court eventually granted Northwest Trustee’s motion.

December 24, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments