July 16, 2013
Mortgage Bankers Ask Permission to Hijack GSE Reform
The Mortgage Bankers Association issued a concept paper that calls for a board of mortgage industry representatives to “have the authority to direct the scope and immediate priorities of the [Central Securitization] Platform’s development, and the capability to redirect resources from the GSEs’ back offices to aid the project.” (3) So, to be clear, the mortgage industry wants not only to (a) define the scope and activities of the Platform but also (B) tell Fannie and Freddie how to spend their money to do so. As Christmas is still a ways away, let’s spend some time working through this industry wishlist in the concept paper, The Central Securitization Platform: Direction, Scope, and Governance.
To start, what is the purpose of this mysterious “Platform?” According to the FHFA, it is supposed to “streamline and simplify those functions that are commoditized and routinely repeated across the secondary mortgage market.”(Building a New Infrastructure for the Secondary Mortgage Market, 5-6)
The MBA is calling for the establishment of “a strong panel of industry representatives to guide the development of the Platform.” (1)
But here is where I become nervous: “this Platform is just one piece of a much larger puzzle that impacts borrowers, lenders and the market as a whole. For these reasons, it is critical to appoint an industry advisory panel with real authority over the Platform’s early development. FHFA should establish and convene this panel before any further development is undertaken.” (2, emphasis added) Moreover, the MBA “believes the Platform should ultimately be owned by the industry as a cooperative.” (2)
So we have an acknowledgement that the Platform impacts “borrowers” and “the market as a whole.” But we have a call for a board with real powers that is only made up of “industry representatives.” Where have I heard a similar story like this before? Oh, the Mortgage Electronic Recording System (MERS), a system designed by the mortgage industry that has been consistently attacked by local government officials and borrowers.
For now, I am agnostic as to whether the Platform is a good idea or not. But I certainly do not believe that only the industry should have the power to define its “scope and activities” and I certainly don’t believe that the industry should have the power to spend Fannie and Freddie’s money to pursue its vision. There are a lot more interests at stake than just the special interests represented by the MBA.
July 16, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Minnesota Court Holds MERS Foreclosure Valid, Although Signatories on the Assignment Were Officers of More Than One Entity
The court in deciding Ostigaard v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al., No. 0:10cv1557, (May 2, 2011) granted MERS as well as its codefendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The court heavily relied on the holding from an earlier case [Jackson v. MERS].
The plaintiff made the allegation that the foreclosure was invalid, claiming that the signatories on the assignment were officers of more than one entity. The court, in rejecting the plaintiff’s notion, found that “In [Jackson v. MERS], the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the operation of MERS and noted ‘legislative approval of MERS practices’ by the Minnesota Legislature. The Jackson court also recognized that MERS shares officers with some of the lenders with which it works. Consequently, the plaintiff’s argument failed.” Likewise, the court also rejected the plaintiff’s contention that his inability to contact the MERS signing officer who executed the assignment was a denial of due process.
July 16, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Minnesota District Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Fraud Claims and Holds That MERS Had Legal Title and Authority to Foreclose
The Minnesota District Court in Allen v. Wilford & Geske et al.,No. 70-CV-10-29502 (D. Minn. May 9, 2011), after hearing the plaintiff’s contentions, dismissed his complaint for foreclosure fraud. The court held that MERS had legal title and authority to foreclose.
By granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court found that, “MERS was not required to register every assignment of the loan or to track that history in its foreclosure documents…” and “…it was not a misrepresentation for MERS to identify itself as the mortgagee in the foreclosure documents and not to identify all past and present lenders.”
July 16, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
California Court Affirms MERS’ Authority to Assign its Interest Under a Deed of Trust
The court in Hollins v. ReconTrust et al., Civil No. 2:11-cv-00945-PSG –PLA (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2011) affirmed MERS’ authority to assign its interest under a deed of trust and granted MERS’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs claimed that the foreclosure proceedings initiated by the U.S. Bank as well as ReconTrust were not valid. Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that MERS lacked the authority to assign the deed of trust.
The court considered the plaintiff’s contentions, but rejected the argument. In rejecting the palintiff’s argument, the court found that “federal and state courts in California have repeatedly rejected similar challenges to MERS in cases where the plaintiff expressly authorized MERS to act as a beneficiary.” Regarding the plaintiffs’ allegation that U.S. Bank was not authorized to foreclose due to lack of “documentation evidencing the proper status of U.S. Bank as a party in interest,” the court found the allegation “negated by a judicially noticeable record of assignment from MERS to U.S. Bank.” Last but not least, the plaintiffs’ failure to tender was fatal to their claims.
July 16, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Jefferson County Circuit Court Holds That Fannie Mae Had Standing to Bring Ejectment Action
The circuit court in Fannie Mae v. Steele, Jefferson County Circuit Court No. 09-900069 (May 18, 2011) found in favor of the plaintiff [Fannie Mae], by deciding to deny the defendants’ motion to set aside the judgment for possession. The defendants contended that the judgment in favor of Fannie Mae should be vacated on the grounds it was void due to MERS’ assignment of the mortgage to Everhome Mortgage. Everhome Mortgage was the party who conveyed the property to Fannie Mae through foreclosure deed.
The defendants also argued that Fannie Mae lacked standing to eject the defendants. This claim was premised on the holding from to Crum v. LaSalle Bank, 2009 WL 2986655 (Ala. Civ. App. Sept. 18, 2009). After considering the defendants’ contentions, the court held that the MERS assignment to Everhome was valid because MERS had the ability to assign the mortgage and take other actions as the nominee of the lender and its assigns. Likewise, the court also held that Fannie Mae had standing to bring the ejectment action.
July 16, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
July 15, 2013
Where’s Perry? Are Phannie and Freddie Busted?!?
With all apologies to Perry the Platypus who stars in my sons’ favorite TV show, Phineas and Ferb, today I look at the complaint in Perry Capital, LLC v. Lew et al. Perry Capital has sued the federal government for destroying the value of Fannie and Freddie securities held by Perry and the investment funds it manages. In particular, the complaint (drafted by Theodore Olson and others at Gibson Dunn) states that
Perry Capital seeks to prevent Defendants from giving effect to or enforcing the so-called Third Amendment to preferred stock purchase agreements (“PSPAs”) executed by Treasury and the FHFA, acting as conservator for the Companies. The Third Amendment fundamentally and unfairly alters the structure and nature of the securities Treasury purchased under the PSPAs, impermissibly destroys value in all of the Companies’ privately held securities, and illegally begins to liquidate the Companies. (2)
The plaintiff alleges that the government’s actions violate the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA). The APA governs the decision-making procedures of federal agencies like Treasury and independent agencies like the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). HERA was passed at the outset of the financial crisis and governs the process by which Fannie and Freddie may be put into conservatorship. (I discuss the enactment of HERA in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, which is also available on BePress.)
[Warning: necessary but complex details follow. Those who are not GSE geeks may skip to the end.]
After the two companies were put into conservatorship in 2008,
Treasury and the FHFA executed the PSPAs, according to which Treasury purchased 1 million shares of the Government Preferred Stock from each company, in exchange for a funding commitment that allowed each company to draw up to $100 billion from Treasury as needed to ensure that they maintained a net worth of at least zero. As relevant here, the Government Preferred Stock for each company has a liquidation preference equal to $1 billion plus the sum of all draws by each company against Treasury’s funding commitment and is entitled to a cumulative dividend equal to ten percent of the outstanding liquidation preference. The PSPAs also grant Treasury warrants to purchase up to 79.9% of each company’s common stock at a nominal price. (2-3)
According to the complaint, the Third Amendment to the PSPA changed the way that profits would be distributed by the two companies:
Under the original stock certificates, Treasury’s dividend was paid quarterly in the amount equal to an annual ten percent of the Government Preferred Stock’s outstanding liquidation preference. In the Third Amendment, the FHFA and Treasury amended the dividend provision to require that every dollar of each company’s net worth above a certain capital reserve amount be given to Treasury as a dividend. . . . Treasury’s additional profits from the Third Amendment are enormous. (5)
This is a very complex case, and I will return to it in future posts. For now, I would just flag some issues that may pose problems for Perry.
First, is this case ripe for adjudication? Perry states that they will be harmed when the two companies liquidate, but they are nowhere near liquidation. Will the harm Perry predicts necessarily come about? The claim that they are harmed as to their expected dividends is stronger. Yet Perry acknowledges that the PSPAs “explicitly prohibit the payment of any dividend to any shareholder other than Treasury without Treasury’s consent.” (16)
Second, to what extent is this matter governed by the APA? I am not an APA expert, and I am wary of second-guessing Olson’s complaint in a blog post. But I would note that the court may not find that the APA even applies in this case and may find that HERA governs this dispute on its own. And even if the APA applies, the court may give great deference to the decisions of Treasury and the FHFA.
Finally, does the language from HERA that Perry relies on really give it much to hang its hat on? I think the crux of Perry’s argument is that the Third Amendment “created new securities” instead of changing the terms of existing securities. (24) If a court disagrees with Perry on this (and it seems like a bit of a stretch to me), the theory of the case will be severely weakened.
All of this being said, I would agree with Perry that the holders of the Private Sector Preferred Stock — particularly the holders that predate conservatorship — look like they are receiving a raw deal from the federal government. Various regulations encouraged lending institutions to hold Fannie and Freddie preferred stock over other investments. Those incentives sure looked like an implied guarantee before the subprime crisis knocked Fannie and Freddie off their feet.
Bottom line: this dispute cannot be settled in a late night blog post. We’ll have to wait and see if Agent P can pull off what may be his most difficult mission yet.
July 15, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Oregon Court Holds That Oregon’s Non-Judicial Foreclosure Statute Does Not Require Presentment of the Note
The court in Buckland v. Aurora Loan Services, Josephine County No. 10 CV 1023 (March 18, 2011) granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for wrongful foreclosure with prejudice.
MERS, although not being a party to the case, the plaintiff’s complaint contained claims that MERS lacked the power to appoint a trustee as it was not the beneficiary of the plaintiff’s deed of trust. The plaintiff’s complaint also alleged that Aurora was required to prove it was the note holder before directing the trustee to non-judicially foreclose. The court considered the plaintiff’s contentions, but ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.
The court relied on the cases cited in Aurora’s motion to dismiss, including Stewart v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (holding that presentment of note not required and MERS is a valid deed of trust beneficiary). The court ultimately held that Oregon’s non-judicial foreclosure statute does not require presentment of the note.
July 15, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
