June 6, 2013
Massachusetts’s District Court Finds That Non-Party Mortgagors Lack Standing to Challenge Assignment Between Third Parties
In Aliberti v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, 779 F.Supp.2d 242 (D.Mass.2011), the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff sought to stay GMAC’s foreclosure proceeding by challenging the assignment of the mortgage from MERS to GMAC. Plaintiff filed a three-count compliant that alleged, fraud, violations of Massachusetts’s foreclosure procedural law, and challenged the validity of the assignment.
Plaintiff alleged that the GMAC’s signatory who authorized the assignment was a “well known robo signer” and therefore the plaintiff had reason to believe that the signature on the assignment of the Mortgage was not genuine. The court rejected this argument, noting that an assignment is presumptively valid and the plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to challenge its presumptive validity. Further since the assignment satisfied the requirements of Massachusetts law they are deemed valid.
Next the plaintiff alleged that the assignment was invalid because MERS was never actually the mortgagee. Although, the mortgage stated that MERS was the mortgagee it also stated that “MERS is a separate corporation acting solely as a nominee for the lender and lender’s successors and assigns,” plaintiff alleged that MERS could not be both the agent as the nominee and the principal as the mortgagee to the same property right. Plaintiffs further claim GMAC could not demonstrate valid assignment of the promissory note, and that, because it could not establish valid assignment of both the mortgage and the promissory note, it had no right to foreclose on the property.
In addressing whether the assignment was valid, the court sided with the GMAC’s argument that the plaintiffs, as mortgagors, had no standing to challenge the validity of a mortgage assignment between the mortgagee and a third party. The court relied on the holding in Livonia Property Holdings, LLC. V. 12840-12978 Farmington Road Holdings, LLC., 717 F.Supp 2d 727, 735 (E.D. Mich. 2010). On similar facts, the court in Livonia, held that a borrower, as a non-party to the assignment documents it was challenging, lacked standing to challenge them.
Lastly, plaintiffs contented that GMAC’s refusal to negotiate loan modification was in violation of Massachusetts’s law. The court also rejected the contention that GMAC’s failure to negotiate constituted a violation. Under Massachusetts’s case law, absent an explicit provision in the mortgage contract, there is no duty to negotiate for loan modification once a mortgagor defaults.
June 6, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
June 5, 2013
The Mortgage Interest Deduction: A Taxing Expenditure
The Congressional Budget Office has issued a report, The Distribution of Major Tax Expenditures in the Individual Income Tax System, which evaluates the mortgage interest deduction and the state and local tax deduction among other tax expenditures. It finds (consistent with all previous findings) that they accrue disproportionately — grossly so — to the wealthy. The mortgage interest deduction has a budgetary effect of $70 billion and the state and local tax deduction has a budgetary effect of $77 billion. (6, Table 1) (to be clear, budgetary effect is not the same as lost revenue; read the report for an explanation of the difference)
Itemized deductions such as these “provide the largest benefits — in both absolute dollars and relative to income — to the highest-income taxpayers. Those tax expenditures benefit only the roughly one-third of taxpayers who itemize their deductions, and lower-income taxpayers are much less likely than higher-income taxpayers to do so.” (17) The CBO “estimates that the top quintile will receive almost three-quarters of the benefit of the deduction in 2013, including 15 percent accruing to the top percentile.” (18)
I and many, many others have argued that this is not a good state of affairs but the real estate industry are very well organized around this issue. Real estate brokers are particularly focused on this because a reduction in these deductions would likely lead to a significant and permanent reduction in their income. Smaller deductions would make owning a home less financially attractive and thereby push down prices. Brokers typically get paid by a percentage commission of the sales price. So they would suffer not just during a transition period (as sellers in the transition period would) but for all time.
So there is no reason to believe that we will see reform around these regressive tax expenditures in the near future, but it should always be kept on the table as part of a tax reform package, particularly if it is implemented in some incremental way (for example, capping the value of the deductions individually or as part of a basket of deductions).
June 5, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Massachusetts District Court Rejects Homeowner-Plaintiff’s Challenge of the Validity of MERS’s Assignment in a Foreclosure Proceeding
In Kiah v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, No. 10-40161-FDA, 2011 WL 841282 (D.Mass. Mar.4, 2011), the plaintiff-homeowner alleged that discrepancies in the assignment process prevented the foreclosing party [Aurora Loan Services, LLC] from having statutory power to initiate such proceedings. The plaintiff, on several grounds, challenged Aurora’s standing to bring such an action.
The plaintiff contended that MERS did not have the power to assign the mortgage to Aurora and that Aurora therefore cannot foreclose on the plaintiff’s property because it is not the mortgagee. The plaintiff did not, however, dispute Aurora’s possession of the note or challenge Aurora’s substantive right to enforce the note.
The question of mortgage ownership arose out of bankruptcy of the loan originator. The plaintiff argued that originator filed for bankruptcy and was dissolved before the mortgage was assigned to Aurora, that MERS could not act on behalf of a non-existent entity, and therefore MERS did not have the legal power to transfer the plaintiff’s mortgage to Aurora. The plaintiff argued that the assignment of the mortgage and the mortgage itself were therefore void as a result.
In deciding whether the mortgage and assignment were void the court focused on the assignment of the note and rejected the plaintiff’s contentions because he did not challenge the validity of the assignment of the note to Aurora. By law in Massachusetts, the transfer of the note automatically transfers an equitable interest in the underlying mortgage, even without a formal assignment. Thus, an equitable right in the mortgage was transferred to Aurora along with the note.
The plaintiff’s claim that the assignment was fraudulent was also without merit. The plaintiff alleged that Aurora cannot be the mortgagee if another entity owns the debt and that the assignment of the mortgage to Aurora is therefore fraudulent. The Court found that Aurora was acting in their capacity as a servicer and as such could act on behalf of Fannie Mae, the owner of the debt. Thus, as Fannie Mae’s agent, Aurora has the right to both collect debt and foreclose on the mortgage.
The plaintiff also alleged that the assignment was invalid as it was backdated and that MERS lacked the authority to have the mortgage assigned. Plaintiff asserted that the “backdating of the document was part of a scheme and conspiracy of fraudulent conveyance.” Plaintiff argued that the assignment was ineffective because MERS’s signing officer lacked the signatory authority at the time of the assignment to Aurora. The court found both of these contentions without merit. First, the signing officer had signatory authority on the date of assignment given to him by MERS’ “Corporate Resolution” that predated the assignment. Second, the Court found that even if the signing officer lacked the authority to assign the mortgage, this would not invalidate the assignment under Massachusetts law.
Plaintiff further contended that an assignment of a mortgage is invalid unless the note is transferred with it. As such Plaintiff alleged that MERS could not have assigned the mortgage because it did not have physical possession of, or a beneficial interest in, the note, and therefore the assignment is void. The Court found that even if MERS was not in possession of or a beneficial interest in the note, this claim fails because MERS was holding the mortgage in trust for Aurora. The assignment of mortgage, therefore, would still be valid.
June 5, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
June 4, 2013
Effect of Qualified Mortgages on Credit Availability: Little to None
The Congressional Research Service has issued a somewhat opaque report, The Ability-to-Repay Rule: Possible Effects of the Qualified Mortgage Definition on Credit Availability and Other Selected Issues, that summarizes the Ability-to-Repay Rule. More importantly, it offers a bit of an evaluation of the impact of the new regulatory regime for mortgages on the availability of credit.
According to the CFPB, “close to 100% of the 2011 mortgage market would have been in compliance with the” Ability-to-Repay Rule. (9) The CFPB thus believes that the rule will “have a minimal effect on access to credit.” (9) The report reviews two alternative estimates, one by CoreLogic and another by Amherst Securities, that offer a less optimistic forecast.
CoreLogic uses 2010 data for its analysis. The CRS appears to agree with me that the CoreLogic report is misleading, but it does report that CoreLogic believes that nearly half of all mortgages will not meet the Qualified Mortgage rules once temporary compliance options for the rule expire. I do not credit the CoreLogic report and would discount its findings for the reasons that I have given previously and for the additional reasons contained in the CRS report.
Amherst takes a look at jumbo mortgages in 2012 and finds that a significant portion of them would not comply with the rule. I have not seen the Amherst report, so I can only respond to what I read about it in the CRS report. The bottom line appears that about eight percent of jumbos are likely not to comply with the rule. Given that jumbos make up about 10% of the mortgage market (at least according to CoreLogic), we are talking about one percent of the total residential mortgage market. Many of those non-complying mortgages do not comply because of limitations on debt-to-income ratio. Thus, it would appear that the affected borrowers could get mortgages for smaller amounts that would comply with the rule.
I think it is safe to say that based on what we know now, the rule will have an extremely modest effect on credit availability.
June 4, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Rhode Island Superior Court: Homeowners Lack Standing to Challenge MERS Assignment
In Scarcello v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., et al, C.A. No. KC 2011-0548 (R.I. Super. June 26, 2012), the court granted defendant MERS’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint challenging assignee Aurora’s standing to foreclose and seeking an order to quiet title on the property. Plaintiff homeowners executed a note and mortgage for the property to MERS as nominee for Homecomings Financial Network, Inc., which were later assigned by MERS to Aurora Loan Services, Inc. After plaintiffs defaulted, Aurora foreclosed and subsequently sold the property. Plaintiff homeowners alleged that Aurora, as assignee, lacked standing to foreclose and sell the property. The court found the facts of Scarcello similar to those in Kriegel v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, No. PC 2010-7099, 2011 WL 4947398 (R.I. Super. Oct. 13, 2011) stating “it is well established that ‘homeowners lack standing to challenge the propriety of mortgage assignments and the effect those assignments, if any, could have on the underlying obligation.'” Since plaintiff homeowners are not a party to the assignment, they lack standing to challenge the assignment’s validity. Plaintiffs further alleged that the assignment was unenforceable without a power of attorney for the signing party, but the court held that this was not required as MERS’s power to assign the mortgage stems from its designation as mortgagee and nominee of Homecomings, as clearly stated in the mortgage instrument. Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim for relief, and as such, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint.
June 4, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
May 31, 2013
NY Appellate Court Rules Modification Not Enforceable in Foreclosure
The Appellate Division ruled in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Meyers, 2013 Slip Op. 03085 (2d Dep’t), that a failure to negotiate a loan modification in good faith, which is required under NY foreclosure law, does not support the unilateral imposition of a mortgage modification.
The uncontested facts in this case read like one of the well-publicized Alice-in-Wonderland tales of homeowners trying to negotiate a modification with a Red-Queen-like loan servicer:
- Wells Fargo alleges that it is the holder of the note and mortgage but later says that Freddie Mac is
- Wells Fargo tells the homeowners to default in order to get into the loan modification program and then forecloses, although the Wells Fargo representative states that they “had no idea” why the foreclosure had been initiated. (4)
- Wells Fargo repeatedly loses documents sent by the homeowners
- Wells Fargo changes the terms of its modification offer because of a “miscalculation” (4)
The Court upholds the finding that Wells Fargo did not negotiate in good faith. One can only imagine how homeowners feel dealing with such a bureaucratic counter-party: is it grossly incompetent or slyly malevolent?
The Appellate Division notes that the statute at issue provides, “Both the plaintiff and defendant shall negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, including a loan modification, if possible” (8, quoting CPLR 3408[f]). This provision contains no remedies, however, for the failure to do so. The Court then identifies a variety of sanctions that have been employed against mortgagees/servicers pursuant to this statute. These include
- barring them from “collecting interest, legal fee, and expenses” (10)
- imposing exemplary damages
- staying the foreclosure
- imposing a monetary sanction
The Court also noted that it determined in another case that cancelling the mortgage and note was too severe a sanction, one that was not authorized by law. The Court found that the remedy in this case, imposing a modification, was also inappropriate. The court stated that to do so would be to rewrite a contract that had voluntarily been entered into in violation of the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. The court also states that such a unilateral action “is without any source for its authority” and appears inconsistent with CPLR 3408 itself. (12) It is is unclear to me whether the Court is reading the Contracts Clause properly, but I agree that the trial court’s remedy seems extreme on these facts.
(Hat tip Wilson Freyermuth)
May 31, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
June 3, 2013
NY Federal Magistrate Issues Declaratory Ruling That Note Transfer Is Effective
By David Reiss
Magistrate Judge Gold issued an opinion in Robinson v. H & R Block Bank, 12-Civ-4196 (EDNY, May 29, 2013). Professor Dale Whitman posted a commentary about it on the Dirt listserv and he has given us permission to cross-post it here.
Synopsis: Transfer of note and mortgage were effective, despite defects in allonge and mortgage assignment.
This brief opinion by a federal magistrate neatly disposes of a couple of attacks on a secondary market sale of a mortgage. In 2005 Robinson obtained a mortgage loan from Option One. In 2006 he also obtained a second mortgage loan from the same lender. In 2007, he and Option One agreed to consolidate the two loans into a single loan, and Robinson signed a new note and mortgage for the combined balance.
Option One then sold the loan to H & R Block Bank, delivering the note to Block, but it made two errors in doing so. The first was that the endorsement of the note (which was a “special” endorsement to Block) was placed on an allonge, but the allonge was merely placed behind the note in the file, and was not physically affixed (by stapling) to the note until Block did so in 2013.
However, under the New York version of UCC Article 3, “An indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” UCC 3-202(2). Hence, the endorsement on the allonge was not effective as of the date the note was delivered, and in effect the note was unendorsed.
Second, although Option One recorded an assignment of the mortgage to Block in 2008, it mistakenly referred to the original 2005 mortgage rather than the consolidated mortgage of 2007. This error was discovered in 2012, and a “correction assignment” was then recorded with a reference to the correct mortgage.
Later in 2012 Robinson filed an action against Option One and Block, claiming fraud in the mortgage transfer. The court correctly observes that there is no evidence whatever of fraud in any literal sense, but treats the plaintiff’s claim as on attacking the validity of the transfer. Even so, it concludes that the errors were harmless and that Block has the right to foreclose the mortgage.
With respect to the unattached allonge, the court observes that
Any alleged defect concerning the allonge, however, would be immaterial, because an assignment may be made under New York law by physical delivery and not only by written indorsement. … [S]ee also In re Idicula, 484 B.R. 284, 288 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2013) (“An assignment of the note and mortgage can be effectuated by a written instrument or by physical delivery of the instrument from assignor to assignee.”).
On this point the court is plainly correct. Under the current version of the Article 3 (New York has not adopted it, but it’s the relevant version for most DIRT readers), one can become a “holder” only by taking delivery of an endorsed note. However, a person with possession of a negotiable note, but without an endorsement, can be a “nonholder with the rights of a holder” under UCC 3-301(2). The 2011 PEB report on mortgage notes explains it this way:
[This can] occur if the delivery of the note to that person constitutes a “transfer” (as that term is defined in UCC Section 3-203, because transfer of a note “vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the instrument.” Thus, if a holder (who, as seen above, is a person entitled to enforce a note) transfers the note to another person, that other person (the transferee) obtains from the holder the right to enforce the note even if the transferee does not become the holder.
What’s more, “the transferee has a specifically enforceable right to the unqualified indorsement of the transferor.” See UCC § 3-203(c). Thus, since the note in this case was indisputably delivered, the absence of a valid endorsement really doesn’t matter.
The second error, the mortgage assignment with a reference to the wrong mortgage, was equally unimportant. First, it was corrected by a refiling. But even that was unnecessary for purposes of transferring the right to foreclose the mortgage. The reason is the ancient rule that “the mortgage follows the note.” Thus, whoever, has the right to enforce the note (Block, in this case) has the right to foreclose the mortgage as well — whether they have a mortgage assignment or not. As the court says,
Neither is it required that mortgage assignments are recorded, or that they even be in writing, as long as the mortgage and note are actually delivered. In re Feinberg, 442 B.R. 215, 223 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that the holder’s “possession of the note and mortgage attests to their delivery and is sufficient evidence of a valid mortgage assignment”).
The reference to “possession of the mortgage” is a bit peculiar; there is no legal principle that suggests that possession of the actual mortgage document has any legal relevance at all. It is possession of the note that is of critical importance, assuming that the note is negotiable (and it’s clear that this court is making that assumption).
This is a doctrine that is widely misunderstood. Many people have the incorrect belief that somehow, having a recorded chain of mortgage assignments is essential to the right to foreclose the mortgage. Not so, except in perhaps a dozen states where assignments are necessary to carry out nonjudicial foreclosures. (New York, of course, has no nonjudicial foreclosure, and no requirement for assignments at all.)
This is not to suggest that recording a mortgage assignment isn’t a good idea. It can accomplish two significant things for the assignee: (1) It will prevent the assignor from fraudulently releasing or satisfying the mortgage in the public records, allowing the borrower to sell the property free and clear to a bona fide purchaser; and (2) it will ensure that the assignee is entitled to notice of any litigation that might be filed affecting the real estate, such as an eminent domain action or a code enforcement proceeding. But it isn’t necessary to foreclose.
The bottom line: two common errors, often raised by foreclosure defense counsel, are simply red herrings: a failure to endorse the note, and a failure to record an assignment of the mortgage. On the other hand, failure to deliver the note would have been a huge problem for the Bank in this case — but fortunately, the note was indeed delivered.
(HT Mike Siris)
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June 3, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments