REFinBlog

Editor: David Reiss
Cornell Law School

February 9, 2013

Arkansas Supreme Court Holds that MERS is Not a Necessary Party in Foreclosure Proceedings

By Gloria Liu

In MERS, Inc. v. Southwest Homes of Arkansas, 301 S.W.3d 1 (AK S. Ct, 2009), the Supreme Court held that MERS was not a real party in interest and need not be named or served in a foreclosure action by a second mortgage holder. The case arose from a foreclosure on a mortgage granted in a one-acre lot that also had a prior deed of trust. To secure the first mortgage, the borrowers entered into a deed of trust. The lender on that deed of trust was Pulaski Mortgage, the trustee was James C. East, and the borrowers were the Lindseys. MERS was listed on the deed of trust as the “Beneficiary” acting “solely as nominee for Lender,” and “Lender’s successors and assigns.” To secure a second promissory note, the owners of the mortgage granted the mortgage to Southwest Homes. Both mortgages were recorded. Southwest later entered into foreclosure closings and did not serve MERS. The Court found that MERS was at most the mere agent of the lender Pulaski Mortgage Company, Inc., and as such it held no property interest and was not a necessary party.

February 9, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments

February 8, 2013

Minnesota Court of Appeals holds that MERS has Standing to Foreclose By Advertisement

By Gloria Liu

In In re Sina, No. A06-200, 2006 WL 2729544 (MN. Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals of Minnesota held that MERS had standing to foreclose when it held legal title to a mortgage and was acting as nominee for the holder of the note. Candice Sina, the appellant, had executed a mortgage on the property in favor of Maribella.  Maribella then executed an assignment of mortgage in favor of MERS.  After Sina defaulted on her mortgage payment, MERS recorded the assignment and commenced foreclosure proceedings. Although the record showed that a secondary broker serviced the mortgage, the assignment of mortgage was recorded in MERS’s name and by agreement, MERS retained the power to foreclose the mortgage in its name. Therefore, they had standing to foreclose the property by advertisement.

February 8, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments

Nebraska Supreme Court Holds that MERS is Not a Mortgage Broker

By Gloria Liu

In MERS, Inc. v. Nebraska Dept. of Banking & Fin, 704 N.W.2d 784 (NE S. Ct. 2005), the Supreme Court held that MERS was not a mortgage broker under the Mortgage Bankers Registration and Licensing Act. The court agreed with the district court’s characterization of the services provided by MERS. The district court stated that the “MERS system was created to facilitate the transfer of ownership interests and servicing rights in mortgage loans. Under the System, MERS serves as mortgagee of record for participating members through assignment of the members’ interests to MERS. Mortgage lenders participate in the MERS System as members upon completion of a membership application.” Even though the Supreme Court was in agreement with the above characterization it concluded that such services are not equivalent to acquiring mortgage loans, as defined by the Act.

February 8, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments

Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS): A Twenty First Century Creation Navigating An Eighteenth Century Legal System

By Gloria Liu

Thomas Kilpatrick of the University of South Carolina School of Law discusses MERS and argues that MERS is emblematic of the systemic problems leading up to the 2008 housing crisis as it was forged out of the environment which ultimately led to the housing bubble. He asserts further that MERS helped sustain and strengthen the housing bubble, is a lead contributor to the ongoing foreclosure crisis, and is a primary impediment to its swift resolution.

Read article here: https://www.natlawreview.com/article/mers-twenty-first-century-creation-navigating-eighteenth-century-legal-system

February 8, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments

More on DoJ’s S&P Complaint

By David Reiss

I highlighted some of the juicy bits of the complaint a few days ago.  There has been a lot of discussion of the suit and related issues.  Here is my two cents’ worth.

  • FIRREA, an untested enforcement statute, has gone from zero to hero in sixty seconds.  The federal government has had very little experience using the enforcement provisions of FIRREA but commentators have now identified it as a powerful tool to hold financial companies accountable for their misdeeds in the early 2000s.  Time will tell if courts agree that this expansive interpretation will hold up.
  • It is probably no coincidence that the federal government brought the S&P case in California, which is in the 9th Circuit.  Or rather, I should say, it is probably no coincidence that the government did NOT bring it in the 2nd Circuit.  The 2nd Circuit has ruled in favor of the rating agencies even since the events of the financial crisis had become well known, continuing the trend of treating rating agencies as editorialists, albeit terse ones.  Even though Judge Scheindlin (SDNY) has issued a series of rulings against rating agencies, the 2nd Circuit will ultimately rule on any appeals from the cases she hears.  While the 9th Circuit is more of a wild card than other Circuits, there is no doubt that it will go its own way on rating agency liability.
  • It is hard to say whether the federal government is primarily seeking to reform the rating agency industry by bringing this lawsuit (I would assume that similar suits are in the works for Moody’s and Fitch) or whether it is merely seeking to hold it accountable for its alleged bad acts.
  • It is interesting to see how the states are piling on, with lawsuits and investigations in a number of states, including NY.  The rating agencies’ potential liability from all of these suits combined is quite significant — indeed, going-out-of-business significant.
  • And it is scary to realize that for all of the documented flaws in the rating agency industry, no one has come up with a model for the industry that is clearly superior to what we have now.  There is a lot of work to be done.

February 8, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments

Arkansas District Court Dismisses Recording Fee Case

By Gloria Liu

In Brown v. Mers, No. 11-cv-06070 (W.D. Ark., 2012), the Arkansas District Judge dismissed a recording-fee lawsuit filed against MERS and held that state laws do not require mortgage assignments to be recorded. The case had transformed into a class action suit alleging that mortgage assignments were made without the payment of transfer fees to the counties. The court believed that use of the MERS System fulfills the purpose of the recording statutes and payment is made when the mortgage when the mortgage is recorded in public land records. Moreover, Arkansas law does not provide for a duty to record mortgages. Without a duty to record mortgages, the court found that MERS did not deprive defendants of any entitlement.

February 8, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments

February 7, 2013

Minnesota District Court Holds that MERS Could Foreclose on Homeowners’ Property even though MERS was not the Holder of the Promissory Note

By Robert Huberman

In Kraus v. CitiMortgage, Inc., CIV. 11-3213 DWF/FLN, 2012 WL 1581113 (D. Minn. May 4, 2012), the Minnesota District Court found that homeowners/borrowers’ complaint lacked particularity.

Plaintiffs are thirteen homeowners and loan borrowers who executed promissory notes with six different lenders that relate to seven different properties. According to the complaint, five notes were secured by mortgages executed in favor of MERS and two were secured by mortgages executed in favor of CitiMortgage.

Plaintiffs allege that: 1) they executed original promissory notes and mortgages with entities different from Defendants who now claim the legal right to foreclose; 2) Defendants do not have physical possession of the original notes, Defendants sold the original notes through a pooling and servicing agreement, and Defendants purported to transfer legal title to the original notes to a separate and distinct legal entity; 3) Defendants cannot assert the right of foreclosure under the mortgages because they do not have clear legal title to the original notes; and 4) Usset is a law firm acting as an agent for purposes of enforcing defaults on Plaintiffs’ notes and foreclosing their mortgages. Plaintiffs allege that Usset falsely represented that its principal was entitled to foreclose and recorded false documents.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint violated Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. While the Rule 8 pleading standard does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ it does demand ‘more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.’ A complaint will not suffice if it ‘tenders naked assertion[s]’ devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint asserted thirteen causes of action involving thirteen Plaintiffs, seven different mortgage loans and properties, and four separate Defendants. Plaintiffs did not specify which factual claims were asserted against any particular Defendant. Thus, the Court concluded that such pleading was inadequate and that Rule 8 required greater specificity than found in Plaintiffs’ complaint.

Regardless, based on Jackson v. Mortg. Elec.  Registration Sys., Inc.,770 N.W.2d 487, 500 (2009); Stein v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 662 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 2011); and Butler v. Bank of Am., Civil no 11 461, 2011 WL 2728321, at *6 (D. Minn. July 13, 2011), it does not matter whether Defendants could establish that they held the promissory notes in order for Defendants to initiate a foreclosure by advertisement. In addition, Plaintiffs did not allege that Defendants were not the record owners of any mortgage at the time they initiated a foreclosure by advertisement. Further, Plaintiffs did not allege facts showing a defect in the mortgage instrument or mortgage assignment. Thus Plaintiffs failed to establish why Defendants were not entitled to foreclose.

In addition, the court held that Plaintiffs’ fraud claim against Usset fails. Plaintiffs’ fraud claim depended upon the discredited argument that only the holder of the promissory note may foreclose on a mortgage by advertisement. Plaintiffs also failed to allege their fraud claim with sufficient particularity. Thus, ultimately, the court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety.

February 7, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments