January 16, 2013
Class Action Recording Fee Suit in Missouri Dismissed
Jackson County, Missouri v. MERSCorp, Inc., et al., No. 12-0665-CV-W-ODS (W.D. Mo. Jan. 14, 2013) is a suit by Jackson County to recover lost recording fees resulting from the use of MERS. This suit is a class action law suit where the plaintiff county also sought to recover lost fees for all of the counties in Missouri along with St. Louis. The plaintiffs argued that each assignment of a deed of trust within their respective county (or within St. Louis) must be recorded and a recording fee must be paid. In addition to the lost revenue, they also argued that their land records are inaccurate or incomplete because of MERS.
The defendants argued that the plaintiff lacks standing because it cannot recover fees for assignments it never recorded and there is no duty under Missouri law to record deed of trust assignments.
The Court found there was standing because the plaintiff alleged an injury to its financial interest caused by the lost recording fees and inaccurate county land records.
The defendants also argued that there was no private right of action to enforce any violations of statutes regarding recording the assignments. However, the Court found the plaintiffs were not enforcing any statutory requirement to record assignments because the Missouri recording statutes only “encourage” recording, not require them.
The plaintiffs argued the defendants were unjustly enriched because each assignee retained the original assignor’s priority by listing MERS as the beneficiary. However, the Court finds because there is no duty to record assignments, there cannot be unjust enrichment. The defendants did not act improperly by not recording further assignments since it is permissible under Missouri statute.
A claim of civil conspiracy was also dismissed because it relied on the finding of unjust enrichment as the basis of the conspiracy.
Plaintiff also argued that a prima facie tort occurred. This claim requires the plaintiff to establish: (1) an intentional lawful act by defendant; (2) an intent to injure the plaintiff; (3) injury to plaintiff; and (4) insufficient justification for defendant’s action. However, this claim is disfavored under Missouri law, particularly when there are other remedies or tort claims available. However, the defendants argued there was no intent to harm the plaintiffs. The court found no evidence or allegation of malicious intent to injure the plaintiff, as required to satisfy the second prong of the claim. As a result, the claim is dismissed.
The plaintiff’s requests for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief are dismissed because they are remedial actions. Since the court has not found a viable claim for the plaintiff to request remedial action, the court denied the requests.
The court ultimately finds that the plaintiff must convince the legislature to change the statute to create a legal duty to record assignments in order to recover from the defendants (with a private right of action that the plaintiffs can avail of). As a result, the motion to dismiss the claim was granted.
January 16, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
January 15, 2013
Land Use Controls Caused The Financial Crisis?
Respected Housng Economist Edwin Mills and co-author B.N. Jansen write in their article, “Distortions Resulting from Residential Land Use Controls in Metropolitan Areas”,
The strong conclusion of this paper is that stringent residential land use controls were a primary cause of the massive house price inflation from about 1992 to 2006 and possibly of the deflation that started in 2007.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine another plausible cause of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Popular accounts simply refer to a speculative housing price bubble. But productivity growth in housing construction is faster than in the economy as a whole [citation omitted] and the US has an aggressive and competitive housing construction sector. In the absence of excessive controls, housing construction would quickly deflate a speculative housing price bubble.
A final comment is that there appears to be no interest at any level of government, or among the articulate population, in reducing the stringency of land use controls. Indeed, recent trends are in the opposite direction. (200)
Jansen and Mills rely heavily on a dataset constructed by Joseph Gyourko and others to analyze local land use control stringency. I am not in a position to evaluate the dataset or the model that they use, but their findings are consistent with those of Gyourko and Edward Glaeser in Rethinking Federal Homeownership Policy.
It seems to me that Jansen and Mills overstate their case quite a bit — stringent land use controls may have been a necessary condition for the bubble, but I can’t see how their argument demonstrates that it was sufficient unto itself. That being said, I would agree wholeheartedly that this hypothesis is worthy of serious study. The relationship between land use and housing policy is way more important than most members of the “articulate population” understand.
January 15, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
January 13, 2013
United States Bankruptcy Court Bound by Precedent to Recognize Bank’s Standing in Foreclosure Action, but Opines on MERS’s Flawed Assignment Process and Status as Agent
In In re Agard, 444 BR 231, 235 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) vacated in part sub nom. Agard v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., BR 8-10-77338 REG (E.D.N.Y. 2012), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York held that U.S. Bank, the assignee bank in this case, had standing to foreclose because the state court had already determined that the assignment of the mortgage by MERS to U.S. Bank was a valid assignment. The court stated the issue as follows: “[homeowner] argues that the only interest U.S. Bank holds in the underlying mortgage was received by way of an assignment from. . . MERS, as a ‘nominee’ for the original lender. [Homeowner]’s argument raises a fundamental question as to whether MERS had the legal authority to assign a valid and enforceable interest in the subject mortgage.”
In holding for U.S. Bank, the court stated the homeowner’s argument had to be rejected because of the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court stated, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is derived from two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), which together stand for the proposition that lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to sit in direct appellate review of state court judgments.” Also, the court found that res judicata precludes the homeowner from prevailing here: “The state court already has determined that U.S. Bank is a secured creditor with standing to foreclose and this Court cannot alter that determination in order to deny U.S. Bank standing to seek relief from the automatic stay.”
However, the court in this case found it necessary to expound upon whether it believed that U.S. Bank had standing to foreclose, despite the state court’s binding opinion. “[T]he Court believes that it is appropriate to set forth its analysis on the issue of whether [U.S. Bank], absent the Judgment of Foreclosure, would have standing to bring the instant motion.” The court began its analysis by stating, “in order to have standing to seek relief from stay, [U.S. Bank]. . . must show that [it] holds both the Mortgage and the Note. . . [U.S. Bank] can prove that [it] is the holder of the Note by providing the Court with proof of a written assignment of the Note, or by demonstrating that [it] has physical possession of the Note endorsed over to it. . . the Assignment of Mortgage is not sufficient to establish an effective assignment of the Note.” Therefore, U.S. Bank would have to show that MERS both assigned the note and that it had authority to assign the note. Regarding MERS’s authority to assign the note, the court held, “[w]hat remains undisputed is that MERS did not have any rights with respect to the Note and other than as described above, MERS played no role in the transfer of the Note… [U.S. Bank]’s failure to show that [it] holds the Note should be fatal to the Movant’s standing.”
Furthermore, the court took issue with MERS’s status as agent of the original mortgagee. The court stated, “the record of this case is insufficient to prove that an agency relationship exists under the laws of the state of New York between MERS and its members. According to MERS, the principal/agent relationship among itself and its members is created by the MERS rules of membership and terms and conditions, as well as the Mortgage itself. However, none of the documents expressly creates an agency relationship or even mentions the word “agency.” MERS would have this Court cobble together the documents and draw inferences from the words contained in those documents.” The court went even further in its criticism, saying, “Aside from the inappropriate reliance upon the statutory definition of ‘mortgagee,’ MERS’s position that it can be both the mortgagee and an agent of the mortgagee is absurd, at best. . . . even if MERS had assigned the Mortgage acting on behalf of the entity which held the Note at the time of the assignment, this Court finds that MERS did not have authority, as ‘nominee’ or agent, to assign the Mortgage absent a showing that it was given specific written directions by its principal. This Court finds that MERS’s theory that it can act as a ‘common agent’ for undisclosed principals is not support by the law. The relationship between MERS and its lenders and its distortion of its alleged ‘nominee’ status was appropriately described by the Supreme Court of Kansas as follows: ‘The parties appear to have defined the word [nominee] in much the same way that the blind men of Indian legend described an elephant – their description depended on which part they were touching at any given time.’ ”
Absent the state court precedent that the court was bound to follow, the court likely would have emphatically refused to recognize MERS’s authority to assign the note as well as the mortgage, and in turn would have prevented U.S. Bank from proceeding with the foreclosure. Thus, in future cases before the court with similar facts that are not bound by state law precedent, MERS and any assignee bank will not have standing to foreclose.
January 13, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
January 12, 2013
New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Aurora Loan Servicing’s Foreclosure Judgment, Rejecting Homeowners’ “Exceptional Circumstances” Argument
In Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Pagano, A-3887-10T1, 2011 WL 6153634 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 13, 2011) the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Atlantic County, affirmed the denial of defendant/homeowners’ motion to vacate their default judgment of foreclosure.
Michael and Janet Pagano had first executed their note and mortgage in July 2007. After defaulting in June 2008, Aurora Loan Servicing commenced a foreclosure action in September 2008, stating the note and mortgage had been assigned to them by MERS, as nominee for AHM Mortgage. Michael Pagano then filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy. However, Aurora received an order lifting the bankruptcy’s automatic stay, and a final judgment of foreclosure by default was entered in August 2009. After one pro se motion to vacate and a failed attempt at mediation, the Paganos sought to reargue under R. 4:50-1(f) and the “new law” made in Bank of New York v. Raftogianis, standing for the proposition that “foreclosing plaintiff[s] must have had ownership or control of the underlying debt as of the date of filing of the complaint.”
However, the trial judge found defendants’ motion time-barred and without justification for delay under R. 4:50-l(f). Further, the judge disagreed with defendants’ characterization of the earlier decisions as a “change in law” and concluded the foreclosure was “entirely appropriate.” On appeal, defendants argued exceptional circumstances were present to justify vacating the foreclosure, relying on the general recognition by the judiciary of controlling the integrity of the foreclosure process. However, because these matters were not presented to the trial judge, the court found they were precluded from addressing them. Further, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge’s reliance on the bankruptcy records, and found the foreclosure process “consistent with the interests of the holder of the debt” and that defendants were time-barred. Finally, the court addressed defendants’ exceptional circumstances argument and found that “new developments in case law generally do not qualify as such an extraordinary circumstance as to justify relief from a final judgment.” (internal citations omitted). Because there were no exceptional circumstances that would result in a grave injustice here, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court in its entirety.
January 12, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
New Jersey Appellate Division Finds Bank of New York Does Not Have Standing to Prosecute Foreclosure Action
In Bank of New York As Tr. For Certificate Holders CWABS, Inc. v. Cupo, A-1212-10T2, 2012 WL 611849 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 28, 2012) the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey ruled in favor of homeowner Alexander Cupo’s motion challenging the propriety of Bank of New York’s foreclosure. In reversing the trial court, the Appellate Division cited Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Mitchell for the prevailing standard in New Jersey that “a foreclosing mortgagee must demonstrate that it had the legal authority to enforce the promissory note at the time it filed the original complaint for foreclosure.” Here, because MERS, as nominee for the original lender (Countrywide) had assigned the promissory note and mortgage to plaintiff (Bank of New York) thirty-nine days after the complaint was filed, the court found Bank of New York did not have standing as an assignee to prosecute this foreclosure action. However, the court also remanded for purposes of determining whether there was an alternative basis to achieve standing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-301.
January 12, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
January 11, 2013
Before The Next Crisis: Now’s The Time to Rethink The Martin Act
The Martin Act, New York State’s far-reaching securities fraud statute, has been a powerful tool for New York law enforcement officials to pursue wrongdoing by financial institutions. It has a broad definition of fraud and a long statute of limitations. NY Attorneys General like Spitzer, Cuomo and Schneiderman have used it to bring whole industries in line.
The act has faced criticism from the financial sector for being farther reaching than federal securities laws and comparable statutes in other states. Because it is such a powerful too, various groups have promoted various amendments to increase its potency. The financial sector has opposed these attempts (and here) over the last few years to expand its reach by, for instance, creating a private right of action. Manhattan District Attorney Vance has also called for the Martin Act’s statute of limitations (currently six years or two years from when the injured party discovered or could have reasonably discovered fraudulent behavior) to be extended. The financial sector would not welcome such a move either, of course.
With the six year statute of limitations soon to run out on actions from the Subprime Boom, we should ask ourselves — how broad should the Martin Act be? On the one hand, New York must treat businesses fairly for fairness’ sake but also to maintain its dominant position as a global capital of capital. On the other hand, fairness demands that wrongdoers be punished and fraud be deterred by vigorous enforcement.
Now that we are about to have a breather between the last crisis and the next, we should try to come up with a principled balance between those two goals. That balance should be struck while our cooler heads are prevailing.
January 11, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division Holds that Assignee Bank Lacks Standing to Foreclose for Failure to Provide Evidence of Valid Note Assignment
In Bank of New York v Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274 (2d Dept. 2011), the court stated, “[t]he principal issue ripe for determination by this Court . . . is whether MERS, as nominee and mortgagee for purposes of recording, can assign the right to foreclose upon a mortgage to a [bank] in a foreclosure action absent MERS’s right to, or possession of, the actual underlying promissory note.” In making this determination, the court outlined the following rules regarding standing in foreclosure proceedings: “[i]n a mortgage foreclosure action, a [bank] has standing where it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced. . . . [A]n assignment of a note and mortgage need not be in writing and can be effectuated by physical delivery.”
The court found that in this case, “as ‘nominee,’ MERS’s authority was limited to only those powers which were specifically conferred to it and authorized by the [original mortgagee]. Hence, although . . . MERS [had] the right to assign the mortgages themselves, it did not specifically [have] the right to assign the underlying notes, and the assignment of the notes was thus beyond MERS’s authority.” Based on these findings, the court concluded, “MERS was never the lawful holder or assignee of the notes described and identified in the consolidation agreement, the corrected assignment of mortgage is a nullity, and MERS was without authority to assign the power to foreclose to the [bank]. Consequently, the [bank] failed to show that it had standing to foreclose.”
January 11, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
