REFinBlog

Editor: David Reiss
Cornell Law School

October 9, 2017

Monday’s Adjudication Roundup

By Jamila Moore

  • A decade ago, Greenberg Trauig LLP allegedly participated in a Ponzi scheme involving mortgages. Recently, the entity settled its issues with their accusers for $9.75 million.  A federal bankruptcy judge in Arizona approved the settlement, and quoted the settlement as, “reasonable and a fair compromise.”
  • The state of Texas will soon be in court against T-Mobile. T-Mobile South LLC and Eco-Site LLC sued Brownsville, Texas and their city commission because they rejected the entities’ application to develop a local unused lot. T-Mobile and Eco-Site allege the city unlawfully denied their application.
  • South Korean real estate brokers may believe justice is served regarding their loss of $500,000. The brokers believed they were bribing a Middle Eastern investor; however, the duo were being deceived by an art blogger. The art blogger received a 31/2 years in prison for his actions.

October 9, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments

October 6, 2017

Treasury’s Overreach on Securitization Reform

By David Reiss

Treasury Secretary Mnuchin Being Sworn in by Vice President Pence

The Department of the Treasury released its report, A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities Capital Markets. I will leave it to others to dissect the broader implications of this important document and will just highlight what it has to say about the future of securitization:

Problems related to certain types of securitized products, primarily those backed by subprime mortgage loans, contributed to the financial crisis that precipitated the Great Recession. As a result, the securitization market has acquired a popular reputation as an inherently high-risk asset class and has been regulated as such through numerous post-crisis statutory and rulemaking changes. Such treatment of this market is counterproductive, as securitization, when undertaken in an appropriate manner, can be a vital financial tool to facilitate growth in our domestic economy. Securitization has the potential to help financial intermediaries better manage risk, enhance access to credit, and lower funding costs for both American businesses and consumers. Rather than restrict securitization through regulations, policymakers and regulators should view this component of our capital markets as a byproduct of, and safeguard to, America’s global financial leadership. (91-92, citations omitted)

This analysis of securitization veers toward the incoherent. It acknowledges that relatively unregulated subprime MBS contributed to the Great Recession but it argues that stripping away the regulations that were implemented in response to the financial crisis will safeguard our global financial leadership. How’s that? A full deregulatory push would return us to the pre-crisis environment where mortgage market players will act in their short-term interests, while exposing counter-parties and consumers to greater risks.

Notwithstanding that overreach, the report has some specific recommendations that could make securitization more attractive. These include aligning U.S. regulations with the Basel recommendations that govern the global securitization market; fine-tuning risk retention requirements; and rationalizing the multi-agency rulemaking process.

But it is disturbing when a government report contains a passage like the following, without evaluating whether it is true or not:  “issuers have stated that the increased cost and compliance burdens, lack of standardized definitions, and sometimes ambiguous regulatory guidance has had a negative impact on the issuance of new public securitizations.” (104) The report segues from these complaints right to a set of recommendations to reduce the disclosure requirements for securitizers. It is incumbent on Treasury to evaluate whether those complaints are valid are not, before making recommendations based upon them.

Securitization is here to stay and can meaningfully lower borrowing costs. But the financial crisis has demonstrated that it must be regulated to protect the financial system and the public. There is certainly room to revise the regulations that govern the securitization sector, but a wholesale push to deregulate would be foolish given the events of the 2000s.

October 6, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments

Friday’s Government Reports Roundup

By Jamila Moore

  • 2018 fiscal year budget is forging forward. Recently the House of Representatives passed the 2018 fiscal year budget. Their budget is designed not to increase the national deficit; however, the Senate’s competing fiscal year 2018 budget will increase the national deficit by $1.5 trillion over the course of the next ten years. The Senate’s budget causes such a deficit because it promotes the proposed tax reform efforts as well as reduces the corporate tax rate. While the House beat the Senate to moving forward with 2018 budget plans, the Senate will introduce the bill the week of October 16.
  • Today Americans are better suited to lead financially sound lives; however, there are roughly 26 million Americans that are “credit invisible.” The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), recently released a report that studied the effects of this fact. Through the study they found that many minorities are likely not to have a credit score or fail to have a sufficient credit history, thereby making them “credit invisible.” This may seem like a small issue to mitigate, but without such credit scores, their lives as consumers are limited.

October 6, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments

October 5, 2017

Evolution of the CFPB?

By David Reiss

image by Vector Open Stock

The Mortgage Bankers Association has issued a white paper, CFPB 2.0: Advancing Consumer Protection. The Executive Summary reads, in part,

In its first years, the Bureau’s regulatory expertise was largely consumed by the need to meet deadlines on specific rules required under the Dodd-Frank Act, and its supervision program took time to stand up. In its first years, the Bureau spent relatively little time providing guidance to industry on its expectations.

The combination of aggressive enforcement and the absence of regulatory guidance evolved into a regime of “regulation by enforcement.” Director Richard Cordray has argued that the Bureau’s enforcement regime provides “detailed guidance for compliance officers” and that it “would be ‘compliance malpractice’ for the industry not to take careful bearings from [consent] orders about how to comply with the law.” Unfortunately, the reality is that the Bureau’s enforcement program offers only fragmentary glimpses of how the Bureau interprets the laws and regulations it enforces.

This paper explains why authoritative guidance is still needed. Rather than seeking to provide the equivalent of “detailed guidance” through enforcement, the Bureau should simply provide detailed guidance. Such guidance can be provided in a host of forms, including advisory opinions, bulletins, no-action letters, statements of policy, and answers to frequently asked questions. In contrast to enforcement orders, such guidance can be proactive, efficient, clear and comprehensive, and can allow for stakeholder input and revision when facts and circumstances warrant. (v)

It is hard to argue with the MBA that it is better to regulate by supervision than by enforcement as that allows regulated companies to design policies that meet with their regulatory requirements. As the CFPB matures, I would expect that this would happen naturally. Indeed, the white paper acknowledges the challenges of standing up the CFPB in its first few years of existence that led to the early emphasis on enforcement.

I wonder a bit about the timing of this report. The MBA describes the CFPB as being at a “crossroads.” (19) That crossroads may refer to the Republican control of Congress and the Executive Branch, it may refer to the soon-to-be ending term of Director Cordray, or it may refer to both of those developments. So I wonder if this report is meant to provide some intellectual cover to bigger changes that would reduce the CFPB’s role as America’s consumer protection sheriff. Let’s see where the MBA comes down on those bigger changes once their floated in the coming months. Are they advocating tweaks to the way the CFPB does business or are they looking for some kind of revolution in the regulation of consumer protection?

 

October 5, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments

Thursday’s Advocacy & Think Tank Roundup

By Jamila Moore

  • The federal government wants to lower the number of sexual harassment occurrences in the nation’s housing sector. As a result, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), recently launched an initiative to decrease the amount of sexual harassment in housing practices. The DOJ’s initiative seeks to protect women from unruly landlords, property managers, security guards, and other housing employees. The Department of Justice, Civil Rights division will lead the initiative through the enforcement of the Fair Housing Act.
  • In 2012, 44% of middle class families could afford the inventory of homes being sold. Four short years later, the percentage of middle class families able to afford the inventory of homes decreased by 12% in 2016. In order to aid in the decline, Trump’s Administration must support middle class mortgages. In doing so, the administration will encourage economic growth because middle class families will have the mobility to move to areas that offer better jobs and housing options. Further, many of the nation’s largest metropolitans will become more diverse.

October 5, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments

October 4, 2017

FHFA’s Strategic Plan for Fannie and Freddie

By David Reiss

The Federal Housing Finance Agency released its Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2018-2022 for public input. As discussed in yesterday’s post, Director Watt is very focused on maintaining the health of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Strategic Plan reiterates that focus:

As conservator of the Enterprises, FHFA will also promote stability by working to preserve and conserve the Enterprises’ assets and business operations. Additionally, FHFA will encourage the Enterprises and the housing industry to adopt standards and practices that promote market and stakeholder confidence. (8)

The Plan goes into depth to describe the FHFA’s role as conservator:

The Enterprises were placed into conservatorships in September 2008 in the midst of a severe financial crisis. Their ongoing participation in the housing finance market has been an important factor in maintaining market liquidity and stability. Conservatorship permitted the U.S. Government to take greater control over management of the Enterprises and gave investors in the Enterprises’ debt and MBS confidence that the Enterprises would have the capacity to honor their financial obligations. As conservator, FHFA establishes restrictions and expectations for the Enterprises’ boards and for their managements while authorizing them to conduct the Enterprises’ day-to-day operations.

As detailed earlier, FHFA’s authority as both regulator and conservator of the Enterprises is based upon statutory mandates. FHFA, acting as regulator and conservator, must follow the mandates assigned to it by statute and the missions assigned to the Enterprises by their charters. Congress may choose to revise the statutory mandates governing the Enterprises at any time.

*      *     *

The Enterprises are also parties to PSPAs with the Treasury Department. Under the PSPAs, the Enterprises are provided U.S. taxpayer backing with explicit dollar limits. The PSPA commitment still available to Fannie Mae is $117.6 billion and the commitment still available to Freddie Mac is $140.5 billion. Additional draws would reduce these commitments, and dividend payments do not replenish or increase the commitments under the terms of the PSPAs. Starting in 2013, the PSPAs provided each Enterprise with a capital buffer of $3 billion to protect each Enterprise against making additional draws of taxpayer support in the event of an operating loss in any quarter, and the PSPAs provide mandated declines of $600 million each year to these capital buffers. On January 1, 2017, each Enterprise’s capital buffer declined to $600 million and the capital buffer is scheduled to decline to zero on January 1, 2018.

FHFA continues to encourage Congress to complete the important work of housing finance reform. FHFA has reiterated the urgency of reform and that it is up to Congress to determine what future, if any, the Enterprises will have in the future housing finance system. (16-17)

Reading between the lines, I see the FHFA under Watt doing whatever it has to in order to maintain stability and liquidity in the mortgage markets. If Congress does not act, if the Treasury does not act, I think that Director Watt will go it alone and do what it takes to maintain Fannie and Freddie’s reputation with mortgage lenders and MBS investors.

October 4, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments