Rhode Island Court Rules That under State law, Only Parties to a Contract May Seek to Have Rights Declared Under a Contract

The Rhode Island court in deciding Fryzel v. MERS, No. CA 10-352 (D.Ri., 2011) decided that under Rhode Island law, only parties to a contract may seek to have rights declared under a contract. The court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the transfer of the promissory note or assignment of mortgage granted by Plaintiff.

The plaintiff’s complaint disputed AHMSI’s ability to foreclose by challenging the validity of the assignments of their mortgage. The plaintiff further claimed that AHMSI was not entitled to foreclose under the terms of the ‘Pooling and Servicing Agreement’. However, the court found that it was undisputed that plaintiffs were not parties to the assignment agreements or to the PSA. Thus, plaintiffs did not have standing to assert legal rights based on the specified documents.

Court Holds That Mortgagor Lacks Standing to Challenge the Propriety of Mortgage Assignments Under Rhode Island Law

The Rhode Island magistrate judge in Cosajay v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 10-442-M (D.R.I. June 23, 2011) issued “Reports and Recommendations,” holding that according to Rhode Island law a mortgagor “lacks standing to challenge the propriety of mortgage assignments and the effect those assignments, if any, could have on the underlying obligation.”

The Plaintiff challenged the validity of the assignments on multiple grounds, including MERS’ authority to execute the assignment. The magistrate however determined that under Rhode Island law, only parties to a contract may seek to have rights declared under a contract.

Borden & Reiss on REMIC Failure, in a Big Way

Brad and I posted REMIC Tax Enforcement as Financial-Market Regulator to SSRN (as well as to BePress). The article is forthcoming in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Business and it provides our extended analysis of how the organizers of purported Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs) failed to abide by the requirements necessary to obtain the favorable REMIC tax status. We had addressed this topic in shorter articles here, here, and here, but this is our most comprehensive take on the subject. We look forward to hearing reactions to it.

The abstract reads:

Lawmakers, prosecutors, homeowners, policymakers, investors, news media, scholars and other commentators have examined, litigated, and reported on numerous aspects of the 2008 Financial Crisis and the role that residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) played in that crisis. Big banks create RMBS by pooling mortgage notes into trusts and selling interests in those trusts as RMBS. Absent from prior work related to RMBS securitization is the tax treatment of RMBS mortgage-note pools and the critical role tax enforcement should play in ensuring the integrity of mortgage-note securitization.

This Article is the first to examine federal tax aspects of RMBS mortgage-note pools formed in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis. Tax law provides favorable tax treatment to real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs), a type of RMBS pool. To qualify for the favorable REMIC tax treatment, an RMBS pool must meet several requirements relating to the ownership and quality of mortgage notes. The practices of loan originators and RMBS organizers in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis jeopardize the tax classification of a significant portion of the RMBS pools. Nonetheless, the IRS appears to believe that there is no legal or policy basis for challenging REMIC classification of even the worst RMBS pools. This Article takes issue with the IRS’s inaction and presents both the legal and policy grounds for enforcing tax law by challenging the REMIC classification of at least the worst types of RMBS pools. The Article urges the IRS to take action, recognizing that its failure to police these arrangements prior to the Financial Crisis is partly to blame for the economic meltdown in 2008. The IRS’s continued failure to police RMBS arrangements provides latitude to industry participants, which facilitates future economic catastrophes. Even without the IRS taking action, private parties can rely upon the blueprint set forth in the Article to bring qui tam or whistleblower claims to accomplish the purposes of the REMIC rules and obtain the beneficial results that would occur if the IRS enforced the REMIC rules.

California Court Finds that MERS Was Not Liable for Wrongful Foreclosure, Breach of Contract, and Breach of the Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The United States District Court for the Central District of California hearing Gaitan v. MERS, et al, 09-1009 (C.D. Cal. 2009) found that MERS had the right to initiate foreclosure proceedings. The court also found that MERS was not liable for claims including wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing.

The plaintiff alleged that several flaws in the documents he received proved the mortgage loans were obtained by fraud. Specifically, he alleged that neither the adjustable rate mortgage loan documents nor the truth in lending disclosure statement “clearly and conspicuously disclosed”: (1) the actual interest rate on which the scheduled payments were based; “(2) that making the payments according to the payment schedule listed in the TILD will result in negative amortization and that the principal balance will increase; and (3) that the payment amounts listed on the TILD are insufficient to pay both principal and interest.”

The plaintiff alleged that not only were the disclosure statements “unclear and inconspicuous,” but they were “deceptive” and “based in order to mislead and deceive plaintiff into believing that he would be getting a loan with a low fixed payment rate that would be sufficient to pay both interest and principal.” The court examined each of the claims in the plaintiff’s argument in turn, and determined that the plaintiff failed to argue the viability of any of the claims.

California Court Rules That MERS Did Not Breach the Implied Covenant of Good Faith By Initiating Non-Judicial Foreclosure

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California in Winter v. Chevy Chase Bank, No. C 09-3187 SI (N.D. Cal. 2009) found that despite the plaintiff’s allegations, MERS had not committed negligence or breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings against the plaintiff.

Plaintiff Gwendolyn Winter initiated an action in state court against defendants Chevy Chase Bank, Gabrielle Benedetto; U.S. Bank N.A. as Trustee for CCB Libor Series 2005-C Trust; MERS; as well as several unnamed defendants. The plaintiff alleged federal and state law claims related to the mortgage, mortgage default, foreclosure, and sale of plaintiff’s primary residence.

Plaintiff also filed suit against defendants in alleging negligence; breach of contract; breach of fiduciary duty; intentional infliction of emotional distress; fraud and misrepresentation; violations of state and federal lending laws; false advertising and unfair competition under federal and state law; and federal RICO violations. However, after considering the plaintiff’s contentions, the court eventually dismissed the claims.

United States District Court for the Central District of California Finds hat MERS Was the Beneficiary and Entitled to Foreclose

The United States District Court for the Central District of California in Derakhshan v. MERS, No. SACV08-1185 AG (2009) found that MERS was the beneficiary and therefore entitled to foreclose. This case, like many others before this court, involved the sale of an option adjustable rate mortgage loan.

The court held that MERS was the named beneficiary in the deed of trust. By signing the deed, the plaintiff thus agreed that MERS would be the beneficiary and act as nominee for the lender. Further, the deed explicitly stated that the borrower understood and agreed that MERS held only legal title and had the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the property.

Thus, the plaintiff explicitly authorized MERS to act as beneficiary with the right to foreclose on the property.

Court Rules That MERS, as the Beneficiary on the Deed of Trust, Had the Authority to Make a Substitution of Trustee

The United States District Court of the Northern District of California in deciding Lomboy v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. et al, No. C-09-1160 SC (N.D. Cal. 2009) held that under California law, MERS was not required to register to do business in California. The court also ruled that MERS is able to foreclose.

As her first cause of action, Plaintiff sought declaratory relief against SCME, MERS, Quality, and Aurora. Plaintiff asserted that she was the true equitable owner of the house, that the defendants were not holders of the promissory note, which should accompany the deed of trust, and that MERS has no right to foreclose on the house.

Plaintiff Imelda Lomboy also brought an action alleging various improprieties surrounding the then-imminent foreclosure of property that was used as security for a loan. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants “fraudulently obtained the deed of trust.”

The court in rejecting the plaintiff’s contentions note that MERS, as the beneficiary on the deed of trust, had the authority to make a substitution of trustee. The court further noted, that the substitute trustee appointed by MERS was able to carry out the foreclosure.