Tag Archives: non-judicial foreclosure

Rhode Island Court Rules That under State law, Only Parties to a Contract May Seek to Have Rights Declared Under a Contract

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The Rhode Island court in deciding Fryzel v. MERS, No. CA 10-352 (D.Ri., 2011) decided that under Rhode Island law, only parties to a contract may seek to have rights declared under a contract. The court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the transfer of the promissory note or assignment of mortgage granted by Plaintiff.

The plaintiff’s complaint disputed AHMSI’s ability to foreclose by challenging the validity of the assignments of their mortgage. The plaintiff further claimed that AHMSI was not entitled to foreclose under the terms of the ‘Pooling and Servicing Agreement’. However, the court found that it was undisputed that plaintiffs were not parties to the assignment agreements or to the PSA. Thus, plaintiffs did not have standing to assert legal rights based on the specified documents.

Court Holds That Mortgagor Lacks Standing to Challenge the Propriety of Mortgage Assignments Under Rhode Island Law

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The Rhode Island magistrate judge in Cosajay v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 10-442-M (D.R.I. June 23, 2011) issued “Reports and Recommendations,” holding that according to Rhode Island law a mortgagor “lacks standing to challenge the propriety of mortgage assignments and the effect those assignments, if any, could have on the underlying obligation.”

The Plaintiff challenged the validity of the assignments on multiple grounds, including MERS’ authority to execute the assignment. The magistrate however determined that under Rhode Island law, only parties to a contract may seek to have rights declared under a contract.

Ohio Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Claim That Defendant Lacked Standing to Foreclose

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The Ohio court in Turner v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, 776 F.Supp.2d 498 (2011) granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs alleged that defendant [Lerner] engaged in the widespread practice of filing and prosecuting mortgage foreclosure actions, although many of Lerner’s clients lacked proper standing to sue.

The United States District Court, N.D. Ohio considered the plaintiff’s claims that there were violations of FDCPA and Ohio unfair practices act violations, based on the law firm’s filing of foreclosure lawsuits where its clients allegedly lacked proper standing because the law firm client’s employees executed allegedly fraudulent assignments of mortgages from non-party MERS.

In following recent Ohio case law, the court dismissed the case due to the plaintiff’s lack of standing the validity of the assignments of mortgages. The court noted that it was generally accepted law that a litigant who is not a party to an assignment lacks standing to challenge assignment of that note.

United States District Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Contentions Against MERS, Alleging Wrongful Foreclosure and Unfair Business Practices

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The United States District Court for the Northern District of California in deciding Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, et al. 5:09cv016015 (N.D. Cal., 2009) affirmed MERS’ authority to foreclose. MERS’ ability to foreclose was again affirmed in this case, contrary to plaintiff contentions alleging wrongful foreclosure, unfair business practices, failure to disclose information regarding the plaintiff’s loan, claims arising under TARP, and various violations of state law related to the Notice of Default and the trustee sale.

The Court granted MERS’ motion to dismiss on several grounds. One ground was that the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit because he failed to tender the amounts due and owing under the note. The court also held that the plaintiff did not have a private right of action under TARP, and that his claims for unfair business practices were not supported by any facts.

The court also denied the claims for wrongful foreclosure. Accordingly, the court found that under state law, there was no requirement for the production of an original promissory note prior to the initiation of a non-judicial foreclosure. So, the absence of an original promissory note in a non-judicial foreclosure does not render a foreclosure invalid.

California Court Rules That State Law Did Not Require Possession of the Promissory Note in Order to Initiate a Non-Judicial Foreclosure

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The Eastern District of California in deciding Chilton v. Federal National Mortgage Association, No. 1:09; 2187 (E.D. Cal., 2010) dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint claiming wrongful foreclosure and lack of standing. The court held that California law did not require possession of the promissory note in order to initiate a non-judicial foreclosure.

Although MERS was not explicitly named as a defendant in the action, the plaintiff argued that MERS lacked standing to foreclose since the note and deed of trust had been separated. The court rejected this argument.

California Court Rules That MERS Did Not Breach the Implied Covenant of Good Faith By Initiating Non-Judicial Foreclosure

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The United States District Court for the Northern District of California in Winter v. Chevy Chase Bank, No. C 09-3187 SI (N.D. Cal. 2009) found that despite the plaintiff’s allegations, MERS had not committed negligence or breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings against the plaintiff.

Plaintiff Gwendolyn Winter initiated an action in state court against defendants Chevy Chase Bank, Gabrielle Benedetto; U.S. Bank N.A. as Trustee for CCB Libor Series 2005-C Trust; MERS; as well as several unnamed defendants. The plaintiff alleged federal and state law claims related to the mortgage, mortgage default, foreclosure, and sale of plaintiff’s primary residence.

Plaintiff also filed suit against defendants in alleging negligence; breach of contract; breach of fiduciary duty; intentional infliction of emotional distress; fraud and misrepresentation; violations of state and federal lending laws; false advertising and unfair competition under federal and state law; and federal RICO violations. However, after considering the plaintiff’s contentions, the court eventually dismissed the claims.

Court Rules That When MERS Assigned its Interest, it Did Not Commit Negligence Against the Borrower

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The United States District Court of the Eastern District of California in deciding Baisa v. Indymac, MERS, et al, No. Civ. 2:09-1464 (E.D. Cal. 2009), found that MERS had the right to execute an assignment of the deed of trust and was not a debt collector for the purposes of California’s Rosenthal Act. The act of assigning a deed of trust did not constitute debt collection.

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleged that MERS and other defendants violated the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA” or “Rosenthal Act”), 1 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788 et seq. (SAC 9.). However the court found that plaintiffs failed to plead facts necessary to support the inference that MERS is a “debt collector” under the RFDCPA; specifically, that MERS engages in “debt collection,” that the deed of trust memorializes a “consumer credit transaction,” and that the amount owed under the deed of trust is a “consumer debt” according to the RFDCPA

Furthermore, the court found that when MERS assigned its interest, it did not commit negligence against the borrower nor make a misrepresentation or fraudulent claim to the borrower.