Tag Archives: standing

Enforcing The Mortgage Note

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Elizabeth Renuart has posted Uneasy Intersections: The Right to Foreclose and the UCC to SSRN. This is a subject that Brad and I have touched on a bit in the context of the Show Me The Note! defense, but Renuart has done a magisterial fifty state review of how state foreclosure laws interact with the Uniform Commercial Code which has been adopted in all 50 states (NY has an older version it on the books for now). The case law in this area is incredibly confused and confusing.  The article helps to chart a path to navigate the intersection between these two areas of law.

Renuart provides a taxonomy of the caselaw, dividing it into three categories:

1.  The UCC States: “courts in these states explicitly join the right to foreclose on a mortgage that secures the negotiable note with the” UCC. (44)

2.  The Foreclosure-Statute-Definition States: “the courts focus on relevant words in the state’s foreclosure statute, such as ‘mortgagee’ where mortgages are used, ‘beneficiary’ where deeds of trust are used, ‘holder’, or ‘owner.’ Next, they determine if that state’s legislature intended that these designations refer to the note holder or the one with the right to act on behalf of the note holder. These courts may or may not reference the UCC in their decisions but the result generally is consistent with” the UCC. (45)

3.  The UCC- Does-Not-Apply States: “courts in these states reason that the state’s foreclosure scheme is comprehensive, inclusive of the prerequisites to foreclose, or does not define the secured party as the one entitled to repayment on the secured monetary obligation. As a result, the UCC does not apply in any way to identify the party who possesses the right to foreclose. To date, these decisions have arisen exclusively in nonjudicial foreclosure states.” (47)

She concludes that the “methodology utilized in Category 1 and 2 states properly harmonizes the relevant UCC rules with state foreclosure law. Category 3 states dismiss the UCC’s role outright. It is these decisions that muddy the law and create inconsistent outcomes from state to state.” (47-48)

It is no exaggeration to say that the discussions about this topic in the blogosphere are virtually incoherent, so this article may provide guidance for those who are looking for it.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, Remands Lower Court’s Decision by Ordering a Hearing With Reasonable Notice on the Whether the Injunction Should be Continued

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After the decision handed down from Fryzel v. MERS, No. CA 10-352 (D.Ri., 2011) On appeal, the plaintiff-appellees in United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, [(Fryzel, et. al. v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., No. 12–1526 (D.Ri., 2013)] brought suit to prevent foreclosure or eviction, on the shared ground that ostensible assignments of their mortgagees’ legal titles are invalid, leaving the assignees without the right to foreclose.

By appeal and mandamus petition, the group of plaintiffs claimed error in the district court’s failure to provide notice and hearing before issuing successive orders imposing a stay in the nature of a preliminary injunction against foreclosure and possessory proceedings, and in its failure to set limits of time and cost when referring the mortgagors’ cases challenging foreclosure to a Special Master for mandatory mediation.

After considering the plaintiffs’ collective arguments, the First Circuit remanded with instructions to hold a prompt hearing with reasonable notice on the question whether the injunction should be continued, in belated compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(1), and to establish specific limits of time and expense if the reference for mediation is to remain in effect.

Rhode Island Court Rules That under State law, Only Parties to a Contract May Seek to Have Rights Declared Under a Contract

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The Rhode Island court in deciding Fryzel v. MERS, No. CA 10-352 (D.Ri., 2011) decided that under Rhode Island law, only parties to a contract may seek to have rights declared under a contract. The court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the transfer of the promissory note or assignment of mortgage granted by Plaintiff.

The plaintiff’s complaint disputed AHMSI’s ability to foreclose by challenging the validity of the assignments of their mortgage. The plaintiff further claimed that AHMSI was not entitled to foreclose under the terms of the ‘Pooling and Servicing Agreement’. However, the court found that it was undisputed that plaintiffs were not parties to the assignment agreements or to the PSA. Thus, plaintiffs did not have standing to assert legal rights based on the specified documents.

Washington Court Rejects Plaintiff’s Claims That MERS’ Assignment was Fraudulent

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The Washington court in Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, Inc., 2010WL891585 (W.D. Wash. Dist. Ct., March2010), rejected the plaintiff’s contentions that an assignment by MERS was executed fraudulently.

The plaintiff based his claims around the execution of a mortgage assignment by a person designated as an officer of MERS, but who was not also a MERS employee.

The court, in rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments that the assignment was executed fraudulently, noted that the non-employee signors did not commit an affirmative misrepresentation of fact, because of the fact that, for purposes of signing the papers, the non-employee signors misrepresented nothing: [the IndyMac signor] and [the MERS signor] did bear the titles that they used. The employees’ use of the titles was expressly authorized by contracts with IndyMac and MERS.

Thus there was nothing deceptive about using an agent to execute a document, and the court also noted that such practice is commonplace in deed of trust actions.

Texas Court Plaintiff’s Challenges the Authority of MERS to Assign its Lien Interest to a Successive Party

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The Texas court in Eskridge v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 6:10-CV-285, (W.D. Tex., 2011) dismissed Plaintiff’s claims to challenges the authority of MERS to assign its lien interest to a successive party.

The plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that she had superior title because the note as well as the deed of trust was split. Further, plaintiff alleged that MERS lacked authority under the note to transfer either the note and/or the deed of trust. Consequently, any transfer made by MERS in regard to the Note to BAC was allegedly void.

However, the court determined that the plaintiff lacked standing to contest the various assignments, as she was not a party to the assignments. The court further reasoned that even if she had standing, her allegations were without merit because MERS was given the authority to transfer the documents in the deed of trust.

Ohio Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Claim That Defendant Lacked Standing to Foreclose

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The Ohio court in Turner v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, 776 F.Supp.2d 498 (2011) granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs alleged that defendant [Lerner] engaged in the widespread practice of filing and prosecuting mortgage foreclosure actions, although many of Lerner’s clients lacked proper standing to sue.

The United States District Court, N.D. Ohio considered the plaintiff’s claims that there were violations of FDCPA and Ohio unfair practices act violations, based on the law firm’s filing of foreclosure lawsuits where its clients allegedly lacked proper standing because the law firm client’s employees executed allegedly fraudulent assignments of mortgages from non-party MERS.

In following recent Ohio case law, the court dismissed the case due to the plaintiff’s lack of standing the validity of the assignments of mortgages. The court noted that it was generally accepted law that a litigant who is not a party to an assignment lacks standing to challenge assignment of that note.

United States District Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Contentions Against MERS, Alleging Wrongful Foreclosure and Unfair Business Practices

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The United States District Court for the Northern District of California in deciding Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, et al. 5:09cv016015 (N.D. Cal., 2009) affirmed MERS’ authority to foreclose. MERS’ ability to foreclose was again affirmed in this case, contrary to plaintiff contentions alleging wrongful foreclosure, unfair business practices, failure to disclose information regarding the plaintiff’s loan, claims arising under TARP, and various violations of state law related to the Notice of Default and the trustee sale.

The Court granted MERS’ motion to dismiss on several grounds. One ground was that the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit because he failed to tender the amounts due and owing under the note. The court also held that the plaintiff did not have a private right of action under TARP, and that his claims for unfair business practices were not supported by any facts.

The court also denied the claims for wrongful foreclosure. Accordingly, the court found that under state law, there was no requirement for the production of an original promissory note prior to the initiation of a non-judicial foreclosure. So, the absence of an original promissory note in a non-judicial foreclosure does not render a foreclosure invalid.