Author Archives: David Reiss

Cherry Bombs in Michigan

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An ongoing Michigan state case, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cherryland Mall L.P. et al.,  has been generating a lot of heat over an obscure but important issue for commercial mortgage borrowers, the scope of carveouts from standard nonrecourse provisions in loan documents.  And now the most recent opinion issued in the case raises important constitutional issues as well.

This case (as well as the similar Chesterfield case (a federal court case also in Michigan)) took many in the real estate industry by surprise by reading language in the loan documents at issue in those cases so as to gut their nonrecourse provisions.  Michigan (as well as neighboring Ohio) quickly passed legislation to return the nonrecourse language to how it was commonly understood.

The Michigan courts’ interpretations of the language in the loan documents was inconsistent with how such provisions were typically understood in the industry.  While the new statutes returned things to how they were commonly understood to be before the cases were decided, they did so in a way that raises more fundamental issues.  Most importantly, such statutes potentially violate the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution which bars the “impairing” of “the Obligation of Contracts.”

The most recent Cherryland opinion upheld the constitutionality of the new Michigan statute and rightly notes that the Contracts Clause is not read literally. This has been true at least since the Depression era U.S. Supreme Court case of Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell did not invalidate Minnesota’s mortgage moratorium.  The U.S. Supreme Court had thereby given states some leeway pursuant to their police power to remedy social and economic problems, notwithstanding the text of the Contracts Clause.   The situation in the Cherryland case is less sympathetic than that in Depression-era Blaisdell, where many, many homeowners were being foreclosed upon.  The Cherryland borrower, in contrast, is a politically-connected real estate developer. But the point remains that the Contracts Clause is not an absolute bar to legislative revision of privately negotiated contracts.  How politically connected, you might ask.  The court indicates that

defendant [David] Schostak is co-chief executive officer of defendant Schostak Brothers & Company, Inc., and that Robert Schostak is co-chairman and co-chief executive officer.  . . . Robert Schostak is “a high ranking Republican Party leader in Michigan, with many years of involvement in assisting the party’s candidates to gain election in the legislature.” We note that Robert Schostak has been chairman of the Michigan Republican Party since January 2011, was finance chairman through the 2010 election cycle, and had served on campaign fundraising teams for prominent Republicans. (8, note 3)

The borrowers here are as well positioned to get helpful legislation passed as anyone. There is much to chew over here, not the least of which is the Court’s finding that the statute was not “intended to benefit special interests.” (8)

There are also important practical aspects to the case. For instance, it is quite possible that courts in other jurisdictions will read the typical CMBS nonrecourse language similarly to how the Michigan courts read it.  Lenders will want to take a look at their loan documents to determine whether they mean what they say and say what they mean. And borrowers should read the language in their loan documents carefully before signing on the dotted line. They have been warned.

Robo-Signing Complaints Must Sing A Different Toone

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The Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit took a hard look at a complaint alleging robo-signing misbehavior relating to a promissory note and its various endorsements in Toone v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al., (Mar. 8, 2013, No. 11-4188).  The court noted that

Ordinarily, we accept the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true for purposes of resolving a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). But there are exceptions to this rule. Courts are permitted to review “documents referred to in the complaint if the documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim and the parties do not dispute the documents’ authenticity.” The Note falls squarely within this exception: We may consider it in evaluating the plausibility of the Toones’ claims because it is mentioned in the complaint, it is central to their claims, and its authenticity is not disputed. (7, citations omitted)

The Court found that

The face of the Note contradicts the Toones’ allegations. The first endorsement states that Accubanc is Premier’s “agent and attorney in fact,” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 209 (capitalization omitted), and the Toones present no argument why the endorsement would be invalid when signed by Premier’s agent. Likewise, the other endorsements look regular on their face. Of course, the endorsements may be forged or otherwise fraudulent. But the complaint alleges no facts from which one could infer such misconduct. It does not explain what “robo-signing” is or why it renders the endorsements fraudulent, let alone include factual content indicating that it occurred in this case.(8)

The 10th Circuit now joins many other courts in finding that “bald allegations of “robo-signing” do not suffice under the Rule 8(a)(2) standard set by Iqbal.” (8)

Judiciary’s Take on the Subprime Zeitgeist

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The 2nd Circuit’s opinion in FHFA v. UBS Americas Inc. et al. (April 5, 2013, No. 12-3207-cv) offers an interesting window into how at least some members of the judiciary understand the Subprime Crisis. On its face, the case was about some technical issues of procedure — whether the case was untimely and whether the FHFA lacked standing.  The Court’s reasoning, however, delved into some deep issues.

In discussing the timeliness issue, the Court concluded that given the statute’s plain language and the particular provision as a whole, “a reasonable reader could only understand” it to resolve the issue in favor of the FHFA. (17) Then, seemingly gratuitously, the Court delved into the legislative history of the statute.  But this legislative history seemed to be drawn as much from the Court’s understanding of recent events as from the record.  It wrote

Congress obviously realized that it would take time for this new agency to mobilize and to consider whether it wished to bring any claims and, if so, where and how to do so. Congress enacted HERA’s extender statute to give FHFA the time to investigate and develop potential claims on behalf of the GSEs — and thus it provided for a period of at least three years from the commencement of a conservatorship to bring suit.

Of course, the collapse of the mortgage-backed securities market was a major cause of the GSEs’ financial predicament, and it must have been evident to Congress when it was enacting HERA that FHFA would have to consider potential claims under the federal securities and state Blue Sky laws. It would have made no sense for Congress to have carved out securities claims from the ambit of the extender statute, as doing so would have undermined Congress’s intent to restore Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to financial stability. (17-18)

I agree with the Court on the substance, but I found it interesting that certain things about the legislative history were “obvious,” certain facts “must have been evident” and alternative interpretations would make “no sense.”  I am not sure if I could go that far.

This version of legislative history does, however, reflect a view that Congress intended the Executive Branch to take extraordinary measures to hold financial institutions accountable for their role in the financial crisis.

Are Baby Steps Enough for Fannie and Freddie?

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S&P issued a research report, The Implementation Of The FHFA’s Plan For Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac Still Has A Long Way To Go. The report addresses a number of recent events that will impact any reform program for the two Government-Sponsored Enterprises.  S&P strike an optimistic note in the opening lines:  “The U.S. government continues to gradually make progress on the reform of the” two Enterprises.” (1)  It is unclear to me that we are actually making any progress at all. S&P seem to acknowledge as much a few paragraphs later: “Fannie and Freddie are perhaps more entrenched in the housing market today than ever before. Including Ginnie Mae, the government-related housing entities have combined to purchase or guarantee more than 90% of mortgages underwritten in the U.S. since the housing crisis, up from about 50% before the crisis.” (1)

S&P notes that Fannie and Freddie’s financial health is improving as they “are now generating earnings, which reduces the urgency to try to minimize taxpayer costs.” (1)  Their underlying loans are also performing much better:  “At Freddie, loans originated after 2008 account for 63% of its single-family guarantee portfolio and have a seriously delinquent rate of 0.39%, versus 9.56% for loans originated from 2005–2008. At Fannie, loans originated after 2008 account for 66% of its single-family guarantee portfolio and have a seriously delinquent rate of 0.35%, versus 9.92% for loans originated from 2005–2008.” (2)

S&P takes heart that change is afoot because of “the new key aspect of the FHFA’s plan to build a secondary market infrastructure is the proposed creation of a joint venture (JV) between Fannie and Freddie. This JV would have a CEO and chairman that are independent from Fannie and Freddie, and its physical location would also be separate. The GSEs would initially own, operate, and fund this unit, but the JV also would be able to eventually act as a common securitization platform for the entire market, instead of a proprietary platform. Furthermore, the ownership structure would be one that is easily sold or that policymakers can use in housing finance reform once Fannie and Freddie have less of a role in the market.” (2-3)

S&P characterizes the federal government’s approach as “taking baby steps.” (4) I would characterize it as just so much muddling about.

Be Careful What You Contract For . . .

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Justice Ramos of the Commercial Division of the New York State Supreme Court NY County) issued an opinion in Assured Guar. Corp. v. EMC Mtge., LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op. 50519(U) (April 4, 2013).  Assured, a monoline insurer, “alleges that Bear Stearns grossly misrepresented the risk of the underlying pooled loans” that Bear Stearns had used as collateral in RMBS deals that it had underwritten. (1) Assured alleged that loan warranties in nearly 90 percent of the loans in one of the pools at issue had been breached.  The court noted that more than half of the loans in that pool had either “defaulted or are seriously delinquent.” (2) Bear Stearns’ successor-in-interest refused to repurchase the breaching loans.

The Court found that the deal documents make “clear that the parties intended to limit Assured’s remedies for breach of the representations and warranties relating to the quality and characteristics of the pooled loans to the Repurchase Protocol . . .” and the Court indeed so limited Assured’s remedies. (4) Justice Ramos relied on the opinion by Judge Rakoff (SDNY) in Assured Guar. Mun. v. Flagstar Bank, that reached a similar result.

One wonders how monoline insurers will seek to change deal documents going forward.  Will they be so willing to treat representations and warranties as mere risk allocation devices between the parties?  As risk allocation devices, the reps and warranties typically make only limited remedies available.  Or will they demand that they be treated as something more — perhaps as actual representations and warranties about the underlying transaction and upon whose shoulders broader remedies could be hung?

6th Circuit Upholds Foreclosure by Lender Under Michigan Law

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The 6th Circuit upheld a foreclosure under Michigan law in Conlin v. MERS et al., (Case No. 12-2021, April 10, 2013).  Plaintiff Conlin sought to have the foreclosure sale of his property “set aside based on alleged defects in the assignment of the mortgage on the property from Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems to Defendant U.S. Bank.” (2) The Court noted that “Michigan courts have held that once the statutory redemption period lapses [as had occurred in this case], they can only entertain the setting aside of a foreclosure sale where the mortgagor has made ‘a clear showing of fraud, or irregularity.'” (5, citation omitted) Furthermore, the fraud “‘must relate to the foreclosure procedure itself.'” (6, citation omitted)

Conlin claimed that the assignment from MERS to U.S. Bank “was forged or ‘robo-signed.'” (7)  He also claimed that “MERS had no capacity to assign the Mortgage to U.S. Bank.” (7) The Court noted that third parties typically do not have standing to challenge an assignment unless the challenge would render “the assignment absolutely invalid or ineffective, or void.'” (7, citation omitted) The Court determined that the Michigan Supreme Court held that ‘”defects or irregularities in a foreclosure proceeding result in a foreclosure that is voidable, not void ab initio‘” and that borrowers must be prejudiced by lender’s failure to comply with the foreclosure statute’s requirements. (8, citation omitted)

The court concluded:

Even were the assignment from MERS to U.S. Bank invalid, thereby creating a defect in the foreclosure process under § 600.3204(1)(d), Plaintiff has not shown that he was prejudiced. He has not shown that he will be subject to liability from anyone other than U.S. Bank; he has not shown that he would have been in any better position to keep the property absent the defect; and he has not shown that he has been prejudiced in any other way. Additionally, he has also failed to make the clear showing of fraud in the foreclosure process required to challenge the foreclosure after the expiration of the six-month redemption period. (9)

On Fairy Tales for the Subprime Era

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Practicum has posted my short article, The Emperor’s New Loans: A Cautionary Tale from the Subprime Era, today. It begins

A body of folk tales from the subprime mortgage era is now being written. Some are in PowerPoint. Some are in video format. Some appear in the guise of a non-fiction account.  After all, isn’t The Big Short just Jack the Giant Slayer—with the little guys not only ending up with the gold, but also with the big guys dead on the ground? And some stories, like the one below, are just plain old fairy tales.

You might ask why a complex financial crisis needs such folk tales. And I would tell you that they are necessary because they help us to identify the essence of the crisis. They can also make the significance of the crisis clear to non-experts. And they can help shape government responses to the last crisis in order to avert potential future crises. Luckily, noted storyteller Philip Pullman offers us some guidance on finding the essence of a story.

The rest of the article can be found here.