March 25, 2015
Frannie Conservatorships: What A Long, Strange Trip It’s Been
The Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General has posted a White Paper, FHFA’s Conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: A Long and Complicated Journey. This White Paper on conservatorships updates a first one that OIG published in 2012. This one notes that over the past six years,
FHFA has administered two conservatorships of unprecedented scope and simultaneously served as the regulator for these large, complex companies that dominate the secondary mortgage market and the mortgage securitization sector of the U.S. housing finance industry. Congress granted FHFA sweeping conservatorship authority over the Enterprises. For example, as conservator, FHFA can exercise decision-making authority over the Enterprises’ multi-trillion dollar books of business; it can direct the Enterprises to increase the fees they charge to guarantee mortgage-backed securities; it can mandate changes to the Enterprises’ credit underwriting and servicing standards for single-family and multifamily mortgage products; and it can set policy governing the disposition of the Enterprises’ inventory of approximately 121,000 real estate owned properties. (2)
I was particularly interested by the foreward looking statements contained in this White Paper:
Director Watt has repeatedly asserted that conservatorship “cannot and should not be a permanent state” for the Enterprises. Director Watt has indicated that under his stewardship FHFA will continue the conservatorships and build a bridge to a new housing finance system, whenever that system is put into place by Congress. In this phase of the conservatorships, FHFA seeks to place more decision-making in the hands of the Enterprises. (3)
Those who have been hoping that the FHFA will act decisively in the face of Congressional inaction should let that dream go. And given that just about nobody believes (I still hope though) that there will be Congressional reform of Fannie and Freddie during the remainder of the Obama Administration, we must face the reality that we are stuck with the conservatorships and all of the risks that they foster for the foreseeable future. Today’s risks include historically high rates of mortgage delinquencies and exposure to defaults by counterparties like private mortgage insurers. As I have said before, the risks that Fannie and Freddie are nothing to laugh at. Let’s hope that the FHFA is up to managing them until Congress finally acts.
March 25, 2015 | Permalink | No Comments
Wednesday’s Academic Roundup
- Regional Redistribution Through the U.S. Mortgage Market, by Erik Hurst, Benjamin J. Keys, Amit Seru and Joseph Vavra, NBER Working Paper No. w21007.
- Will the Bubble Burst Be Revisited, by P.D. Aditya, March 8, 2015.
- Data & Civil Rights: Housing Primer, by Alex Rosenblat, Kate Wikelius, Danah Boyd, Seeta Peña Gangadharan, & Corrine Yu, Data & Civil Rights Conference, Oct. 2014.
- What Have They Been Thinking? Homebuyer Behavior in Hot and Cold Markets – A 2014 Update, by Karl E. Case, Robert J. Shiller, & Anne K. Thompson, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1876R.
- Supply Restrictions, Subprime Lending and Regional US House Prices, André K. Anundsen & Christian Heebøll, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5236.
- A Quantitative Analysis of the U.S. Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure Crisis, by Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, FRV of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 15-13.
- Alcohol- and Drug-Free Housing: A Key Strategy in Breaking the Cycle of Addiction and Recidivism, by Susan F. Mandiberg & Richard Harris, McGeorge Law Review, Forthcoming.
- The International Problem of Skyrocketing Rent: Why Increased Rent Can Hurt the Economy, Fatima Al Matar, March 17, 2015.
March 25, 2015 | Permalink | No Comments
March 24, 2015
Transferring Risk from Fannie & Freddie
The Federal Housing Finance Agency has posted its FHFA Progress Report on the Implementation of FHFA’s Strategic Plan for the Conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As its name suggests, it provides a progress report on a range of topics, but I was particularly interested in its section on credit risk transfers for single-family credit guarantees:
The 2014 Conservatorship Strategic Plan’s goal of reducing taxpayer risk builds on the Enterprises’ previous risk transfer efforts. Under the 2013 Conservatorship Scorecard, FHFA expressed the expectation that each Enterprise would conduct risk transfer transactions involving single-family loans with an unpaid principal balance (UPB) of at least $30 billion. The 2014 Conservatorship Scorecard tripled the required risk transfer amount, with the expectation that each Enterprise would transfer a substantial portion of the credit risk on $90 billion in UPB of new mortgage-backed securitizations. FHFA also expected each Enterprise to execute a minimum of two different types of credit risk transfer transactions. FHFA required the Enterprises to conduct all activities undertaken in fulfillment of these objectives in a manner consistent with safety and soundness. During 2014, the two Enterprises executed credit risk transfers on single-family mortgages with a UPB of over $340 billion, which is well above the required amounts. (14)
Risk transfer is an important tool to reduce the risks that taxpayers will be on the hook for future bailouts. The mechanism for these risk transfer deals are not well understood because they are pretty new. The Progress Report describes how they work in relatively clear terms:
The primary way that the Enterprises have executed single-family credit risk transfers to date has been through debt-issuance programs. Freddie Mac transactions are called Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) notes, and Fannie Mae transactions are called Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS). Following the release of historical credit performance data in 2012, each Enterprise has issued either STACR or CAS notes that transfer a portion of the credit risk from large reference pools of single-family mortgages to private investors. These reference pools are comprised of loans that the Enterprises had previously securitized to sell the interest rate risk of the loans to private investors. The STACR and CAS transactions take the next step of transferring a portion of the credit risk for these loans to investors as well. Each subsequent credit risk transfer transaction is intended to provide credit protection to the issuing Enterprise on the mortgages in the relevant reference pool. (14)
The Progress Report provides more detail for those who are interested. For the rest of us, we may just want to think through the policy implications. How much credit risk can Fannie and Freddie offload? Is it sufficient to make a real dent in the overall risk that the two companies pose to taxpayers? It would be helpful if the FHFA answered those questions in future reports.
March 24, 2015 | Permalink | No Comments
Tuesday’s Regulatory & Legislative Round Up
- Representative Delany (D-MD) and Others Recently Re-Intoroduced The Partnership to Strengthen Homeownership Act, originally introduced in July 2014, The Act Promises to Reform Housing Finance, Strengthen Affordable Housing and Reduce Taxpayer Risk
- Senator Charles Schumer and Others recently Sent a Letter Urging Congress to Allocate at Least $35 Million to Fund the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Section 4 Capacity Building and Affordable Housing Program
- The Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act, Recently Introduced Into the Senate, Would Invite Private Contractors to Upgrade HUDs Energy Efficiency, With Compensation Tied to Acually Realized Energy Savings
March 24, 2015 | Permalink | No Comments
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- Court denies US Bank’s opportunity to revive suit against Citigroup over hundreds of millions of dollars in mortgage-backed securities sold during the financial crisis.
- IL court refuses to dismiss suit against Bank of America over lowering underwriting standards for borrowers protected by the Fair Housing Act.
- National Credit Union Administration sues HSBC claiming it failed as trustee for $2 billion of residential mortgage-backed securities trusts and lead to the downfall of five credit unions.
March 23, 2015 | Permalink | No Comments
March 20, 2015
Foreign Funding for Real Estate Projects
Jeanne Calderon and Gary Friedland have posted A Roadmap to the Use of EB-5 Capital: An Alternative Financing Tool for Commercial Real Estate Projects. The paper provides a great overview of a relatively new source of funding for real estate deals. The introduction opens,
From an immigrant’s perspective, the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program (“EB-5” or the “Program”) represents merely one of several paths to obtain a visa. The EB-5 visa is based on the immigrant’s investment of capital in a business that creates new jobs. However, from a real estate developer’s perspective, the immigrant’s investment to qualify for the visa creates an alternative capital source for the developer’s project (“EB-5 capital” or “EB-5 financing”).
Despite the Program’s enactment by Congress in 1990, for many years EB-5 was not a common path followed by immigrants to seek a visa. However, when the traditional capital markets evaporated during the Great Recession, developers’ demand for alternate capital sources rejuvenated the Program. Since 2008, the number of EB-5 visas sought, and hence the use of EB-5 capital, has skyrocketed. EB-5 capital has become a capital source providing extraordinary flexibility and attractive terms, especially to finance commercial real estate projects. Consequently, many developers routinely consider EB-5 capital as a potential source to fill a major space in the capital stack. As the financing tool becomes more widely known and understood, this source of capital should become even more popular.
The EB-5 investor’s motivation for making the investment accounts for the relative flexibility and favorable terms afforded by EB-5 capital compared to conventional capital sources. Unlike that of the conventional capital providers (such as banks, private equity funds, REITs, life insurance companies and pension funds), the EB-5 investor’s reason for making the investment is to secure a visa. Thus, his primary objective at the time of making the investment is to satisfy the EB-5 visa requirements. Consequently, so long as the investor believes that the investment will qualify for the visa and result in the safe return of his capital, he is willing to accept a below market, if not minimal, return on the investment. Furthermore, the investor might not require some of the other protections that more sophisticated, conventional real estate investors typically seek.
* * *
Simply stated, the Program requires that the immigrant make a capital investment of $500,000 or $1,000,000 (depending on whether the project is located in a “Targeted Employment Area”) in a business located within the United States. The business must directly create 10 new, full-time jobs per investor. Thus, the number of jobs that a project will create is a key determinant of the amount of the potential EB-5 capital raise. (3-4)
This once exotic funding technique is now becoming quite mainstream. Of interest to some readers of this blog, the paper describes at various points how EB-5 funds have been used in residential projects. The paper is a useful introduction for those who want to know more about this program.
March 20, 2015 | Permalink | No Comments
