June 26, 2014
State of the Nation’s Housing Finance
The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University has released the 2014 edition of The State of the Nation’s Housing. As to the nation’s housing finance system, the report finds that
The government still had an outsized footprint in the mortgage market in 2013, purchasing or guaranteeing 80.3 percent of all mortgages originated. The FHA/VA share of first liens, at 19.7 percent, was well above the average 6.1 percent share in 2002–03, let alone the 3.2 percent share at the market peak in 2005–06. Origination shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were also higher than before the mortgage market crisis, but less so than that of FHA. According to the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center, the GSEs purchased or guaranteed 61 percent of originations in 2012 and 2013, up from 49 percent in 2002 and 2003.
Portfolio lending, however, has begun to bounce back, rising 8 percentage points from post-crisis lows and accounting for 19 percent of originations last year. While improving, this share is far from the nearly 30 percent a decade earlier. In contrast, private-label securitizations have been stuck below 1 percent of originations since 2008. Continued healing in the housing market and further clarity in the regulatory environment should set the stage for further increases in private market activity. (11)
As usual, this report is chock full of good information about the single-family and multi-family sectors. I did find that some of its characterizations of the housing market were lacking. For instance, the report states
Many factors have played a role in the sluggish recovery of the home purchase loan market in recent years, including falling household incomes and uncertainty about the direction of the economy and home prices. But the limited availability of mortgage credit for borrowers with less than stellar credit has also contributed. According to information from CoreLogic, home purchase lending to borrowers with credit scores below 620 all but ended after 2009. Since then, access to credit among borrowers with scores in the 620–659 range has become increasingly constrained, with their share of loans falling by 6 percentage points. At the same time, the share of home purchase loans to borrowers with scores above 740 rose by 8 percentage points.
Meanwhile, the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) have also concentrated both their purchase and refinancing activity on applicants with higher credit scores. At Fannie Mae, only 15 percent of loans acquired in 2013 were to borrowers with credit scores below 700—a dramatic drop from the 35 percent share averaged in 2001–04. Moreover, just 2 percent of originations were to borrowers with credit scores below 620. The percentage of Freddie Mac lending to this group has remained negligible.
Yet another drag on the mortgage market recovery is the high cost of credit. For borrowers who are able to access credit, loan costs have increased steadily. To start, interest rates climbed from 3.35 percent at the end of 2012 to 4.46 percent at the end of 2013. This increase was tempered somewhat by a slight retreat in early 2014. In addition, the GSEs and FHA raised the fees required to insure their loans after the mortgage market meltdown, and many of these charges remain in place or have risen. The average guarantee fee charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac jumped from 22 basis points in 2009 to 38 basis points in 2012. In 2008, the GSEs also introduced loan level price adjustments (LLPAs) or additional upfront fees paid by lenders based on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, credit scores, and other risk factors. LLPAs total up to 3.25 percent of the loan value for riskier borrowers and are paid for through higher interest rates on their loans. (20)
Implicit in this analysis is the view that lending should return in some way to its pre-bust levels. But, in fact, much of the boom lending was unsustainable for many borrowers. The analysis fails to identify the importance of promoting sustainable homeownership and instead relies on one dimensional metrics like credit denials for those with low credit scores. Until we are confident that borrowers with those scores can sustain homeownership in large numbers, we should not be so quick to bemoan credit constraints for people with a history of losing their homes to foreclosure.
The Center’s analysis also takes a simplistic view about guarantee fees. The relevant metric is not the absolute size of the g-fee. Rather, the issue should be whether the g-fee level achieves its goals. At a minimum, those goals include appropriately measuring the risk of having to make good on the guarantee.
Finally, the Center demonstrates symptoms of historical amnesia when it characterizes an interest rate of 4.46% as “high.” This is an incredibly low rate of interest and one would expect that rates would rise as we exit from the bust years.
I have made the point before that the Center’s work seems to reflect the views of its funders. The funders of this report (not identified in the report by the way) include the National Association of Home Builders; National Association of Realtors; National Housing Conference; National Multifamily Housing Council; and a whole host of lenders, builders and companies in related fields that make up the Center’s Policy Advisory Board. These organizations benefit from a growing housing sector. This report seems to reflect an unthinking pro-growth perspective. It would have benefited from a parallel focus on sustainable homeownership.
June 26, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments
Alabama Court Rejects “Split-the-Note” Theory
The court in deciding Gray v. MERSCORP, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ala., 2013) rejected the split the note theory put forward by Gray.
This matter arose out of a note and mortgage executed in March 2007 by plaintiffs Clayburn Kyle Gray and Carrie Ann Gray, defendant Quicken Loans, Inc., and defendant MERS.
Plaintiffs’ resulting suit primarily consisted of two allegations: (1) that the defendant Quicken wrongfully and deceptively caused the plaintiffs’ entire ten-acre property to be encompassed by the mortgage and (2) that the defendant OneWest, to whom the mortgage was subsequently assigned by defendant MERS, was incapable of foreclosing on the mortgaged property, due to “a separation of the note and mortgage in this cause.”
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, this was subsequently granted. The court noted that Alabama courts, have roundly rejected the “split the note” theory, thus rendering it ineffective and inapplicable in the present case.
June 26, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments
Alabama Court Reverses Lower Court’s Decision Granting Summary Judgment to Foreclosing Entity
The court in deciding Sturdivant v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 2013 Ala. Civ. App. (Ala. Civ. App., 2013) reversed the lower court’s ruling that granted summary judgment to a foreclosing entity with respect to its complaint in ejectment against a mortgagor under Ala. Code § 6-6-280(b).
The court’s decision was based on the fact that the foreclosing entity presented no evidence that it was either the assignee of the mortgage or the holder of the note at the time it foreclosed, it failed to present a prima facie case that it had the authority to foreclose and, thus, had valid title to or the right to possess the property–one of the elements of its claim in ejectment.
June 26, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments
June 25, 2014
S&P on Risky Reps and Warranties
Standard & Poor’s posted New Players In The RMBS Market Could Present Unique Representations And Warranties Risks. It opens, S&P
believes that new entrants into the residential mortgage-backed securitization (RMBS) market that make loan-level representations and warranties (R&Ws) may present additional risks not present with more established market players. Many of these new entrants not only lack historical loan performance data, but have not yet established track records for remedying any R&W breaches. This can call into question their ability or willingness to repurchase under R&W provisions. In light of this, mitigating factors may exist that could alleviate the risk of a potential R&W breach. (1)
This all sounds pretty serious, but I am not so sure that it is.
S&P explains its concerns further:
We believe it is important for investors and other market participants to evaluate the quality and depth of various factors that mitigate the risk of R&W breaches occurring in U.S. RMBS transactions, including those that would be remedied by new entities with limited histories and the risk that comes with their willingness or ability to do so. Specifically, we believe the quality and scale of third-party due diligence, the depth of operational reviews, and a transaction’s overall expected losses, are critical for assessing the risk of a breach and if a new entity would be remedying it. We consider all of these aspects in our assessment of the credit characteristics of loans that are securitized in U.S. RMBS deals. (1)
One assumes that every party to every transaction would consider the counterparty risk — the risk that the other side of a deal won’t or can’t make good on its obligations. Regular readers of this blog also know that many well-known companies have attempted to avoid their responsibilities pursuant to reps and warranties clauses. So, when S&P states that “the quality and scale of third-party due diligence, the depth of operational reviews, and a transaction’s overall expected losses, are critical for assessing the risk of a breach and if a new entity would be remedying it,” one wonders why this is more true for new players than it is for existing ones.
Further undercutting itself, this report notes that “post-2008 issuers have been addressing many of these potential R&W risks, including newer players. The level of third-party due diligence in recently issued U.S. RMBS for example has been more comprehensive from a historical (pre-2008) perspective in terms of the number of loans reviewed and the scope of the reviews.” (1)
So I am left wondering what S&P is trying to achieve with this report. Are they really worried about new entrants to the market? Are they signalling that they will take a tough stance on lowering due diligence standards as the market heats up? Are they favoring the big players in the market over the upstarts? I don’t think that this analysis stands up on its own legs, so I am guessing that there is something else going on. If anyone has a inkling as to what it is, please share it with the rest of us.
June 25, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments
California Court Denies Claims that Deficiencies Rendered any Security Interest in the Deed of Trust Invalid
The court in deciding Sollenne v. United States Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2013 U.S. Dist. (S.D. Cal., 2013) ultimately found that the plaintiffs’ claims premised upon the securitization of the loan and violations of the PSA were to be dismissed. The court also found that the plaintiffs could not require the defendants to take any actions to prove their authority unless such factual allegations are presented.
Plaintiffs alleged three causes of action: 1) quiet title; 2) declaratory relief to determine the validity of the deed of trust on the date the note was assigned and to determine if any defendant has authority to foreclose; and 3) injunctive relief to stop further collection activity, including the sale of the property. Plaintiffs’ desired remedies also included a request for an order compelling the defendants to transfer or release legal title and any alleged encumbrances, and possession of the property to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs also alleged that the procedures in the pooling and services agreement (PSA) for the trust had not been followed. They alleged that the note and the mortgage, the debt or obligation evidenced by the note and deed of trust were not properly assigned and transferred from CMG (the originator) to USBNA (the trustee of the Trust) in accordance with the PSA. Plaintiffs claimed the PSA was violated by a failure to complete the assignment before the closing date, and a failure to provide a complete and unbroken chain of transfers and assignments. Plaintiffs claimed that no perfected chain of title exists transferring the mortgage loan from CMG to the Trust.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs claimed that Nationstar alleged to be the holder and owner of the note and beneficiary of the deed of trust, but that the note identified the originator as the holder, and there is no perfected chain of title between CMG and Nationstar. Plaintiffs claimed that no documents or records have been produced to demonstrate the note or deed of trust was properly transferred prior to the closing date, and that any documents transferring it after the closing date are void under the PSA.
Plaintiffs listed the following deficiencies which they contended render invalid any security interest in the deed of trust: 1) the separation of title, ownership and interest in the note and deed of trust; 2) the lack of assignments to or from the intervening entities when the loan was sold; 3) the failure to assign and transfer the beneficial interest in the DOT to Defendants in accordance with the PSA; 4) the failure to endorse, assign, and transfer the note to USBNA in accordance with the PSA and California law; 5) that there were no assignments of beneficiary or endorsements of the note to each intervening entity; and 6) Defendants violated terms of the PSA.
Ultimately, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims premised upon the securitization of the loan and violations of the PSA were to be dismissed. The court also found that the plaintiffs could not require the defendants to take any actions to prove their authority unless such factual allegations were presented.
June 25, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments
June 24, 2014
Borrowers Have “Been Through Hell”
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued an opinion, U.S. Bank, N.A. v. David Sawyer et al., 2014 ME 81 (June 24, 2014), that makes you question the sanity of the servicing industry and the efficacy of the rule of law. If you are a reader of this blog, you know this story.
This particular version of the story is taken from the unrebutted testimony of the homeowners, David and Debra Sawyer. They received a loan modification, which was later raised to a level above the predelinquency level; the servicers (which changed from time to time) then demanded various documents which were provided numerous times over the course of four court-ordered mediations; the servicers made numerous promises about modifications that they did not keep; the dysfunction goes on and on.
The trial court ultimately dismissed the foreclosure proceeding with prejudice. Like other jurisdictions, Maine requires that parties to a foreclosure “make a good faith effort to mediate all issues.” (6, quoting 14 M.R.S. section 6321-A(12) (2013); M.R. Civ. P. 93(j)). Given this factual record, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in imposing” that sanction. (6-7) The sanction is obviously severe and creates a windfall for the borrowers. But the Supreme Judicial Court noted that U.S. Bank’s “repeated failures to cooperate and participate meaningfully in the mediation process” meant that the borrowers accrued “significant additional fees, interest, costs, and a reduction in the net value of the borrower’s [sic] equity in the property.” (8)
The Supreme Judicial Court concludes that if “banks and servicers intend to do business in Maine and use our courts to foreclose on delinquent borrowers, they must respect and follow our rules and procedures . . .” (9) So, a state supreme court metes out justice in an individual case and sends a warning that failure to abide by the law exposes “a litigant to significant sanctions, including the prospect of dismissal with prejudice.” (9)
But I am left with a bad taste in my mouth — can the rule of law exist where such behavior by private parties is so prevalent? How can servicers with names like J.P. Morgan Chase and U.S. Bank be this incompetent? What are the incentives within those firms that result in such behavior? Have the recent settlements and regulatory enforcement actions done enough to make such cases anomalies instead of all-too-frequent occurrences? U.S. Bank conceded in court that these borrowers have “been through hell.” (9, n. 5) The question is, have we reached the other side?
HT April Charney
June 24, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments
Michigan Court Rejects TILA and RESPA Claims in Granting Summary Judgment
By Ebube Okoli
The court in deciding Morton v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. (W.D. Mich., 2013) ultimately concluded that the moving defendants are entitled to judgment on all plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law.
Plaintiff asserted that none of the defendants had standing to foreclose on the mortgage. He also alleged that defendants were liable for violations of the Truth In Lending Act (TILA) and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). Defendants Bank of America, MERS, and Crain had moved for judgment on the pleadings, but supported their motion with documents beyond the pleadings. Therefore, this court elected to treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.
Plaintiff’s complaint identifies two federal claims, in addition to claims arising under Michigan law. The complaint mentions the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f. Plaintiff also purports to assert a claim under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617. The court determined that neither the TILA claim nor the RESPA claim had merit. Plaintiff also asserted three purported state-law claims, which the court deemed to be both redundant and lacking merit. Accordingly, the court recommended that the entry of a summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
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June 25, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments