May 8, 2014
Reiss on Bloomberg Terminals regarding GSE Litigation
I was quoted on the Bloomberg Terminals (behind a very expensive paywall!) on May 6th about the Fannie and Freddie litigation:
Even if the Junior Preferred Shareholders get the Court to void the Third Amendment to the PSPA, they cannot force the companies to issue dividends so that shareholders receive a payoff. And if the government were to lower the guarantee fee that the two companies can charge or if it were to remove the government’s guarantee of the two companies, Fannie and Freddie’s profits would dissipate altogether.
Given that junior preferred shareholders have developed a multi-pronged strategy to squeeze as much value out of their shares as possible, it is worth attempting to determine the possible endgames that they have in mind. It is hard for me to identify a litigation outcome that results in money in their pockets for the reasons stated above. So the litigation strategy must be part of a broader strategy that involves lobbying over housing finance reform in Congress, lobbying the FHFA and other regulators or negotiating with the two companies. Given the amount of money at stake and the depth of the pockets of the junior preferred shareholders, one can imagine that they are playing a very long-term game, one that might last longer than all of the current decision-makers in DC right now. Some disputes arising out of the S&L crisis took many, many years to resolve so there is reason to think that the junior preferred shareholders have a multi-year or even decades-long perspective on this. And the farther away we are from the events of the 2000s and the emotions that they elicit from decisionmakers, the more likely it is that the junior preferred shareholders can negotiate a favorable result for themselves.
May 8, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments
May 7, 2014
Rebirthing NYC Neighborhoods
One can imagine Mayor de Blasio thinking about his ambitious housing plan with one voice saying “Density!” over one shoulder and another voice saying “Preservation!” over the other. But which voice is the angel’s and which is the devil’s?
Peter Byrne has posted a short essay, The Rebirth of the Neighborhood, to SSRN. The essay represents the voice of Preservation and engages with Edward Glaeser, a voice of Density. Byrne argues that
new urban residents primarily seek a type of community properly called a neighborhood. “Neighborhood” refers to a legible, pedestrian-scale area that has an identity apart from the corporate and bureaucratic structures that dominate the larger society. Such a neighborhood fosters repeated, casual contacts with neighbors and merchants, such as while one pursues Saturday errands or takes children to activities. Dealing with independent local merchants and artisans face-to-face provides a sense of liberation from large power structures, where most such residents work. Having easy access to places of sociability like coffee shops and bars permits spontaneous “meet-ups,” contrasting with the discipline of professional life. Such a neighborhood conveys an indigenous identity created by the efforts of diverse people over time, rather than marketing an image deliberatively contrived to control the perceptions of customers. At its best, a neighborhood provides a refuge from the ennui of the workplace and the idiocy of consumer culture, substituting for churches (or synagogues), labor unions, and ethnic clubs that structured earlier urban social life. (1596-97)
Byrne argues that the “three chief legal tools for neighborhoods have been zoning for urban form, historic district preservation, and environmental protection.” (1597) In criticizing Glaeser and his ilk, Byrne writes that they often complain “such “laws destroy or take private property.” (1603) Byrne replies that “historic district regulations enhance property values by protecting the setting within which any urban property sits and from whence it derives most of its value.” (1603)
I am not going to resolve this debate in a blog post, but I will make a few points. First, a lot of these assertions are not self-evidently true and should be empirically tested, if possible. Second, the perspective of the Essay is that of the “new urban residents” who actually make up a small proportion of the total residents of a city. Those “old urban residents” are more likely focused on the affordability of their own homes, the quality of their children’s schools and the safety of their streets. Third, it is possible that Preservation and Density can work together intelligently as we rework the urban fabric.
As Mayor de Blasio struggles with the implementation of his housing plan, it is worth remembering that Preservation and Density can each be an angel, can each be a devil. It is the Mayor’s job to make both of them listen to their better natures.
May 7, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments
May 6, 2014
Reiss on de Blasio Housing Plan
Law360.com quoted me in Developers, Attys Embrace De Blasio’s $41B Housing Plan (behind a paywall). It reads in part,
Real estate attorneys and their developer clients are cautiously optimistic about New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s new affordable housing plan, lauding its concrete objectives while noting that regulatory and financial hurdles could stall some of the most ambitious elements.
The mayor unveiled Monday the highly anticipated plan [you can find the plan here], which presents a $41 billion investment in affordable housing. He pledged to encourage affordable housing development by breaking down existing barriers to density, from adding efficiencies to the land use review process, to making better use of subsidies and tax incentives, to changing the multiple dwellings law to allow for higher floor area ratios at residential buildings.
The multifaceted approach appeared to appeal to many in the development community, who are eager to build across the city but have been uncertain in recent months about how the mayor’s plans to create or preserve 200,000 units of affordable housing would align — or compete — with their interests.
* * *
While de Blasio’s new housing plan is mum on details, Deputy Mayor Alicia Glen said during the press conference Monday that the administration also planned to “take a hard look at where we are able to rezone or upzone to create more opportunities for affordable housing.”
During the last administration, more than 30 percent of the city underwent rezoning, opening up scores of new lots for developers but enraging many community groups and local residents who feared that new market-rate towers would bring with them skyrocketing prices and gentrification.
De Blasio said Monday, however, that while Bloomberg had changed the rules of land use in much of the city, many opportunities remain to increase density — and therefore affordable housing, with mandatory inclusionary zoning — by upzoning additional neighborhoods.
Experts say this may well be one of the most controversial aspects of the plan, though developers and their attorneys generally welcome it. For the most part, they are pleased with the administration’s direction, but the question remains as to whether the plans will be borne out in the face of opposition, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School who blogs about commercial real estate and housing issues.
“The big debate is: Are we going to have a real commitment to increased density in parts of New York City? And if we don’t, it’s hard to imagine we can really reduce the cost of housing,” he said.
May 6, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments
May 5, 2014
The Second Frannie Bailout: Who Could’ve Known?
There is a good chance that five or so years from now, Fannie and Freddie will be in the midst of another bailout. This next crisis will be directly caused by the Executive and Legislative branches of the federal government. But members of those branches will say, “Nobody could have known that this crisis was going to happen, nobody is at fault.” That won’t be true, but nobody will be punished in any case. That’s because the crisis will result from inaction, that most fearsome of government flaws.
Who is the Cassandra, warning us of this impending crisis? None other than Donald Layton, the CEO of Freddie. You may think that he is speaking merely from self-interest and you would probably be right. But his self-interest happens to align with the truth in this matter.
In a letter to FHFA Director Watt, Layton writes:
the ability of Freddie Mac to continue to support the mortgage markets and the U.S. economy duling an unprecedentedly lengthy transition period should be one of the most important objectives of a housing finance reform proposal, such as the Johnson-Crapo Bill. The existing Bill draft does not focus on this issue and so, in my personal but experienced opinion, leaves the risk of a failure in Freddie Mac’ss Core Policy Function unacceptably high. With certain specific changes, none of which alter the fundamental nature of the future state envisioned or even the key aspects of the transition, l believe this risk can be reduced, although it would still remain high. (7)
Layton highlights the extraordinary complexity of Freddie’s activities in an appendix to the letter. The highlights include the fact that Freddie Mac guarantees “about 17% of all U.S. mortgage debt outstanding;” 1,400 Servicers and 2,000 Sellers work with Freddie; and Freddie manages 44,600 REO properties. (8)
Layton states that “It goes without saying that Freddie Mac cannot deliver upon its Core Policy Function, its support of the transition to a future state, or its support of Conservatorship initiatives without experienced and knowledgeable people in place at the executive level, at the Subject matter expert level and at the “been-here-a-long-time-to-know-how-everything-works level.” (3) He believes that departures are likely to cripple the company as experienced staff move on to other, more stable opportunities, leaving behind the quagmire that life in a GSE has become.
The Executive and Legislative branches are not really moving toward some kind of resolution of the Fannie and Freddie conservatorships, although we are now five years past the initial crisis. There is a good chance that the federal government will not move us to the next phase of housing finance in the next couple of years. Operations at the two GSEs will thus continue to suffer and will likely build up to a new crisis. And it will be a totally predictable crisis.
I am the kind of person who likes to say, “I told you so.” But the stakes here are so humungous and so important for the health of the economy, that I could take no pleasure in saying I told you in 2014 that our entire housing finance edifice was going to crumble a second time in a decade. But it will, if nothing is done to prevent it today.
May 5, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments
May 2, 2014
Real Affordability for All New Yorkers?
The Real Affordability for All campaign has issued An Affordable Housing Policy Platform for Mayor de Blasio. A stated goal of the campaign “is to ensure that Mayor de Blasio’s housing policies prioritize and deliver real affordability for the most economically vulnerable households” in the CIty. (1) As with many such studies (this one, for instance), it does a good job of identifying the problem — incomes are not sufficient to keep housing costs affordable — but its solutions do not match the identified problem.
I am not going to focus on all of the good things in the report (for instance, enhancing enforcement of housing laws to protect tenants), but on fundamental flaws in its proposal that the City implement a 50/50 model for increasing the supply of new affordable housing units. The report states that
Affordable housing developers, private sector developers and housing experts agree on two broad 50/50 scenarios that are viable and pragmatic, based on existing developments, current real-estate market assumptions, and the latest mathematical modeling:
1) For high-cost areas of the city (particularly Manhattan), depending on the level of up-zoning, new developments can ensure that 50 percent of the units are market rate and 50 percent are real affordable units targeted to low-income households: specifically, households of four earning 30-60 percent of Area Median Income.
2) For the outer boroughs, where land costs are lower, 100% of new developments can be affordable: 50 percent of the units can be for low-income households (those earning 30-60 percent of Area Median Income) and 50 percent for moderate income households (those earning up to 100 percent of Area Median Income). 100% real affordability can be achieved by increasing current per unit subsidies in the outer boroughs and applying those subsidies to real affordable housing units for low-and moderate-income households. (3)
The first fundamental flaw is an assumption that if the government requires something of developers, developers will do it. For-profit developers will only build if they can make a profit. Otherwise they will just not build. Given the low rates of new housing construction that we have seen in NYC over long periods of time, this is just a fact of life.
This leads to a second flaw — the proposal leaves fewer market rate units to cross-subsidize more affordable units. Given that the costs of development are relatively fixed, this proposal would have to come up with some real new cost-cutting measures for new developments or new sources of revenue to add to the existing subsidies. But the recommendations put forward by the report don’t really do either of those things. Their recommendations are
- Use Subsidies More Wisely to Drive Real Affordability.
- Implement a New Low-Income Real Affordability Framework Across All Housing Programs.
- Enable Not-for-Profit Developers and Owners to Play a Strong and Active Role in the City’s Housing Agenda.
- Prioritize Permanent Affordability for All City-owned Land Dispositions.
- Require that Developers and Investors Receiving Any Type of City Subsidy Provide a Reserve Fund that Creates a Safety Net for Excessively Rent-Burdened Tenants.
- Flip Tax.
- Non-Occupancy Tax.
- Water and Sewer Tax Reform
- Property Tax Overhaul.
- Density Bonuses.(4-5)
Many of these recommendations amount to moving things around, not to reducing costs or increasing subsidies. The ones that do raise revenues, raise relatively small amounts. For instance, the flip tax proposal is estimated to generate between $100 million and $150 million per year. Using a conservative cost estimate of $200,000 per unit of new housing, $150 million in new revenue would only produce 750 new units of real affordable housing per year, a drop in the bucket.
Many have been trying to shape the Mayor’s housing agenda in recent days (here for instance). But few have seriously faced the real market and political constraints that the City faces as it attempts to increase the supply of affordable housing. There is reason to think that the Mayor’s housing team will grapple with these issues seriously, so let’s wait patiently for their plan to be released . . ..
May 2, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments
Defaulting Mortgagor Lacked Standing Under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1109(b)
The court in deciding In re Residential Capital, LLC, 2013 Bankr. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 2013) held that the plaintiff Scott was not a party in interest and therefore lacked standing to assert a violation of the automatic stay. The court thus denied his motion.
Before this court was Phillip Scott’s motion to (1) determine that bankruptcy estate owns title to the note, (2) void state court title transfer, and (3) enjoin post petition state court prosecution.
Through his Motion, Scott sought: (1) declaratory relief determining that the bankruptcy estate owns title to the note; (2) injunctive relief enjoining, restraining, and prohibiting the mortgage foreclosure action in the Supreme Court of New York, County of Westchester; and (3) judgment for costs, including attorneys’ fees.
This court held that a mortgagor who defaulted on a note he executed in 2005 did not have standing under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1109(b) to seek a ruling from the bankruptcy court that a business that declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy after it acquired and transferred a mortgage he executed with the note held title to real property that secured the note, and an order enjoining a foreclosure action which a bank filed against the property in a New York court. The court also held that the mortgagor was not a creditor in the debtors’ bankruptcy estate, the note and mortgage were not owned or serviced by any of the debtors, and none of the debtors was a party to the foreclosure action.
Thus this court denied the mortgagor’s motion for an order declaring that the debtors’ bankruptcy estate owned title to the note, voiding a state court title transfer, and enjoining the foreclosure action that was filed in state court.
May 2, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments
Arizona’s Non-Judicial Foreclosure Statutes do not Require the Beneficiary to ‘Show the Note’ Before Commencing a Non-Judicial Foreclosure
The court in deciding Famili v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, 2013 U.S. Dist. (D. Ariz., 2013) reaffirmed the holding that “Arizona’s non-judicial foreclosure statutes do not require the beneficiary to prove its authority or ‘show the note’ before the trustee may commence a non-judicial foreclosure.”
All counts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint centered on her assertion that whenever the promissory note was transferred or a change was made to the beneficiary of the deed of trust, the holder or beneficiary was required to demonstrate authority for the transfer or substitution. This court noted that each claim of breach of contract and lack of authority put forth by the plaintiff was an iteration of the “show-me-the-note” argument resolved by the Arizona Supreme Court in Hogan v. Wash. Mut. Bank, N.A., 230 Ariz. 584, 277 P.3d 781, 782 (Ariz. 2012).
Thus, as a matter of Arizona law, the court found the plaintiff’s argument without merit.
May 2, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments
