July 21, 2013
Oregon Court Rules That MERS’ Role as Beneficiary is Not Inconsistent With the Purpose of Oregon’s Non-Judicial Foreclosure Statute
The Oregon court in Nigro v. Northwest Trustee Services and Wells Fargo Bank, No. 11 CV 0135 (May 15, 2011) denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction to stop a non-judicial foreclosure sale.
The court in reaching their holding found that the plaintiff failed to establish the necessary elements to sustain a request for a preliminary injunction. Most notably, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success based on the merits.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated the Oregon Deed of Trust Act by failing to record all transfers of the assignment as well as the note. The court, in their ruling, cited Bertrand v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., which held that MERS was specifically designated by all parties as the beneficiary and had the authority to assign the deed of trust. Although MERS was not a party to this case, the court in Nigro ruled that MERS’ role as beneficiary is not inconsistent with the purpose of Oregon’s non-judicial foreclosure statute, and that the Act did not require the recording of note transfers.
July 21, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
July 16, 2013
Oregon Court Rejects Plaintiff’s Argument That the Trust Deed Can Only be Foreclosed if a Single Entity Holds Both the Note and Deed
After receiving a Notice of Default and Election to Sell, the plaintiff in Spencer v. Guaranty Bank et al., No. 10CV0515ST, Deschutes Co. Circuit (May 5, 2011) sought an injunction barring MERS, as well as the other defendants, from bringing a foreclosure action. The court granted the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.
In addition to the court granting the motion to dismiss, the court also noted that the plaintiff “made no claim that she was not in default nor that any requirement of ORS 86.735 were not satisfied,” the court held that MERS satisfied the statutory definition of “beneficiary” under ORS 86.705. Specifically, the court identified that it was “not persuaded that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems couldn’t act in that capacity, even if it is not the holder of the note.”
Moreover, the court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the trust deed can only be foreclosed if a single person or entity holds both the note and deed, noting that ORS 86.770(2) protects the plaintiff from a lawsuit seeking enforcement of the note after the non-judicial sale. “The bottom line is that plaintiff sought to retain ownership, apparently forever, of a property for which she has not paid nor even alleges that she intends to pay for. She has not stated a claim.”
July 16, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Mortgage Bankers Ask Permission to Hijack GSE Reform
The Mortgage Bankers Association issued a concept paper that calls for a board of mortgage industry representatives to “have the authority to direct the scope and immediate priorities of the [Central Securitization] Platform’s development, and the capability to redirect resources from the GSEs’ back offices to aid the project.” (3) So, to be clear, the mortgage industry wants not only to (a) define the scope and activities of the Platform but also (B) tell Fannie and Freddie how to spend their money to do so. As Christmas is still a ways away, let’s spend some time working through this industry wishlist in the concept paper, The Central Securitization Platform: Direction, Scope, and Governance.
To start, what is the purpose of this mysterious “Platform?” According to the FHFA, it is supposed to “streamline and simplify those functions that are commoditized and routinely repeated across the secondary mortgage market.”(Building a New Infrastructure for the Secondary Mortgage Market, 5-6)
The MBA is calling for the establishment of “a strong panel of industry representatives to guide the development of the Platform.” (1)
But here is where I become nervous: “this Platform is just one piece of a much larger puzzle that impacts borrowers, lenders and the market as a whole. For these reasons, it is critical to appoint an industry advisory panel with real authority over the Platform’s early development. FHFA should establish and convene this panel before any further development is undertaken.” (2, emphasis added) Moreover, the MBA “believes the Platform should ultimately be owned by the industry as a cooperative.” (2)
So we have an acknowledgement that the Platform impacts “borrowers” and “the market as a whole.” But we have a call for a board with real powers that is only made up of “industry representatives.” Where have I heard a similar story like this before? Oh, the Mortgage Electronic Recording System (MERS), a system designed by the mortgage industry that has been consistently attacked by local government officials and borrowers.
For now, I am agnostic as to whether the Platform is a good idea or not. But I certainly do not believe that only the industry should have the power to define its “scope and activities” and I certainly don’t believe that the industry should have the power to spend Fannie and Freddie’s money to pursue its vision. There are a lot more interests at stake than just the special interests represented by the MBA.
July 16, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Minnesota Court Holds MERS Foreclosure Valid, Although Signatories on the Assignment Were Officers of More Than One Entity
The court in deciding Ostigaard v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company et al., No. 0:10cv1557, (May 2, 2011) granted MERS as well as its codefendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The court heavily relied on the holding from an earlier case [Jackson v. MERS].
The plaintiff made the allegation that the foreclosure was invalid, claiming that the signatories on the assignment were officers of more than one entity. The court, in rejecting the plaintiff’s notion, found that “In [Jackson v. MERS], the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the operation of MERS and noted ‘legislative approval of MERS practices’ by the Minnesota Legislature. The Jackson court also recognized that MERS shares officers with some of the lenders with which it works. Consequently, the plaintiff’s argument failed.” Likewise, the court also rejected the plaintiff’s contention that his inability to contact the MERS signing officer who executed the assignment was a denial of due process.
July 16, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments