July 16, 2013
Minnesota District Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Fraud Claims and Holds That MERS Had Legal Title and Authority to Foreclose
The Minnesota District Court in Allen v. Wilford & Geske et al.,No. 70-CV-10-29502 (D. Minn. May 9, 2011), after hearing the plaintiff’s contentions, dismissed his complaint for foreclosure fraud. The court held that MERS had legal title and authority to foreclose.
By granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court found that, “MERS was not required to register every assignment of the loan or to track that history in its foreclosure documents…” and “…it was not a misrepresentation for MERS to identify itself as the mortgagee in the foreclosure documents and not to identify all past and present lenders.”
July 16, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
California Court Affirms MERS’ Authority to Assign its Interest Under a Deed of Trust
The court in Hollins v. ReconTrust et al., Civil No. 2:11-cv-00945-PSG –PLA (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2011) affirmed MERS’ authority to assign its interest under a deed of trust and granted MERS’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs claimed that the foreclosure proceedings initiated by the U.S. Bank as well as ReconTrust were not valid. Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that MERS lacked the authority to assign the deed of trust.
The court considered the plaintiff’s contentions, but rejected the argument. In rejecting the palintiff’s argument, the court found that “federal and state courts in California have repeatedly rejected similar challenges to MERS in cases where the plaintiff expressly authorized MERS to act as a beneficiary.” Regarding the plaintiffs’ allegation that U.S. Bank was not authorized to foreclose due to lack of “documentation evidencing the proper status of U.S. Bank as a party in interest,” the court found the allegation “negated by a judicially noticeable record of assignment from MERS to U.S. Bank.” Last but not least, the plaintiffs’ failure to tender was fatal to their claims.
July 16, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Jefferson County Circuit Court Holds That Fannie Mae Had Standing to Bring Ejectment Action
The circuit court in Fannie Mae v. Steele, Jefferson County Circuit Court No. 09-900069 (May 18, 2011) found in favor of the plaintiff [Fannie Mae], by deciding to deny the defendants’ motion to set aside the judgment for possession. The defendants contended that the judgment in favor of Fannie Mae should be vacated on the grounds it was void due to MERS’ assignment of the mortgage to Everhome Mortgage. Everhome Mortgage was the party who conveyed the property to Fannie Mae through foreclosure deed.
The defendants also argued that Fannie Mae lacked standing to eject the defendants. This claim was premised on the holding from to Crum v. LaSalle Bank, 2009 WL 2986655 (Ala. Civ. App. Sept. 18, 2009). After considering the defendants’ contentions, the court held that the MERS assignment to Everhome was valid because MERS had the ability to assign the mortgage and take other actions as the nominee of the lender and its assigns. Likewise, the court also held that Fannie Mae had standing to bring the ejectment action.
July 16, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
July 15, 2013
Where’s Perry? Are Phannie and Freddie Busted?!?
With all apologies to Perry the Platypus who stars in my sons’ favorite TV show, Phineas and Ferb, today I look at the complaint in Perry Capital, LLC v. Lew et al. Perry Capital has sued the federal government for destroying the value of Fannie and Freddie securities held by Perry and the investment funds it manages. In particular, the complaint (drafted by Theodore Olson and others at Gibson Dunn) states that
Perry Capital seeks to prevent Defendants from giving effect to or enforcing the so-called Third Amendment to preferred stock purchase agreements (“PSPAs”) executed by Treasury and the FHFA, acting as conservator for the Companies. The Third Amendment fundamentally and unfairly alters the structure and nature of the securities Treasury purchased under the PSPAs, impermissibly destroys value in all of the Companies’ privately held securities, and illegally begins to liquidate the Companies. (2)
The plaintiff alleges that the government’s actions violate the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA). The APA governs the decision-making procedures of federal agencies like Treasury and independent agencies like the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). HERA was passed at the outset of the financial crisis and governs the process by which Fannie and Freddie may be put into conservatorship. (I discuss the enactment of HERA in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, which is also available on BePress.)
[Warning: necessary but complex details follow. Those who are not GSE geeks may skip to the end.]
After the two companies were put into conservatorship in 2008,
Treasury and the FHFA executed the PSPAs, according to which Treasury purchased 1 million shares of the Government Preferred Stock from each company, in exchange for a funding commitment that allowed each company to draw up to $100 billion from Treasury as needed to ensure that they maintained a net worth of at least zero. As relevant here, the Government Preferred Stock for each company has a liquidation preference equal to $1 billion plus the sum of all draws by each company against Treasury’s funding commitment and is entitled to a cumulative dividend equal to ten percent of the outstanding liquidation preference. The PSPAs also grant Treasury warrants to purchase up to 79.9% of each company’s common stock at a nominal price. (2-3)
According to the complaint, the Third Amendment to the PSPA changed the way that profits would be distributed by the two companies:
Under the original stock certificates, Treasury’s dividend was paid quarterly in the amount equal to an annual ten percent of the Government Preferred Stock’s outstanding liquidation preference. In the Third Amendment, the FHFA and Treasury amended the dividend provision to require that every dollar of each company’s net worth above a certain capital reserve amount be given to Treasury as a dividend. . . . Treasury’s additional profits from the Third Amendment are enormous. (5)
This is a very complex case, and I will return to it in future posts. For now, I would just flag some issues that may pose problems for Perry.
First, is this case ripe for adjudication? Perry states that they will be harmed when the two companies liquidate, but they are nowhere near liquidation. Will the harm Perry predicts necessarily come about? The claim that they are harmed as to their expected dividends is stronger. Yet Perry acknowledges that the PSPAs “explicitly prohibit the payment of any dividend to any shareholder other than Treasury without Treasury’s consent.” (16)
Second, to what extent is this matter governed by the APA? I am not an APA expert, and I am wary of second-guessing Olson’s complaint in a blog post. But I would note that the court may not find that the APA even applies in this case and may find that HERA governs this dispute on its own. And even if the APA applies, the court may give great deference to the decisions of Treasury and the FHFA.
Finally, does the language from HERA that Perry relies on really give it much to hang its hat on? I think the crux of Perry’s argument is that the Third Amendment “created new securities” instead of changing the terms of existing securities. (24) If a court disagrees with Perry on this (and it seems like a bit of a stretch to me), the theory of the case will be severely weakened.
All of this being said, I would agree with Perry that the holders of the Private Sector Preferred Stock — particularly the holders that predate conservatorship — look like they are receiving a raw deal from the federal government. Various regulations encouraged lending institutions to hold Fannie and Freddie preferred stock over other investments. Those incentives sure looked like an implied guarantee before the subprime crisis knocked Fannie and Freddie off their feet.
Bottom line: this dispute cannot be settled in a late night blog post. We’ll have to wait and see if Agent P can pull off what may be his most difficult mission yet.
July 15, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Oregon Court Holds That Oregon’s Non-Judicial Foreclosure Statute Does Not Require Presentment of the Note
The court in Buckland v. Aurora Loan Services, Josephine County No. 10 CV 1023 (March 18, 2011) granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for wrongful foreclosure with prejudice.
MERS, although not being a party to the case, the plaintiff’s complaint contained claims that MERS lacked the power to appoint a trustee as it was not the beneficiary of the plaintiff’s deed of trust. The plaintiff’s complaint also alleged that Aurora was required to prove it was the note holder before directing the trustee to non-judicially foreclose. The court considered the plaintiff’s contentions, but ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.
The court relied on the cases cited in Aurora’s motion to dismiss, including Stewart v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (holding that presentment of note not required and MERS is a valid deed of trust beneficiary). The court ultimately held that Oregon’s non-judicial foreclosure statute does not require presentment of the note.
July 15, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Indiana Supreme Court Allows Citimortgage to Intervene in ReCasa’s Foreclosure Proceeding
In Citi v. Barnabas, 975 N.E.2d 805 (Ind. 2012), the Indiana Supreme Court held that Citimortgage had a right to intervene in ReCasa’s foreclosure proceeding and sale since Citi held a first mortgage on the property, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals and trial court.
The homeowner, Barnabas, granted a first mortgage on the property in 2005 to Irwin Mortgage Corp. (Irwin) with MERS designated as nominee and mortgagee, which later assigned the mortgage to Citimortgage (Citi). In 2007, Barnabas granted a second mortgage to ReCasa. Barnabas defaulted on the second mortgage and ReCasa commenced foreclosure proceedings in 2009. In response to the foreclosure proceedings, Irwin filed a disclaimer of interest in the property. When Citi learned the property was already sold through ReCasa’s foreclosure sale, Citi filed a motion to intervene, which was denied by the trial court. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision.
The Supreme Court found the trial court erred in denying Citi’s motion, as ReCasa didn’t dispute the validity of the assignment from MERS to Citi, but rather argued that MERS lacked a property interest, and therefore so did Citi. However, the court stated that “the assignee of rights under a contract stands in the shoes of the assignor and can assert any rights that the assignor could have asserted,” citing Lake Cnty. Trust Co. v. Household Merch., Inc., 511 N.E.2d 512, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) giving MERS the same property interest as the original lender.
When examining the mortgage language, the court found MERS’s designation as both “nominee” and “mortgagee” to be conflicting based on standard definitions for both terms, rendering the mortgage ambiguous. To determine MERS’s interest, the court looked to the parties’ intent and found that the legal title held by MERS was sufficient to give MERS foreclosure rights, acting as agent for the lender, Irwin.
ReCasa further argued that Irwin’s disclaimer of interest extinguished MERS’s property rights. The court notes that MERS has an agency relationship not only to Irwin, but also to all its member banks, and therefore does not disclaim the interests of another member bank in the property, such as Citi.
Although Citi’s motion to intervene was untimely, the court held that if Citi were not permitted to intervene, its interest would be destroyed in its entirety, prejudicing Citi. The court further noted that although intervention is typically “disfavored,” it is appropriate in certain “extraordinary and unusual circumstances,” particularly when “the petitioner’s rights cannot otherwise be protected.” Bd. of Comm’rs of Benton Cnty. v. Whistler, 455 N.E.2d 1149, 1153–54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). Furthermore, Citi’s delay in filing was a direct result of ReCasa’s failure to notice either Citi or MERS of the foreclosure proceedings. ReCasa argued that notice to an attorney representing Citi in the Barnabas bankruptcy proceeding provided Citi with actual knowledge of the foreclosure. But the court held that “actual knowledge of the suit does not satisfy due process or give the court in personam jurisdiction.” Overhouser v. Fowler, 549 N.E.2d 71, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Glennar Mercury Lincoln, Inc. v. Riley, 167 Ind. App. 144, 152, 338 N.E.2d 670, 675 (1975)).
The court was hesitant to outline MERS’s rights as a mortgagee under Indiana statute, though it noted the original statute might soon require modernization to account for changes in the mortgage industry.
July 15, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Florida Court Dismisses Class Action Against MERS Over Unpaid Recording Fees
The court in Fuller v. MERS, No. 11cv-1153 (M.D. Fla., June 27, 2012) was “confronted with an old problem: the difficulty of reconciling new technology with old law, thus raising the centuries old separation of powers controversy.” In deciding this case the court found that the Florida statute, which created the recording system, was a creature of statute, as such the remedy the plaintiff sought was to be granted by the legislature and not the courts.
In reaching its decision, the court found that the statute creating Florida’s public recording system did not provide a private right of action, as such Fuller was barred from bringing common law claims based on the statute. Fuller’s claims included civil conspiracy, a Writ of Quo Warranto, unjust enrichment, as well as fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. Fuller claimed that these claims were independent of the Florida statute, however, he admitted that the statute was the only source of his authority.
The court found that all of Fuller’s claims failed on their merits. Fuller argued that MERS attempted to usurp his function as the recorder of public instruments and sought a Writ of Quo Warranto. However, MES successfully argued that no law required payment of recording fees when a mortgage is assigned but not recorded.
Fuller failed to establish a conspiracy, as MERS did not commit an unlawful act. The court noted that the recording of mortgages is “at the complete discretion of the party wishing to record the document.” Accordingly, MERS was under no legal obligation to record the assignment or pay the recording fees. Fuller’s unjust enrichment claim was also rejected, as MERS had no duty to record, so Fuller could not establish that he had conferred any benefit on MERS. Lastly, Fuller’s fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims were based on the assumption that MERS falsely designated itself as the mortgagee on recorded instruments. The court rejected this assumption.
July 15, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
