REFinBlog

Editor: David Reiss
Cornell Law School

November 28, 2012

HSH Nordbank Sues Barclays Bank for Fraud in Issuing Mortgage-Backed Securities

By Brad Borden

In HSH Nordbank v. Barclays Bank, No. 652678/2011 (New York County Apr. 2, 2012), HSH Nordbank claims that Barclays Bank issued MBS offering materials that included false and misleading statements regarding (1) assignment of mortgages and notes to trusts, (2) the tax treatment of trusts as REMICs, (3) occupancy status of homes secured by mortgages, (4) the combined loan-to-value ratios of mortgages, and (5) compliance with underwriting standards.

November 28, 2012 | Permalink | No Comments

November 27, 2012

New Affordable Housing Goals Set for Fannie and Freddie

By David Reiss

The FHFA issued a final rule.  The summary is as follows:

The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (Safety and Soundness Act) requires the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to establish annual housing goals for mortgages purchased by the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) (collectively, the Enterprises). FHFA previously established housing goals for the Enterprises through 2011. This final rule establishes new levels for the housing goals for 2012 through 2014, consistent with the requirements of the Safety and Soundness Act.

The new goal levels are lower than those from the last couple of years.  For a taste of the controversy surrounding affordable housing goals see this, this and this on the one hand and see this, this and this on the other.  My own take is that Wallison and Pinto make broad claims about the negative effects of affordable housing goals that attach big effects to long ago events.  Their claims have not been supported empirically and have not gone through a peer review process.  That being said, I think it is valuable to draw attention to the unintended effects of government policies.  Going forward, Congress and the FHFA should be very careful in their program design to ensure that housing policies have their desired effects — no more, no less.

November 27, 2012 | Permalink | No Comments

Disturbing Reminders about Rating Agencies in Brummer’s New Article

By David Reiss

Some disturbing reminders in The New Politics of Transatlantic Credit Rating Agency Regulation.  Major rating agencies (CRAs)

generally did not verify the information used to determine the creditworthiness of the products they rated. Plus new models for rating subprime mortgages assumed that housing prices would continue to increase and the model did not consider the declining quality of the loans themselves. And even where signs did begin to arise, bonds were rated at specific intervals, and not necessarily in reaction to crisis, effectively preserving the long life of artificially inflated ratings. By giving MBS and CDOs high ratings, CRAs essentially encouraged investment in these products. The impact: “Of all mortgage-backed securities it had rated triple-A in 2006, Moody’s downgraded 73% to junk”. Similarly, 80% of CDOs rated AAA by S&P from 2005-2007 were downgraded below investment grade by 2009. Well over a third ended up defaulting, wrecking havoc on the financial system and causing the downfall of scores of financial institutions, including behemoths AIG and Lehman Brothers.  (13-14, citations omitted)

 

November 27, 2012 | Permalink | No Comments

November 26, 2012

Fleisher: “Why a Tax Crackdown Is Not Needed on Mortgage-Backed Securities”

By Brad Borden

In Why a Tax Crackdown Is Not Needed on Mortgage-Backed Securities, Professor Vic Fleisher argues that IRS enforcement of tax laws governing REMICs will merely complicate efforts to properly fix blame and allocate the costs of the financial crisis. Professor Fleisher relies upon poorly-defined policy reasons for his position. Nonetheless, the severity of disregard for the rules, a need to ensure that the mortgage-securitization industry honestly reform, and the potential additional revenue warrant IRS action with respect to REMICs. For additional discussion regarding the need for IRS and other enforcement in this industry see Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss, Wall Street Rules Applied to REMIC Classification; Bradley T. Borden, Did the IRS Cause the Financial Crisis; Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss, An Uneasy Justification for Prosecutorial Abdication in the Subprime Industry; Naked Capitalist, Yes, Virginia, The IRS does not Treat the Connected Like the Rest of Us (REMIC Edition).

November 26, 2012 | Permalink | No Comments

Borden & Reiss: “An Uneasy Justification for Prosecutorial Abdication in the Subprime Industry

By Brad Borden

In an Uneasy Justification for Prosecutorial Abdication in the Subprime Industry, Professors Brad Borden and David Reiss argue that individuals must be accountable for actions they took that led to the financial crisis. Failure to prosecute individuals will not deter similar behavior in the future and we can expect other crises, if prosecutors do not take actions against individual wrongdoers.

November 26, 2012 | Permalink | No Comments

Borden: “Did the IRS Cause the Financial Crisis?”

By Brad Borden

In Did the IRS Cuase the Financial Crisis, Professor Brad Borden explains that competent IRS audits of REMICs would have uncovered many of the problems that led to the financial crisis. Competent audits and tax enforcement of REMICs would therefore have helped prevent the crisis.

November 26, 2012 | Permalink | No Comments

Borden & Reiss: “Wall Street Rules Applied to REMIC Classification”

By Brad Borden

In Wall Street Rules Applied to REMIC Classification, Professors Brad Borden and David Reiss explain how arrangements that fail to satisfy the REMIC requirements may benefit from the so-called Wall Street Rule. They argue, however, the IRS’s failure to audit REMICs may have contributed to the financial crisis and that audits and tax enforcement now will generate tax revenue, help clean up the mortgage securitization industry, and place the cost of the financial crisis on the parties who caused it.

November 26, 2012 | Permalink | No Comments