October 6, 2017
Treasury’s Overreach on Securitization Reform
The Department of the Treasury released its report, A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities Capital Markets. I will leave it to others to dissect the broader implications of this important document and will just highlight what it has to say about the future of securitization:
Problems related to certain types of securitized products, primarily those backed by subprime mortgage loans, contributed to the financial crisis that precipitated the Great Recession. As a result, the securitization market has acquired a popular reputation as an inherently high-risk asset class and has been regulated as such through numerous post-crisis statutory and rulemaking changes. Such treatment of this market is counterproductive, as securitization, when undertaken in an appropriate manner, can be a vital financial tool to facilitate growth in our domestic economy. Securitization has the potential to help financial intermediaries better manage risk, enhance access to credit, and lower funding costs for both American businesses and consumers. Rather than restrict securitization through regulations, policymakers and regulators should view this component of our capital markets as a byproduct of, and safeguard to, America’s global financial leadership. (91-92, citations omitted)
This analysis of securitization veers toward the incoherent. It acknowledges that relatively unregulated subprime MBS contributed to the Great Recession but it argues that stripping away the regulations that were implemented in response to the financial crisis will safeguard our global financial leadership. How’s that? A full deregulatory push would return us to the pre-crisis environment where mortgage market players will act in their short-term interests, while exposing counter-parties and consumers to greater risks.
Notwithstanding that overreach, the report has some specific recommendations that could make securitization more attractive. These include aligning U.S. regulations with the Basel recommendations that govern the global securitization market; fine-tuning risk retention requirements; and rationalizing the multi-agency rulemaking process.
But it is disturbing when a government report contains a passage like the following, without evaluating whether it is true or not: “issuers have stated that the increased cost and compliance burdens, lack of standardized definitions, and sometimes ambiguous regulatory guidance has had a negative impact on the issuance of new public securitizations.” (104) The report segues from these complaints right to a set of recommendations to reduce the disclosure requirements for securitizers. It is incumbent on Treasury to evaluate whether those complaints are valid are not, before making recommendations based upon them.
Securitization is here to stay and can meaningfully lower borrowing costs. But the financial crisis has demonstrated that it must be regulated to protect the financial system and the public. There is certainly room to revise the regulations that govern the securitization sector, but a wholesale push to deregulate would be foolish given the events of the 2000s.
October 6, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments
Friday’s Government Reports Roundup
- 2018 fiscal year budget is forging forward. Recently the House of Representatives passed the 2018 fiscal year budget. Their budget is designed not to increase the national deficit; however, the Senate’s competing fiscal year 2018 budget will increase the national deficit by $1.5 trillion over the course of the next ten years. The Senate’s budget causes such a deficit because it promotes the proposed tax reform efforts as well as reduces the corporate tax rate. While the House beat the Senate to moving forward with 2018 budget plans, the Senate will introduce the bill the week of October 16.
- Today Americans are better suited to lead financially sound lives; however, there are roughly 26 million Americans that are “credit invisible.” The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), recently released a report that studied the effects of this fact. Through the study they found that many minorities are likely not to have a credit score or fail to have a sufficient credit history, thereby making them “credit invisible.” This may seem like a small issue to mitigate, but without such credit scores, their lives as consumers are limited.
October 6, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments
October 5, 2017
Evolution of the CFPB?
The Mortgage Bankers Association has issued a white paper, CFPB 2.0: Advancing Consumer Protection. The Executive Summary reads, in part,
In its first years, the Bureau’s regulatory expertise was largely consumed by the need to meet deadlines on specific rules required under the Dodd-Frank Act, and its supervision program took time to stand up. In its first years, the Bureau spent relatively little time providing guidance to industry on its expectations.
The combination of aggressive enforcement and the absence of regulatory guidance evolved into a regime of “regulation by enforcement.” Director Richard Cordray has argued that the Bureau’s enforcement regime provides “detailed guidance for compliance officers” and that it “would be ‘compliance malpractice’ for the industry not to take careful bearings from [consent] orders about how to comply with the law.” Unfortunately, the reality is that the Bureau’s enforcement program offers only fragmentary glimpses of how the Bureau interprets the laws and regulations it enforces.
This paper explains why authoritative guidance is still needed. Rather than seeking to provide the equivalent of “detailed guidance” through enforcement, the Bureau should simply provide detailed guidance. Such guidance can be provided in a host of forms, including advisory opinions, bulletins, no-action letters, statements of policy, and answers to frequently asked questions. In contrast to enforcement orders, such guidance can be proactive, efficient, clear and comprehensive, and can allow for stakeholder input and revision when facts and circumstances warrant. (v)
It is hard to argue with the MBA that it is better to regulate by supervision than by enforcement as that allows regulated companies to design policies that meet with their regulatory requirements. As the CFPB matures, I would expect that this would happen naturally. Indeed, the white paper acknowledges the challenges of standing up the CFPB in its first few years of existence that led to the early emphasis on enforcement.
I wonder a bit about the timing of this report. The MBA describes the CFPB as being at a “crossroads.” (19) That crossroads may refer to the Republican control of Congress and the Executive Branch, it may refer to the soon-to-be ending term of Director Cordray, or it may refer to both of those developments. So I wonder if this report is meant to provide some intellectual cover to bigger changes that would reduce the CFPB’s role as America’s consumer protection sheriff. Let’s see where the MBA comes down on those bigger changes once their floated in the coming months. Are they advocating tweaks to the way the CFPB does business or are they looking for some kind of revolution in the regulation of consumer protection?
October 5, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments
Thursday’s Advocacy & Think Tank Roundup
- The federal government wants to lower the number of sexual harassment occurrences in the nation’s housing sector. As a result, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), recently launched an initiative to decrease the amount of sexual harassment in housing practices. The DOJ’s initiative seeks to protect women from unruly landlords, property managers, security guards, and other housing employees. The Department of Justice, Civil Rights division will lead the initiative through the enforcement of the Fair Housing Act.
- In 2012, 44% of middle class families could afford the inventory of homes being sold. Four short years later, the percentage of middle class families able to afford the inventory of homes decreased by 12% in 2016. In order to aid in the decline, Trump’s Administration must support middle class mortgages. In doing so, the administration will encourage economic growth because middle class families will have the mobility to move to areas that offer better jobs and housing options. Further, many of the nation’s largest metropolitans will become more diverse.
October 5, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments
Wednesday’s Academic Roundup
- New Construction and the Mortgage Crisis, Mayock and Tzioumis
- Regulating Household Leverage, DeFusco, Johnson, and Mondragon
- Systemic Operational Risk: People Risk in the Global Financial Crisis, McConnell and Blacker
- Payday-Loan Bans: Evidence of Indirect Effects on Supply, Ramirez
- Ancillary Agreements in Real Estate Transactions, Berman, Hines, and Ward
October 4, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments
October 3, 2017
Watt’s Happening with Fannie and Freddie?
Federal Housing Finance Agency Director Watt testified before the House Committee on Financial Services today and gave a good overview of the decade-long conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie. He also gave some sense of the urgency of coming up with at least a stopgap measure before the two companies’ capital buffer drops to zero at the end of the year pursuant to the terms of the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs) that govern the two companies’ relationship with the Treasury. He stated that it would
be a serious misconception for members of this Committee, or for anyone else, to consider any actions FHFA may take as conservator to avoid additional draws of taxpayer support either as interference with the prerogatives of Congress, as an effort to influence the outcome of housing finance reform, or as a step toward recap and release. FHFA’s actions would be taken solely to avoid a draw during conservatorship.
This signifies to me that he is planning on doing something other than reducing the capital buffer to $0. As far as I can tell, Watt is playing a game of chicken with Congress — if you do not act, I will.
It is not clear to me clear how much authority Watt has or thinks he has to change the rules relating to the capital buffer. Does he think that he could act inconsistent with the PSPAa and withhold capital? I have not seen a legal argument that says he could. Is he willing to do it and be sued by Treasury? These are speculative questions, but I do think that he has laid the groundwork for taking action if Congress and Treasury do not.
It does not seem to me that he was much wiggle room according to the terms of the PSPAs themselves, except perhaps to delay making the net worth sweep at the end of this year by converting it to an annual sweep or by some other mechanism. That will be a short-term fix.
Given his strong language — “FHFA’s actions would be taken solely to avoid a draw during conservatorship” — I think he might be prepared to take an action that is inconsistent with the plain language of the PSPAs in order to act in a way that he thinks is consistent with his duty as the conservator. This is less risky than it sounds because the only party that would seem to have standing to sue would be the Treasury, the counter-party to the PSPAs. One could imagine that the Treasury would prefer to negotiate a response with the FHFA or await Watt’s departure rather than to have a judge decide the issue. One could also imagine that Treasury would go along with the FHFA without explicitly condoning its actions, particularly if its actions soothed a turbulent market for Fannie and Freddie mortgage-backed securities.
Watt has consistently signaled that he will act if no other responsible party does and he emphasized that again today.
October 3, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments