April 20, 2017
Thursday’s Advocacy & Think Tank Roundup
- The total time for the process of closings in the U.S. are at the lowest level in over 700 days. In February and March of this year, the time span for closings landed at 46 and 43 days respectively. Last year the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau created the “TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure rule” which caused the industry to create a narrowed focus to decrease the time length of U.S. closings.
- The Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) failed to affirmatively do it’s job when working with Wells Fargo. A report shows that shows the agency failed to take action when Wells Fargo began to fire bank tellers for creating “accounts without customer authorization.” Their oversight failure led to the false creation of over two million accounts.
April 20, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments
April 19, 2017
How Tight Is The Credit Box?
Laurie Goodman of the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center has posted a working paper, Quantifying the Tightness of Mortgage Credit and Assessing Policy Actions. The paper opens,
Mortgage credit has become very tight in the aftermath of the financial crisis. While experts generally agree that it is poor public policy to make loans to borrowers who cannot make their payments, failing to make mortgages to those who can make their payments has an opportunity cost, because historically homeownership has been the best way to build wealth. And, default is not binary: very few borrowers will default under all circumstances, and very few borrowers will never default. The decision where to draw the line—which mortgages to make—comes down to what probability of default we as a society are prepared to tolerate.
This paper first quantifies the tightness of mortgage credit in historical perspective. It then discusses one consequence of tight credit: fewer mortgage loans are being made. Then the paper evaluates the policy actions to loosen the credit box taken by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), as well as the policy actions taken by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), arguing that the GSEs have been much more successful than the FHA. The paper concludes with the argument that if we don’t solve mortgage credit availability issues, we will have a much lower percentage of homeowners because a larger share of potential new homebuyers will likely be Hispanic or nonwhite—groups that have had lower incomes, less wealth, and lower credit scores than whites. Because homeownership has traditionally been the best way for households to build wealth, the inability of these new potential homeowners to buy could increase economic inequality between whites and nonwhites. (1)
Goodman has been making the case for some time that the credit box is too tight. I would have liked to see a broader discussion in the paper of policies that could further loosen credit. What, for instance, could the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau do to encourage more lending? Should it be offering more of a safe harbor for lenders who are willing to make non-Qualified Mortgage loans? The private-label mortgage-backed securities sector has remained close to dead since the financial crisis. Are there ways to bring some life — responsible life — back to that sector? Why aren’t portfolio lenders stepping into that space? What would they need to do so?
When the Qualified Mortgage rule was being hashed out, there was a debate as to whether there should be any non-Qualified Mortgages available to borrowers. Some argued that every borrower should get a Qualified Mortgage, which has so many consumer protection provisions built into it. I was of the opinion that there should be a market for non-QM although the CFPB would need to monitor that sector closely. I stand by that position. The credit box is too tight and non-QM could help to loosen it up.
April 19, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments
Wednesday’s Academic Roundup
- Residential House Prices, Commercial Real Estate and Bank Failures, Fissel, Hanweck, and Sanders.
- Governance Structures and Trust: A Study of Real Estate Networks, Armando, Azevedo, Boaventura, Carnauba, and Todeva
- The Federal Housing Administration and African-American Homeownership, Reiss
- Do the FASB’s Standards Add Shareholder Value?, Khan, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam
- Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation, and Implications- The 2017 Edition, Damodaran
April 19, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments
April 18, 2017
The FHA and African-American Homeownership
Federal Government Redlining Map from 1936
I have posted my article, The Federal Housing Administration and African-American Homeownership, to SSRN and BePress. The abstract reads,
The United States Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) has been a versatile tool of government since it was created during the Great Depression. It achieved success with some of its goals and had a terrible record with others. Its impact on African-American households falls, in many ways, into the latter category. The FHA began redlining African-American communities at its very beginning. Its later days have been marred by high default and foreclosure rates in those same communities.
At the same time, the FHA’s overall impact on the housing market has been immense. Over its lifetime, it has insured more than 40 million mortgages, helping to make home ownership available to a broad swath of American households. And indeed, the FHA mortgage was central to America’s transformation from a nation of renters to homeowners. The early FHA really created the modern American housing finance system, as well as the look and feel of postwar suburban communities.
Recently, the FHA has come under attack for the poor execution of some of its policies to expand homeownership, particularly minority homeownership. Leading commentators have called for the federal government to stop employing the FHA to do anything other than provide liquidity to the low end of the mortgage market. These critics’ arguments rely on a couple of examples of programs that were clearly failures, but they fail to address the FHA’s long history of undertaking comparable initiatives. This Article takes the long view and demonstrates that the FHA has a history of successfully undertaking new homeownership programs. At the same time, the Article identifies flaws in the FHA model that should be addressed in order to prevent them from occurring if the FHA were to undertake similar initiatives to expand homeownership opportunities in the future, particularly for African-American households.
April 18, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments
Tuesday’s Regulatory & Legislative Roundup
- The Federal Reserve Board is making changes to its current practices. This shift potentially could change America’s housing road to recovery. In recent months, reducing the number of bond holdings have been discussed by federal officials. Currently, the U.S. has a 1.75 trillion “stash of mortgage-backed securities.”
- The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) asked for thoughts on its potential changes to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). The Bureau seeks to clarify some of the mortgage lending procedures such as the the reporting and information collection processes of financial institutions.
April 18, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments
April 17, 2017
This Is What GSE Reform Looks Like
Scene from Young Frankenstein
The Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Division of Conservatorship release an Update on Implementation of the Single Security and the Common Securitization Platform. As I had discussed last week, housing finance reform is proceeding apace from within the FHFA notwithstanding assertions by members of Congress that they will take the lead on this. The Update provides some background for the uninitiated:
The Federal Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) 2014 Strategic Plan for the Conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac includes the strategic goal of developing a new securitization infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the Enterprises) for mortgage loans backed by 1- to 4-unit (single-family) properties. To achieve that strategic goal, the Enterprises, under FHFA’s direction and guidance, have formed a joint venture, Common Securitization Solutions (CSS). CSS’s mandate is to develop and operate a Common Securitization Platform (CSP or platform) that will support the Enterprises’ single-family mortgage securitization activities, including the issuance by both Enterprises of a common single mortgage-backed security (to be called the Uniform Mortgage-Backed Security or UMBS). These securities will finance the same types of fixed-rate mortgages that currently back Enterprise-guaranteed securities eligible for delivery into the “To-Be-Announced” (TBA) market. CSS is also mandated to develop the platform in a way that will allow for the integration of additional market participants in the future.
The development of and transition to the new UMBS constitute the Single Security Initiative. FHFA has two principal objectives in undertaking this initiative. The first objective is to establish a single, liquid market for the mortgage-backed securities issued by both Enterprises that are backed by fixed-rate loans. The second objective is to maintain the liquidity of this market over time. Achievement of these objectives would further FHFA’s statutory obligation and the Enterprises’ charter obligations to ensure the liquidity of the nation’s housing finance markets. The Single Security Initiative should also reduce the cost to Freddie Mac and taxpayers that has resulted from the historical difference in the liquidity of Fannie Mae’s Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) and Freddie Mac’s Participation Certificates (PCs). (1, footnote omitted)
This administratively-led reform of Fannie and Freddie is not necessarily a bad thing, particularly because the executive and legislative branches have not taken up reform in any serious way since the two companies entered conservatorship in 2008. While Congress could certainly step up to the plate now, it is worth understanding just how far along the FHFA is in its transformation of the two companies:
Upon the implementation of Release 2, CSS will be responsible for bond administration of approximately 900,000 securities, which are backed by almost 26 million home loans having a principal balance of over $4 trillion. CSS’S responsibilities related to security issuance, security settlement, bond administration and disclosures were described in the September 2015 Update on the Common Securitization Platform. The Enterprises and investors, along with home owners and taxpayers, will rely on the operational integrity and resiliency of the CSP to ensure the smooth functioning of the U.S. housing mortgage market. (8)
That is, upon the implementation of Release 2, the merger of Fannie and Freddie into Frannie will be complete.
April 17, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- A Florida judge just awarded two million to the local government in a fraud scheme with Florida developers and contractors. Lloyd Boggio plead guilty to fraud charges for his role in a scheme to inflate the prices of affordable homes. Lloyd and five others conspired to keep the additional funds collected through their inflated prices.
- An island owner off the coast of Florida argued a taking by the state of Florida; however, the Florida Supreme Court refused to hear the case on appeal. The owner argues the state’s “increasingly restrictive development regulations” constitutes a taking of the land without just compensation. Furthermore, the plaintiff asserts the “city points” given by the government are not compensation for the land.
- The city of Miami is not thrilled with the use of Airbnbs. On March 23, 2017, residents of Miami held a community board meeting to discuss the implications of the use of Airbnbs. The meeting resulted in 3-2 vote in favor of enforcing Miami Mayor, Tomas Regalado, zoning and vacation rental ordinances. Tomas’ ordinances may lead to fines and violations by the Miami residents choosing to rent their homes out to Miami tourists.
April 17, 2017 | Permalink | No Comments
