Kansas Court of Appeals Finds that Wells Fargo’s Possession of Signed Promissory Note was Sufficient to Enforce and Foreclose

The court in deciding Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Richards, 2013 Kan. App. 1160 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) affirmed the lower court’s decision finding that Wells Fargo had standing to bring foreclosure action.

On January 25, 2013, the lower court filed its journal entry of judgment and dismissal, finding that defendant Richards had failed to controvert any of Wells Fargo’s allegations. The lower court found that Wells Fargo was holder of the note and mortgage; Richards was in default and Wells Fargo was entitled to judgment on the note and to foreclose the mortgage. The court reaffirmed its previous dismissal of Richards’ counterclaim, finding the “points, claims, and arguments” to be without merit.

Defendant, in this appeal, asserted five claims, (1) Wells Fargo lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action; (2) the district court erred in holding Wells Fargo’s possession of the promissory note he signed was insufficient to enforce and foreclose the mortgage it secures; (3) Wells Fargo did not experience/suffer a default; (4) there was no contract because the note and mortgage were split; and (5) that there was lack of due process.

The court examined the record and considered the arguments of the parties. After the consideration, the court held that there was no merit to any of defendant Richards’ arguments. Consequently, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Illinois Court of Appeals Upholds Lower Court Decision Finding that Wells Fargo had Standing to Foreclose

The court in deciding Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Abatangelo, 2013 IL App (1st) 130423-U (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013) that Wells Fargo had standing to foreclose the mortgage.

Defendant, Peter Abatangelo, appealed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, on plaintiff’s foreclosure complaint. On appeal, Mr. Abatangelo contended that the court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) the mortgage contract did not properly assign the right to foreclose to Wells Fargo; and (2) the trial court improperly considered new arguments raised by Wells Fargo for the first time in a reply brief in support of their motion to dismiss.

After considering the defendant’s contentions the court ultimately affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

Ohio Court Finds that Bank of America had Standing to Foreclose and MERS had Authority to Assign

The court in deciding Bank of Am., N.A. v. Harris, 2013-Ohio-5749 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga County Dec. 26, 2013) found there was no merit to plaintiff’s appeal, and affirmed the lower court’s dismissal.

Defendant, Frederick Harris, appealed from the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment to plaintiff, Bank of America. Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law by granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee.

Plaintiff argued that Bank of America lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure because the bank was a party solely by virtue of a purported assignment from MERS. It argued that MERS had no authority to assign the mortgage to Bank of America, and thus, Bank of America had no standing to bring the suit.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s contentions, finding that the bank had standing to bring a foreclosure action because it was the real party in interest at the time that a foreclosure complaint was filed. The court also found that the bank had possession of the note, which was payable to bearer. Therefore, it was the current holder of the note and entitled to enforce it under R.C. 1303.31 and that after the merger, the bank stepped into the shoes of the absorbed company and had the ability to enforce. As such no further action was necessary to become a real party in interest.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia Dismisses Case Due to Lack of Jurisdiction

The court in deciding Glaviano v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. 180582 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s claim due to lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants did not have “possession of the note” or a “documented property interest in the note and mortgage or deed of trust.” Plaintiff also alleged that the “deed of trust was void and ineffective due to fraud,” and that the trustee’s foreclosure sale was “void because the alleged beneficiary . . . never had standing to substitute the trustee.” They further claimed that the sale of their property at a foreclosure sale violated their due process rights under the U.S. Constitution. Based on these allegations, plaintiff sought an injunction against the foreclosure sale.

The court considered the plaintiff’s argument and found that the court lacked jurisdiction, as such the case must be dismissed. Because the plaintiff sought the equivalent of appellate review of state court rulings, the district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. The court found that plaintiffs in this case also asked the federal district court to review state court rulings.

Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the motion for injunction was denied as moot due to dismissal of the case.

Kansas Court of Appeals Finds Note Splitting Argument Lacked Merit

The court in deciding Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Richards, 2013 Kan. App. 1160 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) ultimately upheld the lower court’s decision.

The plaintiff [Chester E. Richards, Jr.], appealed the lower court’s decision which granted summary judgment to Wells Fargo.

Plaintiff had asserted (1) Wells Fargo lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action; (2) the lower court erred in holding Wells Fargo’s possession of the promissory note he signed was insufficient to enforce and foreclose the mortgage it secures; (3) Wells Fargo did not experience/suffer a default; (4) there was no contract because the note and mortgage were split; and (5) Richards was not afforded due process.

The court examined the record and considered the arguments of both the parties and held that there was no merit to any of the plaintiffs’ arguments. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision from the lower court.

 

California Court Upholds Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff, Dismissing California Uniform Commercial Code section 9313 Violations

The court in deciding Wolford v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7307 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2013) ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. AHMSI and Wells Fargo met their threshold burden to show they satisfied the requirements necessary for non-judicial foreclosure, and appellant failed to raise a triable issue of material fact.

The plaintiff’s complaint alleged causes of action for declaratory relief; injunctive relief; determination of lien pursuant to California Uniform Commercial Code section 9313; breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; violation of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.); violation of the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.); rescission; unconscionability; and quiet title.

The lower court dismissed the plaintiff’s initial claims as summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants. Appellant contended the denial of summary judgment in the related unlawful detainer action and evidence of irregularities in the foreclosure process demonstrated triable issues of material fact warranting the denial of summary judgment. However, this court in upholding the lower court’s decision, found that there was no merit to the plaintiff’s contentions.

 

Missouri Court Dismisses Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and Home Ownership Equity Protection Act Violation Claims Brought Against Nationstar Mortgage, LLC and MERS

The court in deciding White v. CTX Mortg., LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146589 (W.D. Mo. 2013) ultimately granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff’s complaint asserted that the chain of title had been broken. Consequently, “title was not clear enough” for CTX to foreclose on the property.

Plaintiffs raised eight claims: (1) “Predatory Lending”; (2) “Servicer Fraud”; (3) violations of the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1639, et seq.; (4) violations  [5] of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.; (5) “Breach of Fiduciary Duty”; (6) “Identity Theft”; (7) Civil Rico; and (8) quiet title to real property.

For relief, plaintiffs requested economic damages; a declaratory judgment identifying the “owner” of the note and clarifying whether the deed was actually security for the loan; and injunctive relief conveying the property to plaintiffs or a judgment quieting title to plaintiffs’ property.

At the outset, the court made several general observations about the complaint. In each count, plaintiffs had substituted legal conclusions for facts. Subsequently, Nationstar and MERS argued that the court should dismiss all eight counts because they (1) failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (2) were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Ultimately, the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed.