The California court in deciding Nacif v. White-Sorensen, et al., NO. D056993. (San Diego Ct. Sup. Ct., 2009), determined that MERS held interests in the property and rejected the plaintiff’s argument that MERS had no standing because it was not qualified as a foreign corporation.
The court found that the under California law, MERS’s status as a “nominee” on a deed of trust means that it had the right to initiate foreclosure proceedings as the lender’s agent.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California in Putkkuri v. Recontrust Co., Case No. 08cv1919 WQH (AJB) (S.D.Cal. 2009) granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The plaintiff in this case demanded written proof of the defendants’ right to proceed in foreclosure, and the plaintiff claimed that no such proof had been offered. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants “engaged in a pattern and practice of utilizing the non-judicial foreclosure procedures of this State to foreclose on properties when they do not, in fact, have the right to do so.”
The plaintiff also alleged that in pursuing non-judicial foreclosure, defendants falsely represented that they had a right to payment under plaintiff’s residential loan, which was secured by the deed of trust. However, after considering the plaintiff’s claims the court dismissed them, holding that production of the original note is not required to proceed with a non-judicial foreclosure.
Elizabeth Renuart has posted Uneasy Intersections: The Right to Foreclose and the UCC to SSRN. This is a subject that Brad and I have touched on a bit in the context of the Show Me The Note! defense, but Renuart has done a magisterial fifty state review of how state foreclosure laws interact with the Uniform Commercial Code which has been adopted in all 50 states (NY has an older version it on the books for now). The case law in this area is incredibly confused and confusing. The article helps to chart a path to navigate the intersection between these two areas of law.
Renuart provides a taxonomy of the caselaw, dividing it into three categories:
1. The UCC States: “courts in these states explicitly join the right to foreclose on a mortgage that secures the negotiable note with the” UCC. (44)
2. The Foreclosure-Statute-Definition States: “the courts focus on relevant words in the state’s foreclosure statute, such as ‘mortgagee’ where mortgages are used, ‘beneficiary’ where deeds of trust are used, ‘holder’, or ‘owner.’ Next, they determine if that state’s legislature intended that these designations refer to the note holder or the one with the right to act on behalf of the note holder. These courts may or may not reference the UCC in their decisions but the result generally is consistent with” the UCC. (45)
3. The UCC- Does-Not-Apply States: “courts in these states reason that the state’s foreclosure scheme is comprehensive, inclusive of the prerequisites to foreclose, or does not define the secured party as the one entitled to repayment on the secured monetary obligation. As a result, the UCC does not apply in any way to identify the party who possesses the right to foreclose. To date, these decisions have arisen exclusively in nonjudicial foreclosure states.” (47)
She concludes that the “methodology utilized in Category 1 and 2 states properly harmonizes the relevant UCC rules with state foreclosure law. Category 3 states dismiss the UCC’s role outright. It is these decisions that muddy the law and create inconsistent outcomes from state to state.” (47-48)
It is no exaggeration to say that the discussions about this topic in the blogosphere are virtually incoherent, so this article may provide guidance for those who are looking for it.
After the decision handed down from Fryzel v. MERS, No. CA 10-352 (D.Ri., 2011) On appeal, the plaintiff-appellees in United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, [(Fryzel, et. al. v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., No. 12–1526 (D.Ri., 2013)] brought suit to prevent foreclosure or eviction, on the shared ground that ostensible assignments of their mortgagees’ legal titles are invalid, leaving the assignees without the right to foreclose.
By appeal and mandamus petition, the group of plaintiffs claimed error in the district court’s failure to provide notice and hearing before issuing successive orders imposing a stay in the nature of a preliminary injunction against foreclosure and possessory proceedings, and in its failure to set limits of time and cost when referring the mortgagors’ cases challenging foreclosure to a Special Master for mandatory mediation.
After considering the plaintiffs’ collective arguments, the First Circuit remanded with instructions to hold a prompt hearing with reasonable notice on the question whether the injunction should be continued, in belated compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(1), and to establish specific limits of time and expense if the reference for mediation is to remain in effect.
The Rhode Island court in deciding Fryzel v. MERS, No. CA 10-352 (D.Ri., 2011) decided that under Rhode Island law, only parties to a contract may seek to have rights declared under a contract. The court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the transfer of the promissory note or assignment of mortgage granted by Plaintiff.
The plaintiff’s complaint disputed AHMSI’s ability to foreclose by challenging the validity of the assignments of their mortgage. The plaintiff further claimed that AHMSI was not entitled to foreclose under the terms of the ‘Pooling and Servicing Agreement’. However, the court found that it was undisputed that plaintiffs were not parties to the assignment agreements or to the PSA. Thus, plaintiffs did not have standing to assert legal rights based on the specified documents.
The Texas court in Eskridge v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 6:10-CV-285, (W.D. Tex., 2011) dismissed Plaintiff’s claims to challenges the authority of MERS to assign its lien interest to a successive party.
The plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that she had superior title because the note as well as the deed of trust was split. Further, plaintiff alleged that MERS lacked authority under the note to transfer either the note and/or the deed of trust. Consequently, any transfer made by MERS in regard to the Note to BAC was allegedly void.
However, the court determined that the plaintiff lacked standing to contest the various assignments, as she was not a party to the assignments. The court further reasoned that even if she had standing, her allegations were without merit because MERS was given the authority to transfer the documents in the deed of trust.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California hearing Gaitan v. MERS, et al, 09-1009 (C.D. Cal. 2009) found that MERS had the right to initiate foreclosure proceedings. The court also found that MERS was not liable for claims including wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing.
The plaintiff alleged that several flaws in the documents he received proved the mortgage loans were obtained by fraud. Specifically, he alleged that neither the adjustable rate mortgage loan documents nor the truth in lending disclosure statement “clearly and conspicuously disclosed”: (1) the actual interest rate on which the scheduled payments were based; “(2) that making the payments according to the payment schedule listed in the TILD will result in negative amortization and that the principal balance will increase; and (3) that the payment amounts listed on the TILD are insufficient to pay both principal and interest.”
The plaintiff alleged that not only were the disclosure statements “unclear and inconspicuous,” but they were “deceptive” and “based in order to mislead and deceive plaintiff into believing that he would be getting a loan with a low fixed payment rate that would be sufficient to pay both interest and principal.” The court examined each of the claims in the plaintiff’s argument in turn, and determined that the plaintiff failed to argue the viability of any of the claims.
