Foreclosure Review

The US Government Accountability Office issued a report, Foreclosure Review:  Regulators Could Strengthen Oversight and Improve Transparency of the Process. GAO did this study because it was asked to examine the amended consent order process relating to foreclosures. This process was pretty controversial. By way of background,

In 2011 and 2012, OCC and the Federal Reserve signed consent orders with 16 mortgage servicers that required the servicers to hire consultants to review foreclosure files for errors and remediate harm to borrowers. In 2013, regulators amended the consent orders for all but one servicer, ending the file reviews and requiring servicers to provide $3.9 billion in cash payments to about 4.4 million borrowers and $6 billion in foreclosure prevention actions, such as loan modifications. One servicer continued file review activities. (no page number)

GAO concluded that

One of the goals that motivated the original file review process was a desire to restore public confidence in the mortgage market. In addition, federal internal control standards and our prior work highlight the importance of providing relevant, reliable, and timely communications, including providing information about the processes used to realize results, to increase the transparency of activities to stakeholders — in this case, borrowers and the public. Without making information about the processes used to categorize borrowers available to the public, such as through forthcoming public reports, regulators may miss a final opportunity to address questions and concerns about the categorization process and increase confidence in the results. (66)

GAO also found that in “the absence of specific expectations for evaluating and testing servicers’ actions to meet the foreclosure prevention principles, regulators risk not having enough information to determine whether servicers are implementing the principles and protecting borrowers.” (66)

So we are left with an ongoing crisis in confidence for the public and homeowners in particular. We are also left with regulators who are at risk of not being able to properly regulate financial institutions. With much of the news we are receiving these days, it feels as if we have let our financial crisis go to waste. No foreclosure reform, no housing finance reform, no real leadership to create a housing finance system for the 21st Century.

During the Great Depression, the federal government created the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the Federal Housing Administration, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation. We have created a black hole — Fannie and Freddie are in that limbo known as conservatorship. The President must take a lead on housing finance reform. Otherwise, my money is on another bailout in the not so distant future.

Reforming NYC’s Property Tax Regime

Andrew Hayashi has posted Property Taxes and Their Limits: Evidence from New York City to SSRN. There probably could not be a more obscure and dull topic than this to the general reader (and coming from me, as the author of this blog, that is saying something!). But for those of us who think about such things, this is an incredibly important topic that is at its heart fundamentally about fairness and treating like people alike.

Hayashi argues that

The property tax is the largest source of tax revenue for local governments. It is also an almost irresistible policy instrument for municipalities, which typically do not have control over any other tax with which to influence the urban landscape and the local distribution of income and wealth. The widespread use of the property tax for planning and redistribution means that virtually no jurisdiction straightforwardly calculates the tax liability for a property as a fixed percentage of its market value. Instead, property tax rates tend to vary with the use to which a property is put or the identity of its owner. As a consequence, many of the potential benefits of the property tax, such as ease of administration, transparency, the clear reflection of the costs and benefits of local services, and the intuitive fairness of imposing taxes in proportion to property wealth, are lost. (2, footnotes omitted)

He concludes

The property tax is a hated tax, but attempts to curtail its most offensive feature, the rapid increase in taxes that can accompany paper gains in property value, have had unintended distributional consequences that are hard to justify on policy grounds. In New York City, the caps are regressive and tend to benefit new homebuyers and sellers rather than current homeowners on fixed incomes. The caps should be replaced with a property tax circuit breaker [that limits increases for lower-income homeowners] or deferral system [that delays full payment until the property is conveyed]. (27)

This issue is even bigger than these selections suggest as there are big disparities in the tax burden among different types of property. For example similarly priced single family homes have a lower tax burden than coops or condos in multifamily properties. NYU’s Furman Center (with which Hayashi is affiliated) has studied these issues and, even better, has highlighted them as part of the De Blasio transition.

Property tax fairness is not a Republican or a Democratic issue — it is a good government issue. Hopefully, the De Blasio  Department of Finance will take up this obscure but important issue. Fairness demands it.