Fight Over The Community Reinvestment Act

Bloomberg BNA quoted me in Community Investment Revamp for Banks Likely To Spark Fight (behind a paywall). It opens,

Community groups and banks agree that the Community Reinvestment Act needs an update, but with regulators beginning an ambitious overhaul of the 1977 law there is little agreement on how that update should look.

The Trump administration has been targeting the CRA — which measures how well banks lend to low- to middle-income areas — for a rewrite since last June. Comptroller of the Currency Joseph Otting said March 28 that the first draft would be coming in early April.

Otting set out some broad ideas that his agency, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the other regulators that oversee the CRA will present to the public. The Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation also have responsibility for measuring banks’ compliance with the law, and the OCC says that it hopes the two agencies will sign on to the coming advanced notice of proposed rulemaking.

Banking industry experts and community groups all said that the broad strokes of the regulators’ plan sound promising, but few expect that comity to continue when the details come more into view.

“I think you can assume that everybody is not going to be happy,” Laurence Platt, a partner at Mayer Brown LLP, told Bloomberg Law.

The CRA’s Present

The Trump administration first put the CRA in its sights in a June 2017 Treasury Department report outlining its broader views on altering the rules banks operate under.

The law calls for the OCC, the Fed and the FDIC to periodically measure how much lending the banks they oversee do inside geographical assessment areas based on their branch and ATM locations. If banks are found not to do enough of such lending, regulators can stop some business activities or hold up branch expansions and mergers. But it hasn’t been updated for nearly two decades.

The Treasury Department followed up the June 2017 statement on the CRA with an April 3 report outlining its thinking on ways to modernize the law. The report largely aligns with the path laid out by Otting.

“Our recommendations will improve the effectiveness of CRA by enhancing the assessment and examination process, enhancing the ability of banks to deliver services in the communities they serve while considering technological advances in the financial industry,” Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said in a statement accompanying the report.

Changes to the Community Reinvestment Act have already begun, with the OCC under former acting Comptroller of the Currency Keith Noreika in October declaring that the OCC examiners would no longer include enforcement actions that are not linked to a bank’s CRA compliance in their rating.

That change was minor, and affected only one of the three regulators responsible for the CRA. Otting on March 28 laid out a host of other changes likely coming in a new proposal.

The CRA’s Future?

The broad outline Otting provided on March 28 largely highlights the areas in the CRA that community activists and banks have said need to be addressed.

Among the changes Otting said will be put out for comment include expanding the types of lending that would be included in calculations of banks’ CRA compliance to encompass small business, student lending and other money going into a community.

“I think there’s a sense that community-based activities, beyond individual lending, should be given more credit, such as small business loans and infrastructure loans,” Mayer Brown’s Platt said.

Other areas that are going to be addressed in the proposal will touch on the way CRA information is calculated and reported to the public. Currently, banks are examined for compliance every three to five years, and the banks’ reviews take an additional year.

Overall, Otting said the changes would be significant.

“This is monumental change for America,” Otting said in an appearance March 28 at the Operation Hope Global Forum in Atlanta.

The changes Otting discussed all sound promising, but they are vague. So fights are likely to emerge when the details come out.

“The comments that were made were vague enough to give you both concern and possible joy,” Taylor said.

One other aspect of the CRA that is ripe for reform is the geographic assessment areas regulators use to evaluate banks’ lending efforts. Otting and other regulators have yet to specifically outline their ideas for making changes to that, but both the comptroller and Fed Vice Chair for Supervision Randal Quarles have discussed including mobile banking, online lending, and other financial technology tools into their reviews.

How they elect to make that change is likely to be contentious as well.

“If the assessment area is poorly defined, then the CRA will lose its teeth and that’s going to drive CRA policy for a long time to come,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

Violations of Law and Consumer Harm

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The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) issued a notice and request for comment regarding the Uniform Interagency Consumer Compliance Rating System (CC Rating System). My comment letter reads as follows:

The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) issued a notice and request for comment regarding the Uniform Interagency Consumer Compliance Rating System (CC Rating System). The FFIEC is seeking to revise the CC Rating System “to reflect the regulatory, examination (supervisory), technological, and market changes that have occurred in the years since the current rating system was established.”  81 F.R. 26553.  It is a positive development that the federal government is seeking to implement a consistent approach to consumer protection across a broad swath of the financial services industry.  Nonetheless, the proposed CC Ratings System can be refined to further improve consumer protection in the financial services industry.

One of the CC Rating System’s categories is Violations of Law and Consumer Harm.  The request for comment notes that over the last few decades, the financial services industry has become more complex, and the broad array of risks in the market that can cause consumer harm has become increasingly clear.  Violations of various laws – including the Fair Housing Act and other fair lending laws, for example – may cause significant consumer harm that should raise supervisory concerns.  Recognizing this broad array of risks, the proposed revisions directs examiners to consider all violations of consumer laws based on the root cause, severity, duration, and pervasiveness.  This approach emphasizes the importance of various consumer protection laws, and is intended to reflect the broader array of risks and potential harm caused by consumer protection violations.  81 F.R. 26556.

This is all to the good.  Prior to the Subprime Crisis, a big part of the problem was that financial services companies used regulatory arbitrage to avoid scrutiny.  Lots of mortgage lending migrated to nonbanks that did not need to worry about unwanted attention from the regulators that scrutinized banks and other heavily regulated mortgage lenders.  (To be clear, Alan Greenspan and other federal regulators did not do a good job of scrutinizing the banks. But let’s leave that for another day.)  With the CFPB now regulating many nonbanks and with an updated CC Rating System in place, we should expect that regulatory arbitrage will decrease in the face of this coordinated regulatory action.

I would note, however, an ambiguity in the “Violations of Law and Consumer Harm” category, an ambiguity that should be cleared up in favor of additional consumer protections.  The category title, “Violations of Law and Consumer Harm,” implies that there are some types of consumer harm that are distinct from violations of law and that is obviously true. The discussion of the category emphasizes this by stating that it encompasses “the broad range of violations of consumer protection laws and evidence of consumer harm.” 81 F.R. 26556 (emphasis added).  And the text of the guidance itself states this as well, indicating that the category’s assessment factors “evaluate the dimensions of any identified violation or consumer harm.”  81 F.R. 26558 (emphasis added).

But the remainder of the discussion of this category only focuses on violations of law and pays little attention to “the broad array of risks in the market that can cause consumer harm” that are not also violations of law.  81 F.R. 26556.  Indeed, the four assessment factors for this category are all premises on causes of identified “violations of law.”  This is a significant failing for the CC Rating System because of the many types of consumer harm that are not clear violations of law.  As proposed, the “Violations of Law and Consumer Harm” category appears to be as much about protecting the bank from legal liability from lawsuits brought on behalf of consumers as it is about addressing the legitimate interests of the consumers of financial services.

As we sort out the after-effects of the Subprime Crisis, we have seen many situations where there was no clear violation of law but homeowners suffered from outrageous industry practices.  For instance, many borrowers are suffering needlessly at the hands of their mortgage servicers.  Some servicers are under-resourced, intentionally or not, and continue to treat their borrowers with a maddening disregard.  In some cases, this outrageous behavior does not amount to a clear violation of law, but is behavior that reflects most badly on the parties engaged in it.  The CC Rating System should both acknowledge this type of harm and address it to maximize the benefits that can flow from this forthcoming revision to it.

Consumer Protection’s Holy Grail

The Round Table experiences a vision of the Holy Grail by Évrard d'Espinques

The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) has issued a notice and request for comment regarding the Uniform Interagency Consumer Compliance Rating System (the CC Rating System). The FFIEC’s six members represent the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, State Liaison Committee and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. This veritable roundtable of regulators is seeking to revise the CC Rating System “to reflect the regulatory, examination (supervisory), technological, and market changes that have occurred in the years since the current rating system was established.” (81 F.R. 26553)

I know, I know, this is a deeply technical issued and you are wondering why I am writing about it for a somewhat general audience. The answer is that I think this is a good thing for people to know about: the federal government is seeking to implement a consistent approach to consumer protection across a broad swath of the financial services industry.

One of the CC Rating System’s categories is Violations of Law and Consumer Harm. The request for comment notes that over the last few decades, the financial services

industry has become more complex, and the broad array of risks in the market that can cause consumer harm has become increasingly clear. Violations of various laws, including, for example, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act 5 and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as well as fair lending violations, may potentially cause significant consumer harm and raise serious supervisory concerns. Recognizing this broad array of risks, the proposed guidance directs examiners to consider all violations of consumer laws, based on the root cause, severity, duration, and pervasiveness of the violation. This approach emphasizes the importance of a range of consumer protection laws and is intended to reflect the broader array of risks and the potential harm caused by consumer protection related violations. (81 F.R. 26556)

This is all to the good. A big part of the problem the last time around (pre-Subprime Crisis) was that financial services companies used regulatory arbitrage to avoid scrutiny. Lots of mortgage lending migrated to nonbanks. Nonbanks did not need to worry about unwanted attention from the regulators that scrutinized banks and other heavily regulated mortgage lenders. (To be clear, Alan Greenspan and other regulators did not do a good job of scrutinizing the banks. But let’s leave that for another post.) With the CFPB now regulating nonbanks and with this coordinated approach to consumer protection, we should expect that regulatory arbitrage will decrease.

If successful, this would amount to a regulatory equivalent of finding the Holy Grail.  So, while this is a technical issue, it is something to feel good about.

Comments due July 4th, so get crackin’!

Fannie, Freddie & The Affordable Housing Feint

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Robert J. Shapiro

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Elaine C. Kamarck

 

 

 

 

 

Robert J. Shapiro and Elaine C. Kamarck have posted A Strategy to Promote Affordable Housing for All Americans By Recapitalizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. While it presents as a plan to fund affordable housing, the biggest winners would be speculators who bought up shares of Fannie and Freddie stock and who may end up with nothing if a plan like this is not adopted.  The Executive Summary states that

This study presents a strategy for ending the current conservatorship and majority government ownership of Fannie and Freddie in a way that will enable them, once again, to effectively promote greater homeownership by average Americans and greater access to affordable housing by low-income households. This strategy includes regulation of both enterprises to prevent a recurrence of their effective insolvency in 2008 and the associated bailouts, including 4.0% capital reserves, regular financial monitoring, examinations and risk assessments by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), as dictated by HERA. Notably, an internal Treasury analysis in 2011 recommended capital requirements, consistent with the Basel III accords, of 3.0% to 4.0%. In addition, the President should name a substantial share of the boards of both enterprises, to act as public interest directors. The strategy has four basic elements to ensure that Fannie and Freddie can rebuild the capital required to responsibly carry out their basic missions, absorb losses from future housing downturns, and expand their efforts to support access to affordable housing for all households:

  • In recognition of Fannie and Freddie’s repayments to the Treasury of $239 billion, some $50 billion more than they received in bailout payments, the Treasury would write off any remaining balance owed by the enterprises under the “Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements” (PSPAs).
  • The Treasury also would end its quarterly claim or “sweep” of the profits earned by Fannie and Freddie, so their future retained earnings can be used to build their capital reserves.
  • Fannie and Freddie also should raise roughly $100 billion in additional capital through several rounds of new common stock sales into the market.
  • The Treasury should transfer its warrants for 79.9% of Fannie and Freddie’s current common shares to the HTF [Housing Trust Fund] and the CMF [Capital Magnet Fund], which could sell the shares in a series of secondary stock offerings and use the proceeds, estimated at $100 billion, to endow their efforts to expand access to affordable housing for even very low-income households.

Under this strategy, Fannie and Freddie could once again ensure the liquidity and stability of U.S. housing markets, under prudent financial constraints and less exposure to the risks of mortgage defaults. The strategy would dilute the common shares holdings of current private investors from 20% to 10%, while increasing their value as Fannie and Freddie restore and claim their profitability. Finally, the strategy would establish very substantial support through the HTF and CPM for state programs that increase access to affordable rental housing by very low-income American and affordable home ownership by low-to-moderate income households.

Wow — there is a lot that is very bad about this plan.  Where to begin? First, we would return to the same public/private hybrid model for Fannie and Freddie that got us into so much trouble to begin with.

Second, it would it would reward speculators in Fannie and Freddie stock. That is not terrible in itself, but the question would be — why would you want to? The reason given here would be to put a massive amount of money into affordable housing. That seems like a good rationale, until you realize that that money would just be an accounting move from one federal government account to another. It does not expand the pie, it just makes one slice bigger and one slice smaller. This is a good way to get buy-in from some constituencies in the housing industry, but from a broader public policy perspective, it is just a shuffling around of resources.

There’s more to say, but this blog post has gone on long enough. Fannie and Freddie need to be reformed, but this is not the way to do it.

 

Protecting Homeowners During Mortgage Servicing Transfers

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has issued a Compliance Bulletin and Policy Guidance on Mortgage Servicing Transfers (Bulletin 2014-01). Mortgage Serving Transfers have been receiving a lot of attention (also here) recently from regulators as the servicing industry is going through many changes.

The CFPB is right to focus on the impact of the transfer of mortgage servicing rights on homeowners. Many complaints made directly to regulators and seen in foreclosure cases relate to the Kafkaesque treatment that homeowners receive as their servicer point-of-contact changes from interaction to interaction.

The Bulletin indicates that servicers will have to do a fair amount of planning to ensure that consumers are not harmed by the transfer of servicing rights. In particular, the CFPB will be watching to see that servicers are (WARNING:  Boring and Technical Language Alert!):

  • Ensuring that contracts require the transferor to provide all necessary documents and information at loan boarding.
  • Developing tailored transfer instructions for each deal and conducting meetings to
    discuss and clarify key issues with counterparties in a timely manner; for large transfers, this could be months in advance of the transfer. Key issues may include descriptions of proprietary modifications, detailed descriptions of data fields, known issues with document indexing, and specific regulatory or settlement requirements applicable to some or all of the transferred loans.
  • Using specifically tailored testing protocols to evaluate the compatibility of the
    transferred data with the transferee servicer’s systems and data mapping protocols.
  • Engaging in quality control work after the transfer of preliminary data to validate that the data on the transferee’s system matches the data submitted by the transferor.
  • Recognizing when the transfer cannot be implemented successfully in a single batch and implementing alternative protocols, such as splitting the transfer into several smaller transactions, to ensure that the transferee can comply with its servicing obligations for every loan transferred. (3)

As a bonus, the Bulletin provides an overview of statutes and regulations that govern the transfer of mortgage servicing.

Foreclosure Review

The US Government Accountability Office issued a report, Foreclosure Review:  Regulators Could Strengthen Oversight and Improve Transparency of the Process. GAO did this study because it was asked to examine the amended consent order process relating to foreclosures. This process was pretty controversial. By way of background,

In 2011 and 2012, OCC and the Federal Reserve signed consent orders with 16 mortgage servicers that required the servicers to hire consultants to review foreclosure files for errors and remediate harm to borrowers. In 2013, regulators amended the consent orders for all but one servicer, ending the file reviews and requiring servicers to provide $3.9 billion in cash payments to about 4.4 million borrowers and $6 billion in foreclosure prevention actions, such as loan modifications. One servicer continued file review activities. (no page number)

GAO concluded that

One of the goals that motivated the original file review process was a desire to restore public confidence in the mortgage market. In addition, federal internal control standards and our prior work highlight the importance of providing relevant, reliable, and timely communications, including providing information about the processes used to realize results, to increase the transparency of activities to stakeholders — in this case, borrowers and the public. Without making information about the processes used to categorize borrowers available to the public, such as through forthcoming public reports, regulators may miss a final opportunity to address questions and concerns about the categorization process and increase confidence in the results. (66)

GAO also found that in “the absence of specific expectations for evaluating and testing servicers’ actions to meet the foreclosure prevention principles, regulators risk not having enough information to determine whether servicers are implementing the principles and protecting borrowers.” (66)

So we are left with an ongoing crisis in confidence for the public and homeowners in particular. We are also left with regulators who are at risk of not being able to properly regulate financial institutions. With much of the news we are receiving these days, it feels as if we have let our financial crisis go to waste. No foreclosure reform, no housing finance reform, no real leadership to create a housing finance system for the 21st Century.

During the Great Depression, the federal government created the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the Federal Housing Administration, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation. We have created a black hole — Fannie and Freddie are in that limbo known as conservatorship. The President must take a lead on housing finance reform. Otherwise, my money is on another bailout in the not so distant future.