Tag Archives: MERS

New York Supreme Court Holds that Assignee Banks Must Produce Evidence of MERS’s Authority to Assign in Order to Have Standing to Foreclose

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The New York Supreme Court of Kings County in Bank of New York v. Alderazi, 28 Misc. 3d 376 (Sup. Ct. 2010) held that a foreclosing bank, as assignee, does not have standing to bring a foreclosure action if it cannot submit proof of MERS’s authority to assign the mortgage. In this case, “MERS was referred to in the mortgage as nominee of the mortgagee . . . for the purpose of recording the mortgage.” The court then stated that “MERS, as nominee, is an agent of the principal, for limited purposes, and has only those powers which are conferred to it and authorized by its principal.” Based on this rule, the court held that an assignee moving to foreclose must submit evidence to the court that such authority was granted to MERS by the original mortgagee. Here, “[the assignee] submits no evidence that [the mortgagee] authorized MERS to make the assignment. MERS submits only its own statement that it is the nominee for [the mortgagee], and that it has authority to effect an assignment on [the mortgagee’s] behalf.” Thus, the court found that the assignee in this case could not lawfully conduct a foreclosure proceeding.

The court went on to explain that “even accepting MERS'[s] position that the [mortgagee] acknowledges MERS'[s] authority to exercise any or all of the [mortgagee’s] rights under the mortgage, the mortgage does not convey the specific right to assign the mortgage. The only specific right enumerated in the mortgage is the right to foreclose and sell the property. The general language ‘to take any action required of the Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument’ is not sufficient to give [MERS] authority to alienate or assign a mortgage without getting the mortgagee’s explicit authority for the particular assignment.” Hence, under the terms of its own agreement, MERS would have had to solicit an explicit grant of the authority to assign the mortgage from the original mortgagee in order to effectuate a valid assignment. Since the assignee could not prove that such a grant of authority occurred in this case, the court found that the assignment was still invalid under MERS’s and the assignee’s argument.

The Appellate Division of New York State Supreme Court Holds that Assignee Lenders Must Produce Evidence of MERS’s Authority to Assign Mortgage Notes to Lawfully Conduct a Non-Judicial Foreclosure

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The New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department in Aurora Loan Services v Weisblum, 923 N.Y.S.2d 609 (App. Div. 2011) held that a mortgage lender does not have standing to foreclose if it cannot establish its lawful status as assignee. In this case, MERS assigned both a mortgage and mortgage note to Aurora Services (“the Assignee”), who subsequently moved to foreclose on the subject property. At the time of the assignment, MERS was the holder of the mortgage, but not the note, which was held by the original mortgagee. MERS claimed that the assignment was valid because it was acting on behalf of the original mortgagee when it assigned the note. The court rejected this argument and held that the assignment was not valid because the Assignee failed to prove that MERS received an explicit grant of authority to assign the note from the original mortgagee. The court explained that, in general, MERS can legitimately assign notes. However, if the assignee moves to conduct a foreclosure, it must produce evidence of MERS’s authority to assign, which must be granted from the original lenders. The court further held that the evidence must show that the original mortgagee explicitly granted MERS such authority to assign.

Here, the lender failed to produce any evidence of MERS’s authority to assign the notes. Thus, the court found that MERS could not assign the note and therefore the lender did not have standing to foreclose.

Oregon District Court Holds that MERS Must Record Every Assignment of Trust Deed to Lawfully Conduct a Non-Judicial Foreclosure

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The District Court of Oregon in Hooker v Northwest Trustee Services, Inc., 2011 WL 2119103 (D.Or. May 25, 2011) granted homeowners’ motion for declaratory judgment preventing MERS from continuing with a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding. The court first held that MERS could only be a nominee or agent of a lender, and not have a beneficial interest in the trust deed, where MERS was not listed as the beneficiary on the note. However, the court did not hold that this precluded MERS from lawfully initiating a non-judicial foreclosure. The problem in this case was that MERS only recorded the final assignment of the trust deed, instead of recording every assignment as required by law. In failing to record every assignment of the trust deed in this case, the court found that MERS could not lawfully conduct a non-judicial foreclosure.

MERS Must Possess Note or Have Authority to Act on Behalf of Note Holder in Order to Foreclose, According to Massachusetts Supreme Court

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In Eaton v Federal National Mortgage Association, 462 Mass. 569 (Mass. 2012), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed “the propriety of a foreclosure by power of sale undertaken by a mortgage holder that did not hold the underlying mortgage note.” In this case, the homeowner executed both a promissory note, solely to the lender, and a mortgage to the lender and to MERS. Under the terms of the mortgage, the lender was referred to as “lender” and MERS was referred to as “mortgagee.” As mortgagee, MERS was stipulated to hold legal title to the property with the power of sale “solely as nominee.” MERS was also given explicit authority under the mortgage to exercise the right to foreclose the property as nominee for lender. Subsequently, MERS assigned its interest to Green Tree servicing, LLC (Green Tree). The assignment was recorded in the county register of deeds, but without evidence of transfer of the note.

Eventually, the homeowner fell behind on his mortgage payments and Green Tree moved to foreclose. Green Tree was the highest bidder at the foreclosure auction, and assigned the rights to its bid to Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae later moved to evict the homeowner from the property. In response, the homeowner filed a counterclaim, arguing that the underlying foreclosure was invalid because Green Tree did not hold the note at the time of the foreclosure action. The housing court and the superior court found in favor of the homeowner, holding that a mortgagee must possess both the mortgage and the mortgage note to have authority to foreclose.

However, the Supreme Court, transferring the case to its court on its own motion, came to a different conclusion. The Supreme Court found that the lower courts relied only on common law for their holdings, and that statutory law, particularly G.L.c. 183, § 21 and G.L.c. 244, § 14, changes the analysis. Relying on these stautes, the court held “that where a mortgagee acts with the authority and on behalf of the note holder, the mortgagee may comply with these statutory requirements without physically possessing or actually holding the mortgage note.” Whether a mortgagee is acting with authority and on behalf of the note holder is a an agency question, which the Supreme Court could not address based on the record.

The court also held that the ruling only had prospective effect, and thus the ruling “appl[ies] only to mortgage foreclosure sales for which the mandatory notice of sale has been given after the date of this opinion.” However, the court also applied the ruling to the parties in the case, and the court remanded the case to the superior court to determine whether Green Tree was acting with authority and on behalf of the lender at the time of the closing.

Washington State Supreme Court Holds that MERS is Not a Lawful Beneficiary Under Washington’s Deed of Trust Act and Homeowners May Have a Cause of Action Against MERS Under Washington’s Consumer Protection Act

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Sitting en banc, the Washington Supreme Court in Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, Inc., 285 P.3d 34 (Wash. 2012) answered two of three certified questions from the Federal District Court for the Western District of Washington in favor of two homeowners. In this case, the homeowners’ deeds of trust named MERS as the beneficiary and nominee for the lender, and named the title company as the trustee. The homeowners eventually fell behind in the payments, and MERS, acting as beneficiary of the deeds of trust, named successor trustees who commenced foreclosure proceedings. The assignments of the promissory notes were not recorded. The homeowners sought injunctions to stop the foreclosures, and the cases are pending in federal court. The district court hearing the case certified three questions of state law to the state supreme court.

The first question was “whether MERS is a lawful beneficiary with the power to appoint trustees within the deed of trust act if it does not hold the promissory notes secured by the deeds of trust.” The court held that “only the actual holder of the promissory note or other instrument evidencing the obligation may be a beneficiary with the power to appoint a trustee to proceed with a nonjudicial foreclosure on real property. Simply put, if MERS does not hold the note, it is not a lawful beneficiary.”

The second certified question was “what is the legal effect of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting as an unlawful beneficiary under the terms of Washington’s Deed of Trust Act?” The court declined to answer this question based on the record and briefing before them.

The third certified question was “does a homeowner possess a cause of action under Washington’s Consumer Protection Act against Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., if MERS acts as an unlawful beneficiary under the terms of Washington’s Deed of Trust Act?” The held that “if the first word in the third question was ‘may’ instead of ‘does,’ our answer would be ‘yes.’ Instead, we answer the question with a qualified ‘yes,’ depending on whether the homeowner can produce evidence on each element required to prove a CPA claim.” The elements of a CPA claim are “(1) unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) public interest impact; (4) injury to plaintiff in his or her business or property; (5) causation.” (internal quotations omitted).

Texas Appellate Court Holds that Formal Transfer of Deed is Not Required to Initiate Foreclosure

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In Robeson v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., No. 02-10-00227-CV (Tex. App. –Fort Worth [2nd Dist.] 2012, pet. denied), the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment motion by MERS and the Midfirst bank granted by the trial court. The homeowner plaintiff argued that the bank did not have standing to accelerate the loan and begin foreclosure on January 2009 because the deed of trust was assigned to the Bank on February 2009 and there was no evidence of an endorsement of the note (the note contained a blank endorsement).

The Court of Appeals held that, as to the blank endorsement in the note, no special endorsement is necessary under the Texas Business and Commercial Code, only possession of the note. Two vice presidents of Midfirst bank testified that the bank held both the note and the deed of trust. In addition, one testified that both the note and deed of trust were received on October 2008. Since the plaintiff did not challenge the accuracy of the statements made, the court found that the evidence was sufficient. The court also held that the date the deed of trust was assigned does not create a factual issue of when the interests were transferred to the bank relying on a prior holding that an assignment of the deed of trust from MERS to a lender dated two years after the actual date of transfer does not raise a factual issue of whether the assignment was fabricated. The court held that the date of transfer is not evidence of when the bank is entitled to initiate foreclosure relying on prior holdings which found that the mortgage typically follows the note it secures.

The deed of trust granted both the lender and the beneficiary various lender’s rights in the agreement, particularly the power of sale. As a result, the court stated that MERS was authorized to exercise the right to invoke the power of sale in the deed of trust.

The Texas Supreme Court recently denied the petition for review of this case.

Federal District Court in Texas Rules That Third-Party Lacks Standing in Recording-Fee Case

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It appears that although courts may be receptive to claims about lost recording fees because of MERS, they won’t hear cases brought by third parties (at least, not in federal court). The citizens of a Texas county brought the claim seeking lost recording fees from MERS as a defense while they were in foreclosure. In Huml v. Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Judge David Guaderrama of the U.S. District Court in El Paso, Texas, rejected the plaintiffs’ theory of MERS gaining unjust enrichment. The plaintiffs alleged that the county lost recording fees that would have been acquired had MERS not taken “undue advantage of real property recording systems.”

The Judge found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claim. Since the plaintiffs alleged that counties were harmed by MERS, Judge Guaderrama found the argument of standing “piggy-backs on the direct injury, if any, to the counties.” Since the plaintiffs couldn’t assert direct injury from lost recording fees, and because plaintiffs cannot sue to enforce a third party’s rights in federal court (unless the suit falls under a particular exception, which didn’t happen in this case), the Judge dismissed the claim.