Tag Archives: MERS

Michigan Court Finds That Defendants Were Not Acting Under Color of State Law

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The court in deciding El-Jabazwe v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149854 ( E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2013) denied the plaintiff’s motions and granted the defendants’ motions.

Plaintiff’s complaint listed the following Counts: 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Count I); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count II); 42 U.S.C. § 1983: refusing or neglecting to prevent (Count III); Malicious Abuse of Process (Count IV); 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 (Count V); Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VI); and Mail Fraud (Count VIII). The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s state-law claims (Counts IV and VI) on March 6, 2013.

The court found that the plaintiff’s argument under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) rested solely on conclusory statements. The court found plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is similarly deficient. The court noted that plaintiff wholly failed to meet the evidentiary burdens required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) and 56(a), and thus the court denied both of Plaintiff’s motions. Lastly, the court found that even when construing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Counts I and III must be dismissed against the defendants, as they were not acting under color of state law.

Consequently, pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2), the court ordered that the motions be resolved on the briefs submitted, without oral argument. The court then denied the plaintiff’s motions and granted the defendants’ motions.

Imposing Order on Recording Chaos

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Dale Whitman has posted A Proposal for a National Mortgage Registry: MERS Done Right. This is great timing because he will be touching on some of the issues raised in this article in tomorrow’s webinar. His proposal for a national mortgage registry also shares things in common with elements of Adam Levitin‘s recent proposal.

Whitman’s abstract reads:

In this Article, Professor Whitman analyzes the existing legal regime for transfers of notes and mortgages on the secondary market, and concludes that it is highly inconvenient and dysfunctional, with the result that large numbers of market participants simply did not observe its rules during the huge market run-up of the early and mid-2000s. He also considers Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS), which was designed to alleviate the inconveniences of repeatedly recording mortgage assignments, but concludes that it was conceptually flawed and has proven to be an inadequate response to the problem. For these reasons the legal system was ill-prepared for the avalanche of foreclosures that followed the collapse of the mortgage market in 2007, and continues to be beset by litigation and uncertainty. This Article then provides a conceptual outline for an alternative National Mortgage Registry, which would supplant the present legal system and would provide convenience, transparency, and efficiency for all market participants. He concludes with a draft of a statute that could be enacted by Congress to create such a registry.

The article concludes:

A national mortgage loan Registry structured along the lines outlined here would resolve all of the major legal problems that beset the secondary mortgage market today. To be specific, the following problems would be put to rest.

1. The lack of clarity in the distinction between negotiable and nonnegotiable notes that exists today would become irrelevant for purposes of loan transfer. Negotiable and nonnegotiable notes would be treated exactly alike and would be transferred in the same manner.

2. The need to physically deliver original notes in order to transfer the right of enforcement – an extremely burdensome and inconvenient requirement for negotiable notes in today’s market – would be eliminated. Transfers would take place electronically with assurance that they would be recognized by local law in all jurisdictions.

3. The necessity of recording mortgage assignments in local recording offices would be eliminated. MERS was designed to remove the need for such assignments (except at the point when foreclosure was necessary), but the national Registry would accomplish this without the artificiality and con-fusion engendered by MERS’ “nominee” status.

4. Borrowers would be protected against competing claims by purported mortgage holders because the Registry’s records of loan holdings would be conclusive. Whether in cases of loan modification, payoff and discharge, approval of a short sale, or foreclosure, a borrower would know with certainty whether a purported holder’s claim to the loan was authentic, and whether its purported servicer was authorized to act.

5. All foreclosures, both judicial and non-judicial, could be conducted with assurance that the correct party was foreclosing. The Registry’s certificate could be recorded under state law and become a part of the chain of title of property passing through foreclosure, thus permitting future title examiners to verify that the foreclosure was conducted by the person authorized to do so. Concerns of title insurers about the validity of titles coming through foreclosure, currently a major worry, would be largely eliminated.

6. The current confusion and litigation about separation of notes from their mortgages, and about what proof is needed to foreclose a mortgage, would be brought to an end. The Registry’s certificate would provide all of the documentary evidence necessary to foreclose.

7. The holder in due course doctrine, with its potential for unfair harm to borrowers, would probably disappear in the context of mortgage loans as secondary market participants abandoned the practice of physical delivery of mortgage notes.

The system for transferring mortgage loans with which we are saddled today is a shambles. The result has been enormous uncertainty and likely huge financial loss for investors, servicers, and title insurers. It is time for Congress to act to create a sensible, simple, and efficient alternative. (68-69)

Many (including Brad Borden and I) have argued that the current recording system is horribly flawed. It is unclear whether there is sufficient political will to engage in a structural reform at this time. If there is not, expect to see another foreclosure mess once the current one has played itself out.

District Court Rejects Claims That MERS Lacked Standing

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The court in deciding Pratt v. Bank of Am. NA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151671 (D. Me. 2013) granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff alleged that the existence of forged documents related to a mortgage loan and that MERS lacked standing to transfer the plaintiff’s deed to Bank of America. The plaintiff wanted his promissory note returned to him along with the deed of trust.

The plaintiff’s assertion revolved around the claim that the separation of the deed of trust from the promissory note by the intervention of MERS as a nominee for Quicken Loans somehow breached the contracts between Pratt and Quicken or Bank of America. Plaintiff claimed that MERS, as nominee, had no “standing” to transfer the note and/or mortgage to Bank of America and that Bank of America has no “standing” to enforce these instruments.

Bank of America filed a motion to dismiss. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to remand and his motion for entry of default. The court also granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss.

Lower Court’s Grant of Summary Judgement Affirmed by Nevada Court

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The court in deciding Castro v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2013 Nev. LEXIS 1602 (Nev. 2013) affirmed the lower courts judgment against the plaintiff.

Plaintiff obtained a home loan from Decision One Mortgage Company, LLC and executed a promissory note in favor of Decision One. The note was secured by a deed of trust naming Decision One as the lender and MERS, as the beneficiary and nominee of the lender. The deed of trust authorized MERS, as nominee of the lender, to transfer the deed of trust and appoint a successor trustee.

MERS assigned the deed of trust to defendant, who instituted this action for quiet title seeking to expunge the documents that appellants recorded. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which was not opposed by plaintiff. Plaintiffs provided no evidence of any kind to the district court, and the district court entered summary judgment in respondent’s favor.

The court considered the plaintiff’s assertions, and concluded that the district court properly entered summary judgment in defendant’s favor.

North Carolina Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Claims of Fraud Against MERS, Bank of America, & Trustee Services of Carolina

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The court in deciding Porterfield v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152318 (E.D.N.C. 2013) dismissed plaintiff’s claims and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff asserted the following claims: (1) wrongful foreclosure; (2) fraud; (3) fraudulent misrepresentation; (4) fraud by use of MERS; (5) fraud through securitization; (6) promissory fraud; (7) unfair and deceptive trade practices; (8) violations of the Fair Debt Collections and Practices Act; (9) violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; (10) slander of title; and (11) a quiet title action.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and MERS motioned to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and defendant Trustee Services of Carolina motioned to dismiss to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

The court ultimately granted the defendants’ motions. Plaintiff’s claims against JPMorgan Chase Bank, MERS, and Trustee Services of Carolina, LLC were dismissed with prejudice.

Levitin on the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title

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Adam Levitin has posted The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title to SSRN.  This paper adds to a small (here and here, for instance), but important body of literature that seeks to harmonize the application of foreclosure laws with the Uniform Commercial Code. Levitin’s abstract reads

The mortgage foreclosure crisis raises legal questions as important as its economic impact. Questions that were straightforward and uncontroversial a generation ago today threaten the stability of a $13 trillion mortgage market: Who has standing to foreclose? If a foreclosure was done improperly, what is the effect? And what is the proper legal method for transferring mortgages? These questions implicate the clarity of title for property nationwide and pose a too- big-to-fail problem for the courts.

The legal confusion stems from the existence of competing systems for establishing title to mortgages and transferring those rights. Historically, mortgage title was established and transferred through the “public demonstration” regimes of UCC Article 3 and land recordation systems. This arrangement worked satisfactorily when mortgages were rarely transferred. Mortgage finance, however, shifted to securitization, which involves repeated bulk transfers of mortgages.

To facilitate securitization, deal architects developed alternative “contracting” regimes for mortgage title: UCC Article 9 and MERS, a private mortgage registry. These new regimes reduced the cost of securitization by dispensing with demonstrative formalities, but at the expense of reduced clarity of title, which raised the costs of mortgage enforcement. This trade-off benefitted the securitization industry at the expense of securitization investors because it became apparent only subsequently with the rise in mortgage foreclosures. The harm, however, has not been limited to securitization investors. Clouded mortgage title has significant negative externalities on the economy as a whole.

This Article proposes reconciling the competing title systems through an integrated system of note registration and mortgage recordation, with compliance as a prerequisite to foreclosure. Such a system would resolve questions about standing, remove the potential cloud to real-estate title, and facilitate mortgage financing by clarifying property rights.

I had to agree with one of his conclusions:  “Reduction of transaction costs is ultimately a second-order move for commercial law. The first-order move, so elemental it is easy to forget, is clarification of the property being transferred.” (723-24) The others are pretty compelling too.

Washington Court Denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

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The court in deciding Cameron v. Acceptance Capital Mortg. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151134 (W.D. Wash. 2013) denied the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.

Nearly all of plaintiffs’ claims turn on a single question: whether, under Washington law, Flagstar had legal authority to appoint NWTS as successor trustee. Plaintiffs first asserted that Flagstar could not have become a beneficiary with the power to appoint a successor trustee. Plaintiff reasoned that under Washington state law, MERS was an unlawful initial beneficiary and thus lacked the power to assign its interest to Flagstar.

In their reply brief plaintiffs raised an additional claim alleging that even if Flagstar held the note, it had sold it to Fannie Mae before appointing NWTS as successor trustee, thus it shed its authority to make this appointment when it did so. Ultimately, the Court finds both arguments unpersuasive.

First, the court found that this case is distinguishable from the cited Washington state case law, as Flagstar derived its authority to enforce the note from its position as the note holder, not from its position as assigned beneficiary. The court found plaintiffs’ second allegation, were raised improperly only upon reply, was similarly unconvincing as it rests on a misunderstanding of the law.