The California court in deciding Nacif v. White-Sorensen, et al., NO. D056993. (San Diego Ct. Sup. Ct., 2009), determined that MERS held interests in the property and rejected the plaintiff’s argument that MERS had no standing because it was not qualified as a foreign corporation.
The court found that the under California law, MERS’s status as a “nominee” on a deed of trust means that it had the right to initiate foreclosure proceedings as the lender’s agent.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California in Putkkuri v. Recontrust Co., Case No. 08cv1919 WQH (AJB) (S.D.Cal. 2009) granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The plaintiff in this case demanded written proof of the defendants’ right to proceed in foreclosure, and the plaintiff claimed that no such proof had been offered. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants “engaged in a pattern and practice of utilizing the non-judicial foreclosure procedures of this State to foreclose on properties when they do not, in fact, have the right to do so.”
The plaintiff also alleged that in pursuing non-judicial foreclosure, defendants falsely represented that they had a right to payment under plaintiff’s residential loan, which was secured by the deed of trust. However, after considering the plaintiff’s claims the court dismissed them, holding that production of the original note is not required to proceed with a non-judicial foreclosure.
After the decision handed down from Fryzel v. MERS, No. CA 10-352 (D.Ri., 2011) On appeal, the plaintiff-appellees in United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, [(Fryzel, et. al. v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., No. 12–1526 (D.Ri., 2013)] brought suit to prevent foreclosure or eviction, on the shared ground that ostensible assignments of their mortgagees’ legal titles are invalid, leaving the assignees without the right to foreclose.
By appeal and mandamus petition, the group of plaintiffs claimed error in the district court’s failure to provide notice and hearing before issuing successive orders imposing a stay in the nature of a preliminary injunction against foreclosure and possessory proceedings, and in its failure to set limits of time and cost when referring the mortgagors’ cases challenging foreclosure to a Special Master for mandatory mediation.
After considering the plaintiffs’ collective arguments, the First Circuit remanded with instructions to hold a prompt hearing with reasonable notice on the question whether the injunction should be continued, in belated compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(1), and to establish specific limits of time and expense if the reference for mediation is to remain in effect.
The Rhode Island court in deciding Fryzel v. MERS, No. CA 10-352 (D.Ri., 2011) decided that under Rhode Island law, only parties to a contract may seek to have rights declared under a contract. The court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the transfer of the promissory note or assignment of mortgage granted by Plaintiff.
The plaintiff’s complaint disputed AHMSI’s ability to foreclose by challenging the validity of the assignments of their mortgage. The plaintiff further claimed that AHMSI was not entitled to foreclose under the terms of the ‘Pooling and Servicing Agreement’. However, the court found that it was undisputed that plaintiffs were not parties to the assignment agreements or to the PSA. Thus, plaintiffs did not have standing to assert legal rights based on the specified documents.
The Washington court in Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, Inc., 2010WL891585 (W.D. Wash. Dist. Ct., March2010), rejected the plaintiff’s contentions that an assignment by MERS was executed fraudulently.
The plaintiff based his claims around the execution of a mortgage assignment by a person designated as an officer of MERS, but who was not also a MERS employee.
The court, in rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments that the assignment was executed fraudulently, noted that the non-employee signors did not commit an affirmative misrepresentation of fact, because of the fact that, for purposes of signing the papers, the non-employee signors misrepresented nothing: [the IndyMac signor] and [the MERS signor] did bear the titles that they used. The employees’ use of the titles was expressly authorized by contracts with IndyMac and MERS.
Thus there was nothing deceptive about using an agent to execute a document, and the court also noted that such practice is commonplace in deed of trust actions.
The Texas court in Eskridge v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 6:10-CV-285, (W.D. Tex., 2011) dismissed Plaintiff’s claims to challenges the authority of MERS to assign its lien interest to a successive party.
The plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that she had superior title because the note as well as the deed of trust was split. Further, plaintiff alleged that MERS lacked authority under the note to transfer either the note and/or the deed of trust. Consequently, any transfer made by MERS in regard to the Note to BAC was allegedly void.
However, the court determined that the plaintiff lacked standing to contest the various assignments, as she was not a party to the assignments. The court further reasoned that even if she had standing, her allegations were without merit because MERS was given the authority to transfer the documents in the deed of trust.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California in deciding Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, et al. 5:09cv016015 (N.D. Cal., 2009) affirmed MERS’ authority to foreclose. MERS’ ability to foreclose was again affirmed in this case, contrary to plaintiff contentions alleging wrongful foreclosure, unfair business practices, failure to disclose information regarding the plaintiff’s loan, claims arising under TARP, and various violations of state law related to the Notice of Default and the trustee sale.
The Court granted MERS’ motion to dismiss on several grounds. One ground was that the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit because he failed to tender the amounts due and owing under the note. The court also held that the plaintiff did not have a private right of action under TARP, and that his claims for unfair business practices were not supported by any facts.
The court also denied the claims for wrongful foreclosure. Accordingly, the court found that under state law, there was no requirement for the production of an original promissory note prior to the initiation of a non-judicial foreclosure. So, the absence of an original promissory note in a non-judicial foreclosure does not render a foreclosure invalid.
