Tag Archives: mortgage

Tennessee Court Grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as Wells Fargo Had Ownership Interest in the Note & Deed

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The court in deciding McKee v. Am. Brokers Conduit, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152657 (W.D. Tenn. 2013) granted Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs claimed that (1) Wells Fargo didn’t have lawful ownership or a security interest in the property because the note and deed of trust were unlawfully sold; (2) Leak was not authorized to execute the assignment from MERS to Wells Fargo; (3) Wells Fargo could not show possession or ownership of the original note or deed and therefore had an imperfect security interest; and (4) ABC had no authority to execute the assignment because it was in bankruptcy proceedings at the time of the assignment.

The court found the plaintiff’s line of reasoning factually incorrect. The court noted that the note was made payable to Wells Fargo and the deed was assigned to Wells Fargo. Both the endorsed note and the assignment agreement were recorded. Furthermore, counsel for Wells Fargo had the original note in his possession. Finally, both the note and the deed allowed for such an assignment. Plaintiffs had presented the court with no evidence to rebut these facts. As such, the plaintiffs had not offered enough to challenge Wells Fargo’s enforcement of the note and the court granted summary judgment.

California Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Action Alleging Violations of RESPA, HOEPA, UCL & Negligent Misrepresentation

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The court in deciding Monreal v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151731 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2013) granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims arising under federal law with prejudice, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims. Therefore, the remaining state-law claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff alleged four causes of action against Deutsche Bank, GMAC, ETS, and MERS, including: (1) violation of the UCL; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) violation of RESPA; and (4) violation of HOEPA. In total plaintiff alleged two claims arising under federal law, RESPA and HOEPA, and two claims arising under state law, negligent misrepresentation and violation of the UCL.

In deciding the matter at hand, the court decided that their subject matter jurisdiction was premised on federal question jurisdiction over the claims arising under federal law, and supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state-law claims.

Accordingly, because the court found that plaintiff failed to state a viable cause of action under either RESPA or HOEPA, the court dismissed the federal causes of action with prejudice, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

As a result, the Court did not address the merits of the plaintiffs’ state-law causes of action.

Texas Court Finds Plaintiff’s “Split-the-Note” Theory Without Merit

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The court in deciding Morlock, L.L.C. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153386 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2013) ultimately dismissed plaintiff’s bifurcation theory based complaint.

Plaintiff alleged that the deed of trust had been “executed and delivered . . . to secure MERS” and that it “was allegedly assigned to defendant Chase by MERS.” Plaintiff further alleged, the deed of trust and assignment, although appearing valid on its face, was invalid and of no force or effect because, MERS was not the holder of the original note that was secured by the deed of trust.

Accordingly, the plaintiff argued, the assignment by MERS was not valid and defendant Chase was not the owner and holder of the note. Therefore, Chase had no right or authority to post the property for a trustee’s Sale.

Chase alleged that the plaintiff’s argument against the validity of the assignment came from the theory that the ‘bifurcation’ of the note and deed of trust renders the deed of trust invalid. Chase argued that Texas courts have rejected the “bifurcation theory” and that plaintiff had therefore failed to state a claim.

The court ultimately granted Chase’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and dismissed the action with prejudice.

California Court Denies Petition for Preliminary Injunction on Foreclosure Proceeding

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The court in deciding Vazquez v. Select Portfolio Servicing, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152454 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2013) denied the plaintiff’s petition for a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from proceeding with the foreclosure sale of his home.

Plaintiff alleged that MERS claimed to have a legal and effective lien on the property, and that it owned the note and mortgage without providing the plaintiff proof of those claims. Plaintiff asserted that he had the right to inspect the original note and deed of trust, pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f, and U.C.C. § 3-501.

The plaintiff further alleged that he had proof that the foreclosing entities did not have standing to foreclose. Id. Plaintiff asserted that defendants did not hold any instrument, note, or deed that would entitle them to foreclose.

The court denied the plaintiff’s verified petition for injunction, concluding that plaintiff failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of any of his potential claims.

United States District Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Intentional Misrepresentation and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims

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The court in Hoffman v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155092, 2013 WL 5797623 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2013) dismissed both of the plaintiff’s intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation claims.

Plaintiffs asserted two claims in their complaint: intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation. In regards to the first claim, the court found that the plaintiffs’ claim for the misrepresentation failed because it was not pled with specificity as required by Rule 9(b). Nowhere in the complaint did plaintiffs allege who made the fraudulent statements, when the statements were made, or where they were made.

Plaintiffs failed to allege the specific content of the fraudulent statements—their allegations include only broad generalizations. Plaintiffs also failed to identify precisely what reliance they placed on the “misrepresentations” such that plaintiffs are entitled to damages or equitable relief.

Lastly, the court found that the plaintiffs also nakedly assert a claim for “negligent misrepresentation,” and that the claim suffered from the same deficiencies as the first claim.

United States District Court Grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s TILA, RESPA, and GLBA Claims

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The court in deciding Hopkins v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155547, 2013 WL 5888086 (D. Md. Oct. 30, 2013) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s TILA, RESPA, and GLBA claims.

Plaintiff referenced three statutes in their complaint: TILA, RESPA, and GLBA. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated TILA by “withholding certain disclosures and documentation.” Plaintiff also claimed that defendant violated RESPA by making “loan servicing errors.” Plaintiff, however, did not state which provisions of these statutes defendant violated. With regard to the GLBA, Plaintiff alleged neither how defendant violated the statute, nor which provision defendant violated.

Accordingly, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to meet the pleading requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, and the complaint did not include any of the basic information necessary to be properly considered a complaint. Defendant also claimed that plaintiff’s complaint contained none of the information required by Rule 8(a). Specifically, with regard to Rule 8(a)(2)‘s requirement of “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.”

The defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s complaint was nothing more than an unadorned collection of vague and conclusory statements, in which the plaintiff failed to plead any specific facts supporting the claim that Green Tree somehow violated the law. Additionally, defendant argued that plaintiff failed to identify a single provision of RESPA and TILA that Green Tree allegedly violated. The court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint.

California Court Determines Plaintiff’s Claims are Barred by Res Judicata

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The court in deciding Maxwell v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155930, 2013 WL 5882457 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013) concluded that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata and therefore granted [with prejudice] the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs brought this action against defendants Deutsche, OneWest, and MERS. Plaintiff alleged various violations of California and federal consumer protection statutes. The plaintiff asserted a claim for an invalid transfer of a trust deed, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

The defendants moved to dismiss the proceedings, arguing that the claims were barred by res judicata. The court, after considering the evidence presented, concluded that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.