Tag Archives: motion to dismiss

Utah Court Holds That Under Utah Law, MERS Was Not Required to Identify the Note-Holder in Order to Permit the Trustee to Proceed With Foreclosure

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The plaintiff in Nielsen v. Aegis Wholesale Corporation, MERS et al., No. 10-606 (D. Utah May 4, 2011) argued that MERS divided the deed of trust as well as the promissory note. The court, in reaching their decision and rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, noted that “the court adopted the defendant’s argument that plaintiff had latched onto a failed theory—that a note and trust deed can be ‘split’ and rendered null and void.” The court subsequently dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against MERS with prejudice.

The court further went on to state that, “by law, each successor to the note also received the benefit of the security, and by contract, MERS was appointed as the nominee beneficiary under the First Deed of Trust. Contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, MERS had established its rights with respect to foreclosure on the security and MERS had, at all relevant times been, entitled to act as beneficiary under the First Deed of Trust.”

The court further noted that under Utah law, MERS was not required to identify the note holder in order to permit the trustee to proceed with foreclosure.

Oregon Court Rules That MERS’ Role as Beneficiary is Not Inconsistent With the Purpose of Oregon’s Non-Judicial Foreclosure Statute

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The Oregon court in Nigro v. Northwest Trustee Services and Wells Fargo Bank, No. 11 CV 0135 (May 15, 2011) denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction to stop a non-judicial foreclosure sale.

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The court in reaching their holding found that the plaintiff failed to establish the necessary elements to sustain a request for a preliminary injunction. Most notably, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success based on the merits.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated the Oregon Deed of Trust Act by failing to record all transfers of the assignment as well as the note. The court, in their ruling, cited Bertrand v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., which held that MERS was specifically designated by all parties as the beneficiary and had the authority to assign the deed of trust. Although MERS was not a party to this case, the court in Nigro ruled that MERS’ role as beneficiary is not inconsistent with the purpose of Oregon’s non-judicial foreclosure statute, and that the Act did not require the recording of note transfers.

What Was S&P Puffing?

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I have been closely following DoJ’s suit against S&P since the complaint was filed in February (and see here, here and here).  DoJ alleges that S&P “issued or confirmed ratings that did not accurately reflect true credit risks” and seeks to obtain civil penalties pursuant to FIRREA. (4) Yesterday, Judge Carter issued a doozy of an order, denying S&P’s motion to dismiss the case.

Let’s remember that for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the judge takes as true all of the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint.  So, if a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, it means that the legal theory of the case is sound and that the plaintiff can win if the facts are as it alleges.

This should be the scariest passage in the order, as far as S&P is concerned:

Defendants lead off with a proposition that is deeply and unavoidably troubling when you take a moment to consider its implications.  They claim that, out of all the public statements that S&P made to investors, issuers, regulators, and legislators regarding the company’s procedures for providing objective, data-based credit ratings that were unaffected by potential conflicts of interest, not one statement should have been relied upon by investors, issuers, regulators, or legislators who needed to be able to count on objective, data-based credit ratings. (7-8)

This is repudiation of S&P’s “puffery” defense: their statements about their objectivity and rigorous methodology were merely “non-actionable puffery” along the lines of Charmin’s claim that it is the softest of all toilet papers. (8)

The Court follows this line of thought through to its logical conclusion:

if no investor believed in S&P’s objectivity, and every bank had access to the same information and models as S&P, is S&P asserting that, as a matter of law, the company’s credit ratings service added absolutely zero material value as a predictor of creditworthiness? (12)

One wonders how S&P executives responded to their lawyers when they proposed this argument — were they thinking about anything else other than winning this motion?  Did they consider how regulators might react to this argument?

And, while this goes beyond the matter at hand, the Court’s reaction to S&P’s argument is an implicit indictment of the business model of the major rating agencies: they are really in the business of selling licenses to access the capital markets more than they are in the business of issuing mini-editorials about the creditworthiness of securities, as they have successfully argued in previous cases challenging their ratings.

Oregon Court Rejects Plaintiff’s Argument That the Trust Deed Can Only be Foreclosed if a Single Entity Holds Both the Note and Deed

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After receiving a Notice of Default and Election to Sell, the plaintiff in Spencer v. Guaranty Bank et al., No. 10CV0515ST, Deschutes Co. Circuit (May 5, 2011) sought an injunction barring MERS, as well as the other defendants, from bringing a foreclosure action. The court granted the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.

In addition to the court granting the motion to dismiss, the court also noted that the plaintiff “made no claim that she was not in default nor that any requirement of ORS 86.735 were not satisfied,” the court held that MERS satisfied the statutory definition of “beneficiary” under ORS 86.705. Specifically, the court identified that it was “not persuaded that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems couldn’t act in that capacity, even if it is not the holder of the note.”

Moreover, the court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the trust deed can only be foreclosed if a single person or entity holds both the note and deed, noting that ORS 86.770(2) protects the plaintiff from a lawsuit seeking enforcement of the note after the non-judicial sale. “The bottom line is that plaintiff sought to retain ownership, apparently forever, of a property for which she has not paid nor even alleges that she intends to pay for. She has not stated a claim.”

California Court Affirms MERS’ Authority to Assign its Interest Under a Deed of Trust

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The court in Hollins v. ReconTrust et al., Civil No. 2:11-cv-00945-PSG –PLA (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2011) affirmed MERS’ authority to assign its interest under a deed of trust and granted MERS’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs claimed that the foreclosure proceedings initiated by the U.S. Bank as well as ReconTrust were not valid. Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that MERS lacked the authority to assign the deed of trust.

The court considered the plaintiff’s contentions, but rejected the argument. In rejecting the palintiff’s argument, the court found that “federal and state courts in California have repeatedly rejected similar challenges to MERS in cases where the plaintiff expressly authorized MERS to act as a beneficiary.” Regarding the plaintiffs’ allegation that U.S. Bank was not authorized to foreclose due to lack of “documentation evidencing the proper status of U.S. Bank as a party in interest,” the court found the allegation “negated by a judicially noticeable record of assignment from MERS to U.S. Bank.” Last but not least, the plaintiffs’ failure to tender was fatal to their claims.

Jefferson County Circuit Court Holds That Fannie Mae Had Standing to Bring Ejectment Action

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The circuit court in Fannie Mae v. Steele, Jefferson County Circuit Court No. 09-900069 (May 18, 2011) found in favor of the plaintiff [Fannie Mae], by deciding to deny the defendants’ motion to set aside the judgment for possession. The defendants contended that the judgment in favor of Fannie Mae should be vacated on the grounds it was void due to MERS’ assignment of the mortgage to Everhome Mortgage. Everhome Mortgage was the party who conveyed the property to Fannie Mae through foreclosure deed.

The defendants also argued that Fannie Mae lacked standing to eject the defendants. This claim was premised on the holding from to Crum v. LaSalle Bank, 2009 WL 2986655 (Ala. Civ. App. Sept. 18, 2009). After considering the defendants’ contentions, the court held that the MERS assignment to Everhome was valid because MERS had the ability to assign the mortgage and take other actions as the nominee of the lender and its assigns. Likewise, the court also held that Fannie Mae had standing to bring the ejectment action.

Florida Court Dismisses Class Action Against MERS Over Unpaid Recording Fees

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The court in Fuller v. MERS, No. 11cv-1153 (M.D. Fla., June 27, 2012) was “confronted with an old problem: the difficulty of reconciling new technology with old law, thus raising the centuries old separation of powers controversy.” In deciding this case the court found that the Florida statute, which created the recording system, was a creature of statute, as such the remedy the plaintiff sought was to be granted by the legislature and not the courts.

In reaching its decision, the court found that the statute creating Florida’s public recording system did not provide a private right of action, as such Fuller was barred from bringing common law claims based on the statute. Fuller’s claims included civil conspiracy, a Writ of Quo Warranto, unjust enrichment, as well as fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. Fuller claimed that these claims were independent of the Florida statute, however, he admitted that the statute was the only source of his authority.

The court found that all of Fuller’s claims failed on their merits. Fuller argued that MERS attempted to usurp his function as the recorder of public instruments and sought a Writ of Quo Warranto. However, MES successfully argued that no law required payment of recording fees when a mortgage is assigned but not recorded.

Fuller failed to establish a conspiracy, as MERS did not commit an unlawful act. The court noted that the recording of mortgages is “at the complete discretion of the party wishing to record the document.” Accordingly, MERS was under no legal obligation to record the assignment or pay the recording fees. Fuller’s unjust enrichment claim was also rejected, as MERS had no duty to record, so Fuller could not establish that he had conferred any benefit on MERS. Lastly, Fuller’s fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims were based on the assumption that MERS falsely designated itself as the mortgagee on recorded instruments. The court rejected this assumption.