Tag Archives: motion to dismiss

Oregon District Court Finds Claim Preclusion Bars Stop-Foreclosure Action

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In Buckland v. MERS, Or. 11-3053-CL (2011) the court dealt with res judicata and the plaintiff relitigating the same claims that were raised or could have been raised in a previous action. The court found that the same factual transaction was at issue in the plaintiff’s prior litigation and at issue in the present case. Both actions arose out of the same non-judicial foreclosure proceeding associated with the loan on the plaintiff’s property.

The plaintiff had named Aurora Loan Services as sole defendant in his state action and MERS as a nominee for American Mortgage Network as sole defendant in the current action, although he referenced each of the parties in the complaints filed in both actions and challenged foreclosure of his property in both actions. As agents for the lender, the relationship between Aurora and MERS was close enough such that the court found the parties to be in privity. Since claim preclusion applies to a party to an earlier action and to a person who was not a party in the earlier action but who was in privity with the party to the earlier action, the plaintiff’s claim was precluded.

The court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims brought in this action, which arose out of the same factual transaction as the previous litigation, the court found that the claims could have been brought in those proceedings. Accordingly the claims were thus barred by claim preclusion.

First Circuit Grants Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff-Homeowner’s Suit to Preclude Foreclosure Sale

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The court in McKenna v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Case No. 11-1650 (C.A. 1, Aug. 16, 2012) was faced with questions relating to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Here, Wells Fargo’s primary assertion in its removal papers – “that there was federal question jurisdiction present in the case” – turned out to be mistaken as no federal claim was present. However, diversity jurisdiction was found to be sufficient enough to support the state statutory claims that were asserted in the complaint.

Wells Fargo brought a foreclosure action against the plaintiff [McKenna], the plaintiff responded by asserting a right to rescind the mortgage and then filed suit to preclude the foreclosure sale.

The plaintiff claimed a right to rescind on the grounds that [1] Wells Fargo had provided her with only one Truth in Lending disclosure statement at the time of the loan rather than two copies, and [2] Wells Fargo had understated the finance charge in its Truth in Lending statement by more than $35. The lower court then issued a preliminary injunction restraining Wells Fargo from taking further action to sell the plaintiff’s home.

On March 10, 2010, Wells Fargo removed the case to the federal district court in Massachusetts. Wells Fargo asserted that federal question jurisdiction existed. The bank then moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the district court granted the motion. On review, the court found that diversity jurisdiction existed as Wells Fargo was a bank and a citizen of the state where it is “located.” The bank’s location being North Dakota, and the plaintiff being a citizen of Massachusetts, allowed for diversity jurisdiction.

On review the court determined that the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Wells Fargo made certain misrepresentations. However, the court found that the plaintiff failed to specify the time or place of these misrepresentations or their real content and, as the district court held, these assertions were “too vague to meet the particularity requirement of Rule 9.” The First Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling. Further, the suit was not timely under the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635(a), and the complaint failed to state claims under the equivalent state law.

Servicing Fraud Claim Survives Motion To Dismiss

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Judge Gonzalez Rogers issued an opinion in Ellis v. J.P. Morgan Chase, No. 4:12-cv-03897-YGR (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2013) in which she denied a motion to dismiss a fraud claim in this class action lawsuit arising from Chase’s servicing business. The plaintiffs allege that “Chase engaged in fraudulent practices by charging marked-up or unnecessary fees in connection with Defendants’ home mortgage loan servicing businesses.” (1)

The opinion states that

Plaintiffs have alleged numerous instances where deficient information was provided and could have been revealed—namely, in the mortgage agreements themselves, in the mortgage statements reflecting the marked-up fees, or during communications with Chase where it told Plaintiffs that the fees were in accordance with their mortgage agreements.  Plaintiffs provide specific dates for statements in which they believe they were charged the marked-up fees, and allege they paid the fees without knowing their true nature.  Plaintiffs describe the content of the omission as the failure to inform them that the fees were marked-up and that the majority of the fees ultimately went to Chase, and not third-party vendors performing the services.  As discussed above, Plaintiffs have also sufficiently alleged that they did pay the marked-up fees. (36)

It continues,

Defendants allegedly demanded payment for fees that, in some cases, were never actually incurred. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that false representations were made to borrowers when Chase told them that the fees were in accordance with their mortgage contracts—this is distinguishable from an omission. As alleged, the fraud is equally about the failure to disclose material information as it is that the amounts demanded on mortgage statements were false because they did not correspond to the actual amounts owed pursuant to the mortgage agreements relied upon by Defendants. Based on the alleged nature of the fraudulent scheme, the lack of an explicit “duty to disclose” is not dispositive in light of affirmative fraud that is also alleged. (37, citations omitted)

Denying the motion to dismiss this claim exposes servicers to great potential liability for their acts and omissions.

Oregon District Court Dismisses Borrower’s Suit to Invalidate Foreclosure in Favor of BOA and MERS, Stating Lack of Merit

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In Moreno v. Bank of America., N.A., 3:11-CV-1265-HZ, (D. Or. Apr. 27, 2012) the U.S. District Court of Oregon, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff had alleged violations under several federal and state Acts, each of which the Judge rejected based on lack of merit.

The plaintiff brought action to invalidate a foreclosure sale, which, although dated earlier than the filed complaint, had not yet occurred. On March 29th, 2007, Moreno borrowed $220,000 from Aegis Wholesale Corporation. A promissory note in favor of Aegis was secured by a Deed of Trust (DOT) against the plaintiff’s real property and identified Fidelity National Title Insurance Company of Oregon (Fidelity) as trustee, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the “beneficiary under this Security Instrument.” MERS later assigned the DOT to BAC Home Loans Servicing (BACHLS) in June of 2010. On the same day, BACHLS appointed ReconTrust Co. as successor trustee to Fidelity. Fidelity filed a Notice of Default and Election to Sell (NODES), initiating foreclosure proceedings against Moreno, who had been in default since July, 2009.

The Court dismissed each of the plaintiff’s complaints in turn, starting with his first two claims of relief based on violations of the Oregon Trust Deed Act (OTDA). The plaintiff claimed that under the DOT, MERS lacked authority to assign beneficial interests to BACHLS, who in turn, lacked power to appoint ReconTrust as successor trustee. The Judge, Marco A. Hernandez, stated that he had previously held that “naming MERS as a beneficiary in a DOT does not violate the OTDA,” and while other judges in the district have found otherwise, he would continue to uphold this ruling. The plaintiff alleged that a 3-year gap between the execution of the DOT and MERS’s assignment to BACHLS  showed there “must have” been unrecorded assignments (in violation of ORS 86.735(1)). The Court found that allegation was both speculative and based on an erroneous assertion of fact (the Complaint mistakenly names Bank of America as the original lender, whereas the DOT names Aegis, and subsequent documents state Bank of America was assigned interest only in 2010). The second OTDA based claim was that the defective notice was invalid for failure to include a correct statement of the amount in default. The Court dismissed it because the plaintiff had not “plead his ability to cure the default, that his damages resulted from the lost opportunity to cure the default, and that he requested information from the trustee under O.R.S. § 86.757 and O.R.S. § 86.759.”

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Next, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim brought under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) for both the failure to meet the 1-year statute of limitations and for having incorrectly brought the action against Bank of America rather than Aegis, the original lender. Under TILA a claim may only be brought against the Creditor, who is the person who “regularly extends… consumer credit” and “to whom the debt arising from the consumer credit transaction is initially payable.” 15 U.S.C. Sect. 1602(g). The plaintiff further argued that he is Hispanic and “as a result” did not understand the nature of the loan documents. He therefore requested equitable tolling, which suspends the “limitation period until the borrower discovers or had reasonable opportunity to discover the fraud or nondisclosure that form the basis of the TILA action,” which he stated was in 2011 after having spoken to a translator who explained his loan audit. The Court found this unconvincing on several accounts. First, since the complaint brought no allegations in support of equitable tolling, it failed to state a TILA violation. Second, the plaintiff never alleged he did not speak English. Third, equitable tolling is applied when the 1-year period would be “unjust” or “frustrate the purpose” of the TILA. Fourth,  the plaintiff must bring allegations “that the defendant had fraudulently concealed information that would have allowed plaintiff to discover his claim,” engaged in action to prevent plaintiff from discovering a claim, or encountered “some other extraordinary circumstance would have made it reasonable for Plaintiff not to discover his claim within the limitations period.” Garcia v Wachovia Mortg. Corp. 676 F. Supp.2d 895, 905 (C.D. Cal. 2009).

The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) for failure to meet the statute of limitations since his claim arose out of the origination of the loan in 2007, and his arguments for equitable tolling “are unavailing.”  Plaintiff also failed to allege that a RESPA violation resulted in actual damage, a requirement of a RESPA claim.

The plaintiff’s claim under Oregon’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) was dismissed because at the time of the loan, in 2007, UTPA had not yet been amended to include “loans and extensions of credit,” O.R.S. 646.605(6) (2010), therefore plaintiff’s loan was not covered by the Act. Additionally, UTPA claims must be brought within a year from the discovery of the “unlawful method, act or practice,” but the plaintiff failed to assert that the discovery of a UTPA violation could not have been made at the time of the loan

Standard & Poor Puffery

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The Department of Justice filed its opposition to S&P’s Motion to Dismiss the federal government’s FIRREA lawsuit.  At this stage of the litigation, it appears as if the key issue is whether S&P’s alleged misrepresentations about its business practices are actionable false statements or are mere “puffery” as S&P’s lawyers describe them in their brief (passim).  Let’s put aside the fact that describing your professional standards, principles and guidelines as “puffery” seems like a very bad long-term strategy (imagine the line of questioning at a Congressional hearing about S&P’s role as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization).

But putting that cringer aside, S&P does raise a legitimate legal issue which relies heavily on Boca Raton Firefighters and Police Pension Fund v. Bahash, 12-1776-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2012). In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs-investors’ claims because S&P’s statements regarding the “integrity and credibility and the objectivity of” its ratings were “the type of mere ‘puffery’ that we have previously held to be not actionable.” (6)

DoJ responds that “S&P rests its “’puffery’ defense primarily on [Boca] an unpublished, out-of-circuit opinion addressing securities fraud claims by S&P shareholders.” (opposition brief at 7). These are not substantive critiques of the Boca opinion, of course, so the 9th Circuit could well find the reasoning compelling.

But DoJ further argues that “the focus of the action here is the effect of S&P’s statements not on S&P shareholders [as in Boca], but on investors in the RMBS and CDOs S&P rated.  This is a crucial difference.” (Id.)

Will Judge Carter agree?