Housing Policy and Justice

John Infranca has posted Housing Resource Bundles:Distributive Justice and Federal Low-Income Housing Policy to SSRN. The abstract reads,

Only one in four eligible households receives some form of rental assistance from the federal government. Nonetheless, there is no time limit for the receipt of this assistance; individuals can continue to receive benefits as long as they satisfy eligibility requirements. In addition, individuals who do obtain assistance frequently have higher incomes than those denied it. Beyond simply providing housing, federal rental assistance is enlisted to serve a myriad of additional policy goals — including furthering economic integration and providing access to better neighborhoods — that can exacerbate inequities between those who receive benefits and those denied assistance. These broader objectives often increase the cost of housing assistance and reduce the number of households served.

Given increasingly limited resources and the growing demand for rental assistance, difficult decisions must be made regarding how to satisfy a range of conflicting programmatic goals. Although for at least four decades legal scholars, economists, public policy experts, and politicians have denounced the inequities in existing housing policy, no one has provided a detailed analysis of the specific ways in which this policy departs from norms of distributive justice and of how it might be made more equitable. This Article moves the conversation beyond simply decrying existing inequities and instead carefully analyzes federal housing policy in light of specific theories of distributive justice. Drawing on the philosophical literature, it evaluates the specifics of existing policies, and their distributional impacts, in light of five theories of distributive justice. It then proposes a new structure for federal rental assistance, which would allow recipients to choose among a set of “housing resource bundles.” This approach will not only satisfy the most salient understandings of distributive justice, but will also advance the concerns that underpin other distributive justice theories and allow federal housing policy to more effectively embrace a plurality of programmatic goals.

I was particularly intrigued by one (modest?) proposal:

A commitment to distributing all federal housing assistance to provide for equality of resources would demand that the housing resource bundle approach be put in place for all citizens. Each individual would be limited in the total amount of housing assistance they could receive during their lifetime. All citizens would receive an equal sum of housing resources, either through direct rental assistance or a deduction of mortgage interest (or some combination). This would result in a substantial change in the allocation of resources, resulting in a more equitable distribution of all federal housing assistance. (62-63)

This proposal highlights the extent to which federal housing policy heavily favors upper-income households which benefit greatly from the mortgage interest deduction. The proposal also highlights a limitation of the article.  While it it makes clear that housing policy violates norms of distributive justice, it does not chart a practical course to achieve political change in an environment where the mortgage interest deduction is one of the most heavily protected federal tax expenditures. That being said, the article helps to clarify what is at stake in debates over federal housing policy and provides some intellectual clarity for those who study it.

Tennessee Court Rejected MERS’ Argument that Sale of Property Should be Invalidated

The court in deciding Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys. v. Ditto, 2014 Tenn. App. (Tenn. Ct. App., 2014) affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

This appeal involved the purchase of property at a tax sale. MERS filed suit against purchaser to invalidate his purchase of property because it had not received notice of the sale even though it was listed as a beneficiary or nominee on the deed of trust.

Purchaser claimed that MERS was not entitled to notice because MERS did not have an interest in the property. Purchaser also alleged that MERS failed to properly commence its lawsuit because it did not remit the proper funds pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-2504(c).

The trial court refused to set aside the tax sale, holding that the applicable notice requirements were met and that the purchaser was the holder of legal title to the property. MERS appealed the lower court’s decision, however this court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Since appellant was never given an independent interest in the property, and it did not suffer an injury by the sale of the property at issue, and the only injury suffered by appellant related to the future effect the case could have on its business model, which was not a distinct and palpable injury capable of being redressed by the court, the trial court’s grant of the purchaser’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was properly granted as appellant did not have standing to file suit to set aside the tax sale of the property for lack of notice under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2502(c) and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The court found that the failure to tender the appropriate funds when filing the petition to set aside the sale under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2504(c) was not a prerequisite for relief.