Tag Archives: S&P

DoJ All FIRREA-ed Up With S&P Suit

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Law360 quoted me in a story, Prosecutors Unleashed As $5B S&P Action Rolls On (behind a paywall), about DoJ’s success in fending off S&P’s motion to dismiss its FIRREA case. It reads in part

While the latest ruling against S&P was lighter on substance, Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss called it “a very big deal.”

“It adds to a body of law that gives the government another powerful tool to go after alleged misdeeds by financial institutions,” he said.

The suit, launched in February to much fanfare, targets S&P’s top-notch ratings for complex mortgage-backed securities that later failed. As part of a controversial, widespread practice known as the “issuer pays” model, banks created the securities, paid S&P to rate them and then sold them to investors. The DOJ claims S&P mismarked the securities on purpose to keep clients happy and boost profits.

In its motion to dismiss, the firm argued its public statements touting the ratings as objective, based on solid data and unaffected by potential conflicts of interest amounted to “puffery” and therefore could not form the basis of a fraud suit against S&P and parent company McGraw-Hill Cos. Inc.

But Judge Carter ruled Tuesday that the DOJ had sufficiently alleged S&P’s statements were not general, subjective claims, but were based on specific policies and procedures governing how the firm “shall” or “must not” rate securities. The judge called the firm’s puffery argument “deeply and unavoidably troubling when you take a moment to consider its implications.”

“Despite defendants’ protestations to the contrary, the court cannot find that all of these ‘shalls’ and ‘must nots’ are the mere aspirational musings of a corporation setting out vague goals for its future,” the judge wrote in an 18-page order. “Rather, they are specific assertions of current and ongoing policies that stand in stark contrast to the behavior alleged by the government’s complaint.”

Judge Carter also found the DOJ had sufficiently claimed S&P defrauded investors who had relied upon the ratings in determining the credit risk of certain investments. And the judge ruled the government did not have to plead “with a high degree of particularity” that S&P intentionally issued false ratings because the suit was filed under FIRREA. Tougher pleading requirements set out in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which governs many securities suits, therefore do not apply, the judge ruled.

S&P spokesman Ed Sweeney noted Wednesday that the ruling did not address the merits of the case, as the judge was required to accept the government’s factual allegations as true during the early stages of litigation.

“We now welcome the opportunity to demonstrate the lack of merit to the Department of Justice’s complaint,” Sweeney said. “We firmly believe S&P’s ratings were and are independent, and expect to show just that in court.”

The decision followed a tentative July 8 ruling by Judge Carter. And indeed, given the sheer amount of resources the government has devoted to the case, the finding should have come as no surprise, according to Jacob Frenkel, an attorney at Shulman Rogers Gandal Pordy & Ecker PA who chairs the firm’s securities enforcement practice.

“When you have a deep-pocketed client that is willing to fight, a good lawyer will exhaust all options and remedies,” Frenkel said of S&P’s motion. “It would have been unreasonable to believe it stood any chance of success, but that does not mean you don’t try.”

Still, Judge Carter’s takedown should give the firm pause as it weighs whether to fight the claims or strike a settlement, according to Reiss, the Brooklyn professor.

“We now have a sense that the judge’s take on the guts of the case is pretty favorable to the government,” Reiss said. “And we’re now seeing the rating agencies start to crumble a little bit after their decades-long run of avoiding either settling or losing at trial.”

What Was S&P Puffing?

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I have been closely following DoJ’s suit against S&P since the complaint was filed in February (and see here, here and here).  DoJ alleges that S&P “issued or confirmed ratings that did not accurately reflect true credit risks” and seeks to obtain civil penalties pursuant to FIRREA. (4) Yesterday, Judge Carter issued a doozy of an order, denying S&P’s motion to dismiss the case.

Let’s remember that for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the judge takes as true all of the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint.  So, if a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, it means that the legal theory of the case is sound and that the plaintiff can win if the facts are as it alleges.

This should be the scariest passage in the order, as far as S&P is concerned:

Defendants lead off with a proposition that is deeply and unavoidably troubling when you take a moment to consider its implications.  They claim that, out of all the public statements that S&P made to investors, issuers, regulators, and legislators regarding the company’s procedures for providing objective, data-based credit ratings that were unaffected by potential conflicts of interest, not one statement should have been relied upon by investors, issuers, regulators, or legislators who needed to be able to count on objective, data-based credit ratings. (7-8)

This is repudiation of S&P’s “puffery” defense: their statements about their objectivity and rigorous methodology were merely “non-actionable puffery” along the lines of Charmin’s claim that it is the softest of all toilet papers. (8)

The Court follows this line of thought through to its logical conclusion:

if no investor believed in S&P’s objectivity, and every bank had access to the same information and models as S&P, is S&P asserting that, as a matter of law, the company’s credit ratings service added absolutely zero material value as a predictor of creditworthiness? (12)

One wonders how S&P executives responded to their lawyers when they proposed this argument — were they thinking about anything else other than winning this motion?  Did they consider how regulators might react to this argument?

And, while this goes beyond the matter at hand, the Court’s reaction to S&P’s argument is an implicit indictment of the business model of the major rating agencies: they are really in the business of selling licenses to access the capital markets more than they are in the business of issuing mini-editorials about the creditworthiness of securities, as they have successfully argued in previous cases challenging their ratings.

Ain’t Misrepresentin’

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According to Wikipedia, the performers in the musical Ain’t Misbehavin’ “present an evening of rowdy, raunchy, and humorous songs that encapsulate the various moods of the era and reflect” a “view of life as a journey meant for pleasure and play.” In U.S. RMBS Roundtable: Arrangers And Investors Discuss The Role Of Representations And Warranties In U.S. RMBS Transactions, S&P does something similar with securitization. It presents the views of industry players as they try to predict and shape the future of the recently emerging private-label RMBS market, in the hopes of “achieving a healthy and sustainable RMBS market.” (2)

ACT I:  Lookin’ Good but Feelin’ Bad

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The piece contains a lot of important insights, including the following point made by investors: “standardizing R&Ws would be a step towards improving the transparency and their ease of understanding. Smaller investors noted that they can be particularly limited in distinguishing R&Ws given the complexities involved.” (3)

This point encapsulates in so many words the classic market for lemons problem, famously formalized by George Akerlof.  The lemon problem leads us to ask how a buyer is to price a purchase where the buyer has less information about the product than the seller.  Because of this information assymetry, the purchaser will assume the worst about the product and offer to buy it with that in mind.

R&Ws are an attempt to overcome that problem because the RMBS arranger or the mortgage originator promises to compensate the investor for lemons that are contained with a mortgage pool securing an RMBS. Consistent with that view, investors noted that “they expected to be compensated for losses caused by origination defects, rather than legitimate life events.” (2) In other words, origination defects are the lemons that should be borne by the arranger/originator with its superior information about the mortgages. And “legitimate life events” represent the credit risk that the investors have signed up for.

ACT II:  That Ain’t Right

Arrangers and originators made the following points:

  1. [o]ne arranger indicated that the R&W process should be governed only by the contractual obligations negotiated for each deal. (2)
  2. [o]riginators have strict underwriting guidelines and said they take great care to follow those procedures before issuing a loan. Arrangers are also currently subjecting all or almost all loans to a third-party due-diligence review. (2)
  3. arrangers said that standardizing R&Ws will not be an easy task as differences between arrangers and product types will limit the degree to which R&Ws can be homogenized. (3)

These points clearly align with the interests of the seller in a market for lemons.  To restate them a bit, 1. caveat emptor; 2. arrangers and originators don’t sell lemons (!); and (3) it is too hard to come up with provisions that consistently protect investors so don’t bother trying.

ENCORE:  Find Out What They Like

S&P notes that there “was broad agreement that one of the keys to achieving a healthy and sustainable RMBS market is aligning the interests of arrangers and investors.” (2) From that broader perspective, S&P is right that the industry should work toward a state of affairs that “minimizes the cost of unknown risks and ultimately reduces losses and related litigation.” (2) Given the spate of lawsuits over reps and warranties, we had fallen shy of that mark in the past (here, for example).  It remains to be seen if the industry can get it better next time and if the incentives are aligned enough to do so.

 

Standard & Poor Puffery

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The Department of Justice filed its opposition to S&P’s Motion to Dismiss the federal government’s FIRREA lawsuit.  At this stage of the litigation, it appears as if the key issue is whether S&P’s alleged misrepresentations about its business practices are actionable false statements or are mere “puffery” as S&P’s lawyers describe them in their brief (passim).  Let’s put aside the fact that describing your professional standards, principles and guidelines as “puffery” seems like a very bad long-term strategy (imagine the line of questioning at a Congressional hearing about S&P’s role as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization).

But putting that cringer aside, S&P does raise a legitimate legal issue which relies heavily on Boca Raton Firefighters and Police Pension Fund v. Bahash, 12-1776-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2012). In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs-investors’ claims because S&P’s statements regarding the “integrity and credibility and the objectivity of” its ratings were “the type of mere ‘puffery’ that we have previously held to be not actionable.” (6)

DoJ responds that “S&P rests its “’puffery’ defense primarily on [Boca] an unpublished, out-of-circuit opinion addressing securities fraud claims by S&P shareholders.” (opposition brief at 7). These are not substantive critiques of the Boca opinion, of course, so the 9th Circuit could well find the reasoning compelling.

But DoJ further argues that “the focus of the action here is the effect of S&P’s statements not on S&P shareholders [as in Boca], but on investors in the RMBS and CDOs S&P rated.  This is a crucial difference.” (Id.)

Will Judge Carter agree?

The Weak Can Never Forgive?

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S&P has issued a report, Principal Forgiveness, Still The Best Way To Limit U.S. Mortgage Redefaults, Is Becoming More Prevalent, that asserts that its research “demonstrates the likelihood that servicers will recover a greater portion of their receivables through principal forgiveness versus other modification tools,” such as rate modification. (5) In particular, the authors found that as of March of 2013, “loans that received a principal reduction maintained the highest percentage (about 76%) of current-pay borrowers. By contrast, on average less than 50% of loans outstanding that received a modification other than principal forgiveness remained current.” (4)

I am not sure that their research actually demonstrates a causal connection between principal modification and recoveries as opposed to just providing a correlation between the two.  This perhaps naive analysis does, in any event, raise interesting and important questions about the efficacy of modifications.

And modifications are increasing.  Indeed, as of “February of this year, more than 1.5 million homeowners have received a permanent modification through the U.S. federal government’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).” (1) Since last year, there has been “22% rate of growth in the number of modifications on an additional $2.4 billion in mortgage debt.” (1) Among the big five servicers, “principal forgiveness, as a percentage of average modifications performed on a monthly basis, has increased by about 200% since the latter half of 2011.” (1) And since 2009, “servicers have forgiven principal on approximately $45 billion of outstanding non-agency mortgages.” (1)

At the beginning of the crisis, many were terrified about the impact that principal modification would have on investors. FHFA Acting Director DeMarco was also concerned about the impact of Fannie and Freddie principal reductions on taxpayers. With a new Director for FHFA on the horizon, there might be a change of direction on this.

Gandhi said that forgiveness is an attribute of the strong.  Perhaps, our housing market is now strong enough to contemplate some serious loan forgiveness.

S&P Myth #1: No One Could Have Known

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S&P filed its Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss the DoJ lawsuit filed back in February. The memorandum states that S&P’s inability, along with other market participants, “to predict the extent of the most catastrophic meltdown since the Great Depression reveals” only “a lack of prescience” and “not fraud.” (1) This short phrase requires some serious unpacking.

First, it ignores the fact that many of the analysts who engaged in fact-based investigations of the rated securities were sounding warnings but were overruled by higher ups who demanded that market share be maintained.  So if S&P and “other market participants” is defined to exclude all of those analysts, risk officers, underwriters and due diligence providers that worked for all of those market participants, then S&P is certainly right.  But if plaintiffs can demonstrate that facts were ignored to the extent that short term profits would be hurt by them, then S&P’s characterization is less compelling.

A second related point is that S&P’s argument that “its views were consistent with those of virtually every other market participant” is not compelling if plaintiffs can demonstrate that it ignored the facts before it and the findings of its own models.

Finally, its characterization of the Subprime Bust as “the most catastrophic meltdown since the Great Depression” fails to acknowledge that an S&P AAA rating offers quite the stamp of approval:  “An issuer or obligation rated ‘AAA’ should be able to withstand an extreme level of stress and still meet its financial obligations. A historical example of such a scenario is the Great Depression in the U.S.”  (The quote is from S&P’s website and can be accessed here on page 58.) But mortgage-backed securities with that S&P triple A did not quite live up to their promise.

This is not to say that S&P has not raised serious legal issues with Justice’s complaint in its motion to dismiss, but just that its rationalizations of its own behavior (which echo those of Dick Fuld and many others at the helm of various “market participants”) don’t stand up against the record.

S&P’s Coy-ful Analysis of Basel Securitization Framework

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S&P has long taken the public position that ratings from an NRSRO (like S&P or Moodys) should not be required.  This position would seem to be against its own interest and thus be quite public spirited.

Its recent Response to Consultation on Basel Securitization Framework may make one question whether it really stands by that public position after all.

The response raises a “number of significant concerns” about proposed revisions to the Basel securitization framework:

  • In seeking to reduce the framework’s reliance on external ratings, the proposals increase its reliance on various formula-based approaches. These generally do not take into account the full range of factors that can affect the creditworthiness of a securitization exposure, potentially undermining the framework’s risk sensitivity.
  • Because the proposed framework includes at least five different approaches to calculating securitization capital charges, there is significant scope for inconsistencies in treatment between different banks and/or jurisdictions.  . . .
  • Notwithstanding the Committee’s aim of ensuring more prudent capital charges for some securitization exposures, we question whether the losses experienced by securitizations globally since the 2007-2008 financial crisis warrant the scale of increase in capital charges that the proposals would result in, especially for investment-grade tranches.
  • Our analysis suggests that in many situations the Revised Ratings-Based Approach (RRBA) leads to significantly higher capital charges than the other proposed approaches, which suggests the RRBA may be incorrectly calibrated.
  • Although the proposals envisage various capping mechanisms to mitigate the risk of excessively high capital charges, our analysis suggests that these caps could determine capital charges in many situations, rather than being an exception. . . . (2)
The first two concerns appear to argue that NRSROs are necessary to the rating process.  The second two appear self-interested (consistent with their behavior for years) in that they argue against higher capital charges.  Higher capital charges would slow the growth of the securitization market and thus their own rating business income. Given that S&P had gotten its models for RMBS so wrong, it is disconcerting to see it oppose capital requirements that might err the other way for once.  And the last concern — that the exception may swallow the rule — is deliciously ironic, given that that was a major problem with S&P’s ratings of RMBS during the boom. As always, S&P’s input on this topic must be viewed through the lens of its self-interest to ensure that its positions are in the public interest.