Author Archives: Ebube Okoli

United States District Court Dismisses RICO and FDCPA Claims

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The court in deciding Koenig v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. (E.D. Cal., 2013) ultimately granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff Philip A. Koenig commenced this action against defendant Bank of America. Plaintiff alleged causes of action for violations of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Plaintiff also brought claim requesting declaratory relief against the defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). After considering the arguments, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

The theory underlying the totality of plaintiff’s complaint was that defendant had no right to affect foreclosure on the property. The second cause of action was a request for declaratory relief. Plaintiff sought a declaration from the court indicating that the defendant did not have and had never had any interest in the property.

Plaintiff alleged that the entity that intended to foreclose on the property was not the lender that originated any mortgage and was not an assignee of any mortgagee or a duly appointed trustee, thus the entity lacked the legal authority to foreclose.

After consider the plaintiff’s arguments, the court rejected them and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

California Court Denies Dismissal of Wrongful Foreclosure Claim

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The California court in Engler v. ReconTrust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. 179950 (C.D. Cal. 2013) dismissed all but one of the plaintiff’s complaint.

Plaintiff originally filed suit against defendants BAC and MERS on June 6, 2012. On March 1, 2013, the lower court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend.

The plaintiff’s current complaint alleged thirteen causes of action: (1) Declaratory Relief; (2) Violation of RICO; (3) “Common Law Conspiracy;” (4) “Filing of Invalid Lien;” (5) “Fraudulent Conveyance Deceptive Practices Code of Federal Regulations 17 CFR Parts 204-249;” (6) Fraudulent Concealment; (7) Fraudulent Inducement; (8) Wrongful Foreclosure; (9) Violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; (10) Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act; (11) Violation of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices; (12) Violation of the Truth in Lending Act; and (13) Constructive Fraud.

After considering the plaintiff’s contentions the court found that the plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action were rightfully dismissed with prejudice. However, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s eighth cause of action was denied. Accordingly, the only cause of action remaining in Plaintiff’s claim was the Eighth Cause of Action.

Ohio Court Dismisses Claims Asserting that MERS Could Not Act as Nominee

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The court in deciding Cline v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 2013-Ohio-5706 (Ohio Ct. App., Franklin County 2013) overruled appellant’s seven assignments of error, thus this court upheld the judgment of the lower court.

The lower court granted MERS’ motion after concluding that, because appellant voluntarily signed the mortgage and agreed to the existing lien, the mortgage could not constitute a cloud on appellant’s title subject to R.C. 5303.01. On appeal, appellant argued the original loan was originated by CBSK, a company no longer in business; therefore, any agreement between CBSK and MERS that MERS would act as nominee for CBSK is void.

In appellant’s view, because the agreement between CBSK and MERS was void, the note and mortgage were no longer in effect and constituted a cloud upon her title. Appellant argued that, unlike Unger, which concerned mortgage assignments, this matter was different as it concerns the underlying mortgage itself.

Upon review, this court found that the appellant’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and, thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing appellant’s complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Accordingly, all of the appellant’s claims were overruled.

Washington Court Upholds Dismissal of RESPA Claims

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The court in deciding Bhatti v. Guild Mortg. Co., 2013 U.S. App. 25659 (9th Cir. Wash. 2013) ultimately upheld the lower court’s decision by dismissing the plaintiff’s RESPA claims.

Plaintiffs Nusrat Bhatti and Erfan Semuel filed a complaint in Washington state court against Guild Mortgage Co. and MERS for quiet title, declaratory judgment, and violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601.

Defendants filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The lower court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appealed, after considering the plaintiff’s appeal, this court affirmed the lower court.

This court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion. This court also found that defendants did not violate the DTA’s requirement that a deed of trust’s beneficiary hold the note when it appoints a successor trustee

Accordingly, the lower court’s judgment was affirmed.

 

Illinois Court Finds that Assignment was Proper, Thus Wells Fargo Could Foreclose

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The court in deciding Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Abatangelo, 2013 IL App (1st) 130423-U (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013) affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of plaintiff Wells Fargo. The court determined Wells Fargo had standing to bring the foreclosure action.

Mr. Abatangelo challenged the lower court’s grant of summary judgment on Wells Fargo’s foreclosure complaint, specifically its finding that Wells Fargo had standing to foreclose on the mortgage. On this appeal, Mr. Abatangelo contended that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) the mortgage contract did not properly assign the right to foreclose to Wells Fargo; and (2) the trial court improperly considered new arguments raised by Wells Fargo for the first time in a reply brief in support of their motion to dismiss.

After considering the arguments put forward by Abatangelo the court affirmed the lower court decision.

The Court found That Bank of America had Standing Even After Merger

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The court in deciding Bank of Am., N.A. v. Harris, 2013-Ohio-5749 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga County 2013) found Bank of America had standing after merger.

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment arguing that Bank of America lacked standing to foreclosure because the bank was “a party solely by virtue of a purported assignment from MERS.” Plaintiff argued that MERS had no authority to assign the mortgage to Bank of America, and thus, Bank of America had no standing to bring the suit.

The court found that the bank had standing to bring a foreclosure action because it was the real party in interest at the time that a foreclosure complaint was filed. The court noted that a party who received an assignment of mortgage from MERS as a nominee had standing to foreclose when the borrower defaulted. The court found that here the bank had possession of the note, therefore, it was the current holder of the note and entitled to enforce it under R.C. 1303.31. Further, the court found that after the merger, the bank stepped into the shoes of the absorbed company and had the ability to enforce, thus no further action was necessary to become a real party in interest.

 

United States District Court Rejects Claim Under the Washington Consumer Protection Act

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The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington in deciding Massey v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 2013 U.S. Dist. 180472 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2013) granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Cindy T. Massey asserted a claim under the Washington Consumer Protection Act against defendants in connection with non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. Defendants Freddie Mac and MERS, together, brought a separate motion for summary judgment. After considering the plaintiff’s arguments the court granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

In regards to her CPA claim the court found that the plaintiff failed to identify any deceptive acts perpetrated by Freddie Mac. For that reason alone the CPA claim against Freddie Mac failed.

Ms. Massey also argued that Bank of America did not possess the authority to initiate non-judicial foreclose proceedings on the property for various reasons, the primary of which was the characterization of MERS as the beneficiary on the deed of trust. Specifically, Ms. Massey argued that the assignment of the deed of trust to Bank of America was void, that the Appointment of Northwest Trustee as successor trustee was void, and that Bank of America did not hold the Note when it initiated foreclosure. After considering this argument the court found that they were without merit.