REFinBlog

Editor: David Reiss
Cornell Law School

May 2, 2014

Real Affordability for All New Yorkers?

By David Reiss

The Real Affordability for All campaign has issued An Affordable Housing Policy Platform for Mayor de Blasio. A stated goal of the campaign “is to ensure that Mayor de Blasio’s housing policies prioritize and deliver real affordability for the most economically vulnerable households” in the CIty. (1) As with many such studies (this one, for instance), it does a good job of identifying the problem — incomes are not sufficient to keep housing costs affordable — but its solutions do not match the identified problem.

I am not going to focus on all of the good things in the report (for instance, enhancing enforcement of housing laws to protect tenants), but on fundamental flaws in its proposal that the City implement a 50/50 model for increasing the supply of new affordable housing units. The report states that

Affordable housing developers, private sector developers and housing experts agree on two broad 50/50 scenarios that are viable and pragmatic, based on existing developments, current real-estate market assumptions, and the latest mathematical modeling:

1) For high-cost areas of the city (particularly Manhattan), depending on the level of up-zoning, new developments can ensure that 50 percent of the units are market rate and 50 percent are real affordable units targeted to low-income households: specifically, households of four earning 30-60 percent of Area Median Income.

2) For the outer boroughs, where land costs are lower, 100% of new developments can be affordable: 50 percent of the units can be for low-income households (those earning 30-60 percent of Area Median Income) and 50 percent for moderate income households (those earning up to 100 percent of Area Median Income). 100% real affordability can be achieved by increasing current per unit subsidies in the outer boroughs and applying those subsidies to real affordable housing units for low-and moderate-income households. (3)

The first fundamental flaw is an assumption that if the government requires something of developers, developers will do it. For-profit developers will only build if they can make a profit. Otherwise they will just not build.  Given the low rates of new housing construction that we have seen in NYC over long periods of time, this is just a fact of life.

This leads to a second flaw — the proposal leaves fewer market rate units to cross-subsidize more affordable units. Given that the costs of development are relatively fixed, this proposal would have to come up with some real new cost-cutting measures for new developments or new sources of revenue to add to the existing subsidies. But the recommendations put forward by the report don’t really do either of those things. Their recommendations are

  1. Use Subsidies More Wisely to Drive Real Affordability.
  2. Implement a New Low-Income Real Affordability Framework Across All Housing Programs.
  3. Enable Not-for-Profit Developers and Owners to Play a Strong and Active Role in the City’s Housing Agenda.
  4. Prioritize Permanent Affordability for All City-owned Land Dispositions.
  5. Require that Developers and Investors Receiving Any Type of City Subsidy Provide a Reserve Fund that Creates a Safety Net for Excessively Rent-Burdened Tenants.
  6. Flip Tax.
  7. Non-Occupancy Tax.
  8. Water and Sewer Tax Reform
  9. Property Tax Overhaul.
  10. Density Bonuses.(4-5)

Many of these recommendations amount to moving things around, not to reducing costs or increasing subsidies. The ones that do raise revenues, raise relatively small amounts. For instance, the flip tax proposal is estimated to generate between $100 million and $150 million per year.  Using a conservative cost estimate of $200,000 per unit of new housing, $150 million in new revenue would only produce 750 new units of real affordable housing per year, a drop in the bucket.

Many have been trying to shape the Mayor’s housing agenda in recent days (here for instance). But few have seriously faced the real market and political constraints that the City faces as it attempts to increase the supply of affordable housing. There is reason to think that the Mayor’s housing team will grapple with these issues seriously, so let’s wait patiently for their plan to be released . . ..

 

May 2, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments

Defaulting Mortgagor Lacked Standing Under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1109(b)

By Ebube Okoli

The court in deciding In re Residential Capital, LLC, 2013 Bankr. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 2013) held that the plaintiff Scott was not a party in interest and therefore lacked standing to assert a violation of the automatic stay. The court thus denied his motion.

Before this court was Phillip Scott’s motion to (1) determine that bankruptcy estate owns title to the note, (2) void state court title transfer, and (3) enjoin post petition state court prosecution.

Through his Motion, Scott sought: (1) declaratory relief determining that the bankruptcy estate owns title to the note; (2) injunctive relief enjoining, restraining, and prohibiting the mortgage foreclosure action in the Supreme Court of New York, County of Westchester; and (3) judgment for costs, including attorneys’ fees.

This court held that a mortgagor who defaulted on a note he executed in 2005 did not have standing under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1109(b) to seek a ruling from the bankruptcy court that a business that declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy after it acquired and transferred a mortgage he executed with the note held title to real property that secured the note, and an order enjoining a foreclosure action which a bank filed against the property in a New York court. The court also held that the mortgagor was not a creditor in the debtors’ bankruptcy estate, the note and mortgage were not owned or serviced by any of the debtors, and none of the debtors was a party to the foreclosure action.

Thus this court denied the mortgagor’s motion for an order declaring that the debtors’ bankruptcy estate owned title to the note, voiding a state court title transfer, and enjoining the foreclosure action that was filed in state court.

May 2, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments

Arizona’s Non-Judicial Foreclosure Statutes do not Require the Beneficiary to ‘Show the Note’ Before Commencing a Non-Judicial Foreclosure

By Ebube Okoli

The court in deciding Famili v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, 2013 U.S. Dist. (D. Ariz., 2013) reaffirmed the holding that “Arizona’s non-judicial foreclosure statutes do not require the beneficiary to prove its authority or ‘show the note’ before the trustee may commence a non-judicial foreclosure.”

All counts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint centered on her assertion that whenever the promissory note was transferred or a change was made to the beneficiary of the deed of trust, the holder or beneficiary was required to demonstrate authority for the transfer or substitution. This court noted that each claim of breach of contract and lack of authority put forth by the plaintiff was an iteration of the “show-me-the-note” argument resolved by the Arizona Supreme Court in Hogan v. Wash. Mut. Bank, N.A., 230 Ariz. 584, 277 P.3d 781, 782 (Ariz. 2012).

Thus, as a matter of Arizona law, the court found the plaintiff’s argument without merit.

May 2, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments

Court Rejects Arguments that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. Lacked the Authority to Assign Mortgage

By Ebube Okoli

The court in deciding Jones v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. (W.D. Mich., 2013) granted defendant Nationstar’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff alleged that the foreclosure of his property was unlawful for the following reasons: (1) Nationstar refused to accept his payment of $1,019.74; (2) Nationstar failed to produce the original note with the red blood signature; (3) Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) lacked the authority to assign the mortgage; (4) Plaintiff was not afforded sufficient due process; and (5) Nationstar lacked standing to seek foreclosure. Defendants moved for summary judgment.

Plaintiff had responded to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. However, this court found that the plaintiff had failed to submit any evidence challenging, refuting, or otherwise calling into doubt the evidence submitted by the defendant.

Instead, the court found that the plaintiff had submitted several exhibits that supported the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff had also submitted an affidavit in which he asserted irrelevant matters such as the fact that the defendant Nationstar “was not a human being” and defendants “did not have the rights of a natural human being.”

This court found that to the extent that plaintiff had asserted relevant facts, such did not advance plaintiff’s position.

May 2, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments

New Jersey Court Finds that Plaintiff had Both Possession of the Original Note and Assignment

By Ebube Okoli

The court in deciding Assets Recovery 23, LLC v. Odoemene, 2013 N.J. Super. (App.Div., 2013) this court affirmed the ruling of the lower court that the plaintiff was permitted to foreclose.

In this foreclosure matter, defendants Emmanuel C. Odoemene and Doris D. Odoemene appealed from a June 11, 2012 Chancery Division order, which granted summary judgment to plaintiff Assets Recovery 23, LLC and dismissed defendants’ answer, and denied defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss the complaint. After considering the plaintiff’s contentions this court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

On appeal, defendants merely reiterated that plaintiff lacked standing because it did not physically possess the note at the time it filed the foreclosure complaint. They also argued that the April 2011 assignment did not properly assign the note; however, the court found this argument to be lacking.

This court also found that the evidence in this case clearly established that plaintiff had standing when it filed the foreclosure complaint. Here, the plaintiff had both possession of the original note and an assignment of the mortgage and note prior to filing the complaint.

May 2, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments

May 1, 2014

Stressing out on Fannie and Freddie

By David Reiss

The Federal Housing Finance Agency issued Projections of the Enterprises’ Financial Performance (Stress Tests) (Apr. 30, 2014). This is a pretty technical, but important, document. The Background section provides some needed context:

This report provides updated information on possible ranges of future financial results of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the “Enterprises”) under specified scenarios, using consistent economic conditions for both Enterprises.

*     *     *

. . . the Dodd-Frank Act requires certain financial companies with total consolidated assets of more than $10 billion, and which are regulated by a primary Federal financial regulatory agency, to conduct annual stress tests to determine whether the companies have the capital necessary to absorb losses as a result of adverse economic conditions. This year is the initial implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests.

In addition to stress tests required per the Dodd-Frank Act, this year as in previous years, FHFA worked with the Enterprises to develop forward-looking financial projections across three possible house price paths (the “FHFA scenarios”). The Enterprises were required to conduct the FHFA scenarios as they have in the past, in conjunction with the initial implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests.

*     *     *

The projections reported here are not expected outcomes. They are modeled projections in response to “what if” exercises based on assumptions about Enterprise operations, loan performance, macroeconomic and financial market conditions, and house prices. The projections do not define the full range of possible outcomes. Actual outcomes may be very different. (4, emphasis in the original)

 The stress test results are as follows:

Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests Severely Adverse Scenario

  • As of September 30, 2013, the Enterprises have drawn $187.5 billion from the U.S. Treasury under the terms of the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (the “PSPAs”).
  • The combined remaining funding commitment under the PSPAs as of September 30, 2013 was $258.1 billion.
  • In the Severely Adverse scenario, incremental Treasury Draws range between $84.4 billion and $190.0 billion depending on the treatment of deferred tax assets.
  • The remaining funding commitment under the PSPAs ranges between $173.7 billion and $68.0 billion. (3)

FHFA Scenarios

  • In the FHFA scenarios, cumulative, combined Treasury draws at the end of 2015 remain unchanged at $187.5 billion as neither Enterprise requires additional Treasury draws in any of the three scenarios.
  • The combined remaining commitment under the PSPAs is unchanged at $258.1 billion.
  • In the three scenarios the Enterprises pay additional senior preferred dividends to the US Treasury ranging between $54.0 billion to $36.3 billion. (3)

There are a number of important points to keep in mind when reviewing this report. First, it addresses just four scenarios out of the the multitude of possible ones. But hopefully the Severely Adverse Scenario gives us a sense of the outer limits of what a crisis could do to the Enterprises and the taxpayers who backstop them.

Second, the report is another corrective to arguments that the federal government’s bailout of the Enterprises can be measured by the amount of money that they actually advanced to the two companies, as opposed to a measure that also accounts for the additional amount that the federal government is committed to provide them if their financial situation takes a turn for the worse.

Finally, as I have noted before, there is an important political battle for control of the narrative of the bailout of the Enterprises. The only narrative during the crisis itself was that the federal government bailed out the two companies because they were insolvent. Revisionist histories, put forward in the main by private shareholders of the two Enterprises, challenge that narrative. The shareholders put forth another version of history: the federal government effectively stole  solvent, viable Fannie and Freddie from them. It will be important for objective third parties to document the truth about this in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. From my understanding of the facts, however, it is clear that the two companies were as good as dead when the federal government put them into conservatorship in 2008 and started advancing them tens of billions of dollars year after year until their fortunes turned around in 2012.

May 1, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments

Court Dismissed Minn. Stat. § 559.01 Claims

By Ebube Okoli

The court in deciding Lubbers v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. (D. Minn., 2013) dismissed plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiffs sought to invalidate the foreclosure of the mortgage on their home. Plaintiffs asserted three claims against defendant: (1) quiet-title, to determine adverse claims under Minn. Stat. § 559.01; (2) declaratory judgment; and (3) slander of title.

Plaintiffs alleged the following causes of action:

In count I, plaintiffs asserted a quiet title action pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 559.01, and sought a determination regarding Deutsche Bank’s adverse interest in the Property. According to plaintiffs, in a quiet title action, the burden of proof was on the mortgagee asserting an adverse interest in the property to show that both record title and legal title concur and co-exist at the same time and in the same entity to foreclose by advertisement.

In count II, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment under Minn. Stat. § 555.02 that the various assignments of mortgage, notices of pendency, and powers of attorney were all void, and that plaintiffs remain the owner of the property in fee title.

Count III, plaintiff alleged slander of title, plaintiffs asserted that Wilford, acted at direction of Deutsche Bank, drafted and recorded documents that were false and not executed by legally authorized persons, and that Deutsche Bank knew that the documents were false because unauthorized persons executed the power of attorneys and the assignments of mortgage.

As relief, plaintiffs sought: (1) a determination of adverse interest in the Property; (2) a declaration that the sheriff’s certificate of sale, the various assignments of mortgage, notices of pendency, and powers of attorney are all void; (3) a declaration that plaintiffs remain the owner of the Property in fee title; and (4) money damages. Id., Prayer for Relief.

After considering the plaintiff’s claims, this court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

May 1, 2014 | Permalink | No Comments