July 15, 2013
Indiana Supreme Court Allows Citimortgage to Intervene in ReCasa’s Foreclosure Proceeding
In Citi v. Barnabas, 975 N.E.2d 805 (Ind. 2012), the Indiana Supreme Court held that Citimortgage had a right to intervene in ReCasa’s foreclosure proceeding and sale since Citi held a first mortgage on the property, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals and trial court.
The homeowner, Barnabas, granted a first mortgage on the property in 2005 to Irwin Mortgage Corp. (Irwin) with MERS designated as nominee and mortgagee, which later assigned the mortgage to Citimortgage (Citi). In 2007, Barnabas granted a second mortgage to ReCasa. Barnabas defaulted on the second mortgage and ReCasa commenced foreclosure proceedings in 2009. In response to the foreclosure proceedings, Irwin filed a disclaimer of interest in the property. When Citi learned the property was already sold through ReCasa’s foreclosure sale, Citi filed a motion to intervene, which was denied by the trial court. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision.
The Supreme Court found the trial court erred in denying Citi’s motion, as ReCasa didn’t dispute the validity of the assignment from MERS to Citi, but rather argued that MERS lacked a property interest, and therefore so did Citi. However, the court stated that “the assignee of rights under a contract stands in the shoes of the assignor and can assert any rights that the assignor could have asserted,” citing Lake Cnty. Trust Co. v. Household Merch., Inc., 511 N.E.2d 512, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) giving MERS the same property interest as the original lender.
When examining the mortgage language, the court found MERS’s designation as both “nominee” and “mortgagee” to be conflicting based on standard definitions for both terms, rendering the mortgage ambiguous. To determine MERS’s interest, the court looked to the parties’ intent and found that the legal title held by MERS was sufficient to give MERS foreclosure rights, acting as agent for the lender, Irwin.
ReCasa further argued that Irwin’s disclaimer of interest extinguished MERS’s property rights. The court notes that MERS has an agency relationship not only to Irwin, but also to all its member banks, and therefore does not disclaim the interests of another member bank in the property, such as Citi.
Although Citi’s motion to intervene was untimely, the court held that if Citi were not permitted to intervene, its interest would be destroyed in its entirety, prejudicing Citi. The court further noted that although intervention is typically “disfavored,” it is appropriate in certain “extraordinary and unusual circumstances,” particularly when “the petitioner’s rights cannot otherwise be protected.” Bd. of Comm’rs of Benton Cnty. v. Whistler, 455 N.E.2d 1149, 1153–54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). Furthermore, Citi’s delay in filing was a direct result of ReCasa’s failure to notice either Citi or MERS of the foreclosure proceedings. ReCasa argued that notice to an attorney representing Citi in the Barnabas bankruptcy proceeding provided Citi with actual knowledge of the foreclosure. But the court held that “actual knowledge of the suit does not satisfy due process or give the court in personam jurisdiction.” Overhouser v. Fowler, 549 N.E.2d 71, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Glennar Mercury Lincoln, Inc. v. Riley, 167 Ind. App. 144, 152, 338 N.E.2d 670, 675 (1975)).
The court was hesitant to outline MERS’s rights as a mortgagee under Indiana statute, though it noted the original statute might soon require modernization to account for changes in the mortgage industry.
July 15, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Florida Court Dismisses Class Action Against MERS Over Unpaid Recording Fees
The court in Fuller v. MERS, No. 11cv-1153 (M.D. Fla., June 27, 2012) was “confronted with an old problem: the difficulty of reconciling new technology with old law, thus raising the centuries old separation of powers controversy.” In deciding this case the court found that the Florida statute, which created the recording system, was a creature of statute, as such the remedy the plaintiff sought was to be granted by the legislature and not the courts.
In reaching its decision, the court found that the statute creating Florida’s public recording system did not provide a private right of action, as such Fuller was barred from bringing common law claims based on the statute. Fuller’s claims included civil conspiracy, a Writ of Quo Warranto, unjust enrichment, as well as fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. Fuller claimed that these claims were independent of the Florida statute, however, he admitted that the statute was the only source of his authority.
The court found that all of Fuller’s claims failed on their merits. Fuller argued that MERS attempted to usurp his function as the recorder of public instruments and sought a Writ of Quo Warranto. However, MES successfully argued that no law required payment of recording fees when a mortgage is assigned but not recorded.
Fuller failed to establish a conspiracy, as MERS did not commit an unlawful act. The court noted that the recording of mortgages is “at the complete discretion of the party wishing to record the document.” Accordingly, MERS was under no legal obligation to record the assignment or pay the recording fees. Fuller’s unjust enrichment claim was also rejected, as MERS had no duty to record, so Fuller could not establish that he had conferred any benefit on MERS. Lastly, Fuller’s fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation claims were based on the assumption that MERS falsely designated itself as the mortgagee on recorded instruments. The court rejected this assumption.
July 15, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Oregon District Court Finds Claim Preclusion Bars Stop-Foreclosure Action
In Buckland v. MERS, Or. 11-3053-CL (2011) the court dealt with res judicata and the plaintiff relitigating the same claims that were raised or could have been raised in a previous action. The court found that the same factual transaction was at issue in the plaintiff’s prior litigation and at issue in the present case. Both actions arose out of the same non-judicial foreclosure proceeding associated with the loan on the plaintiff’s property.
The plaintiff had named Aurora Loan Services as sole defendant in his state action and MERS as a nominee for American Mortgage Network as sole defendant in the current action, although he referenced each of the parties in the complaints filed in both actions and challenged foreclosure of his property in both actions. As agents for the lender, the relationship between Aurora and MERS was close enough such that the court found the parties to be in privity. Since claim preclusion applies to a party to an earlier action and to a person who was not a party in the earlier action but who was in privity with the party to the earlier action, the plaintiff’s claim was precluded.
The court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims brought in this action, which arose out of the same factual transaction as the previous litigation, the court found that the claims could have been brought in those proceedings. Accordingly the claims were thus barred by claim preclusion.
July 15, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
Bank of America and MERS Motion for Dismissal Granted Against Homeowner-Plaintiff in Reconsideration of Order Denying Preliminary Injunction in Foreclosure Proceeding
In Harris v. Americas Wholesale Lender, No. 2011-659-CH (Macomb Cty. Cir. Ct. June 8, 2011) the court granted the defendant’s motion for dismissal of all the homeowner-plaintiff’s claims in foreclosure proceeding.
Defendants Countrywide, Bank of America, and MERS moved for summary disposition against plaintiff-homeowner under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8). Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the lower court’s denial for preliminary injunction and another motion for entry of default judgment.
Plaintiff alleged five counts; [1] fraud, [2] breach of contract, [3] collusion, [4] conversion, and finally [5] unjust enrichment. In assessing these claims the court found that they were all without merit.
In regards to the plaintiff’s alleged fraud claim the court dismissed it as frivolous as plaintiff could not, and had not, produced any evidence to support the allegation. Upon considering the second count, the court likewise dismissed as the plaintiff failed to show any cognizable allegation of a breach of contract.
The claim of collusion was also dismissed as the court found that the plaintiff failed to plead the claim with particularity. Accordingly, the claim of conversion was also dismissed as the plaintiff failed to explain, to the court’s satisfaction, how a claim of conversion could be supported. Finally, the claim of unjust enrichment was found to be without merit, as the court found that the plaintiff failed to show how an unjust enrichment took place.
July 12, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
July 11, 2013
FHA Whitewash, Redux
Richard Brooks and Carol Rose have recently published their book Saving the Neighborhood: Racially Restrictive Covenants, Law, and Social Norms. This well-written book brings to mind my recent post on the FHA Whitewash which reviewed a recent paper by HUD-affiliated researchers. The paper minimized the role that the FHA played in furthering housing discrimination. I mentioned that Kenneth Jackson’s classic book, Crabgrass Frontier, documented this sorry chapter of the FHA’s history. Saving The Neighborhood covers some of the same ground, but from a legal and legal history perspective. By doing so, it adds depth and texture to the historic record.
The book makes clear just how much of a role the FHA played. The FHA’s
Underwriting Manual reflected private developers’ and brokers’ views of the kinds of features that made housing values stable and secure. Those features clearly included racial segregation. In a section on “Protection from Adverse influences,” the Manual stated bluntly that “[a] change in social or racial occupancy generally leads to instability and a reduction in values” (par. 233). Thus property evaluators were to investigate the surrounding areas for the presence of “incompatible racial and social groups” and to assess whether the location might be “invaded” (par. 233). The Manual specifically noted that deed restrictions on “racial occupancy” could create a “favorable condition” (par. 228). in the section on subdivisions that were still in the development stage, the Manual recommended deed restrictions that included, among other matters, “. . . (g) Prohibition of the occupancy of properties except by the race for which they are intended” (par. 284(3)). (109)
The authors argue that these preferences gave developers, even those who did not favor segregation, an incentive to employ racially restrictive covenants in their projects. (110)
The FHA’s record of racial discrimination during the first few decades of its existence is clear, for all to see.
July 11, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
First Circuit Grants Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff-Homeowner’s Suit to Preclude Foreclosure Sale
The court in McKenna v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Case No. 11-1650 (C.A. 1, Aug. 16, 2012) was faced with questions relating to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Here, Wells Fargo’s primary assertion in its removal papers – “that there was federal question jurisdiction present in the case” – turned out to be mistaken as no federal claim was present. However, diversity jurisdiction was found to be sufficient enough to support the state statutory claims that were asserted in the complaint.
Wells Fargo brought a foreclosure action against the plaintiff [McKenna], the plaintiff responded by asserting a right to rescind the mortgage and then filed suit to preclude the foreclosure sale.
The plaintiff claimed a right to rescind on the grounds that [1] Wells Fargo had provided her with only one Truth in Lending disclosure statement at the time of the loan rather than two copies, and [2] Wells Fargo had understated the finance charge in its Truth in Lending statement by more than $35. The lower court then issued a preliminary injunction restraining Wells Fargo from taking further action to sell the plaintiff’s home.
On March 10, 2010, Wells Fargo removed the case to the federal district court in Massachusetts. Wells Fargo asserted that federal question jurisdiction existed. The bank then moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the district court granted the motion. On review, the court found that diversity jurisdiction existed as Wells Fargo was a bank and a citizen of the state where it is “located.” The bank’s location being North Dakota, and the plaintiff being a citizen of Massachusetts, allowed for diversity jurisdiction.
On review the court determined that the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Wells Fargo made certain misrepresentations. However, the court found that the plaintiff failed to specify the time or place of these misrepresentations or their real content and, as the district court held, these assertions were “too vague to meet the particularity requirement of Rule 9.” The First Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling. Further, the suit was not timely under the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635(a), and the complaint failed to state claims under the equivalent state law.
July 11, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments
July 12, 2013
Ain’t Misrepresentin’
By David Reiss
According to Wikipedia, the performers in the musical Ain’t Misbehavin’ “present an evening of rowdy, raunchy, and humorous songs that encapsulate the various moods of the era and reflect” a “view of life as a journey meant for pleasure and play.” In U.S. RMBS Roundtable: Arrangers And Investors Discuss The Role Of Representations And Warranties In U.S. RMBS Transactions, S&P does something similar with securitization. It presents the views of industry players as they try to predict and shape the future of the recently emerging private-label RMBS market, in the hopes of “achieving a healthy and sustainable RMBS market.” (2)
ACT I: Lookin’ Good but Feelin’ Bad
The piece contains a lot of important insights, including the following point made by investors: “standardizing R&Ws would be a step towards improving the transparency and their ease of understanding. Smaller investors noted that they can be particularly limited in distinguishing R&Ws given the complexities involved.” (3)
This point encapsulates in so many words the classic market for lemons problem, famously formalized by George Akerlof. The lemon problem leads us to ask how a buyer is to price a purchase where the buyer has less information about the product than the seller. Because of this information assymetry, the purchaser will assume the worst about the product and offer to buy it with that in mind.
R&Ws are an attempt to overcome that problem because the RMBS arranger or the mortgage originator promises to compensate the investor for lemons that are contained with a mortgage pool securing an RMBS. Consistent with that view, investors noted that “they expected to be compensated for losses caused by origination defects, rather than legitimate life events.” (2) In other words, origination defects are the lemons that should be borne by the arranger/originator with its superior information about the mortgages. And “legitimate life events” represent the credit risk that the investors have signed up for.
ACT II: That Ain’t Right
Arrangers and originators made the following points:
These points clearly align with the interests of the seller in a market for lemons. To restate them a bit, 1. caveat emptor; 2. arrangers and originators don’t sell lemons (!); and (3) it is too hard to come up with provisions that consistently protect investors so don’t bother trying.
ENCORE: Find Out What They Like
S&P notes that there “was broad agreement that one of the keys to achieving a healthy and sustainable RMBS market is aligning the interests of arrangers and investors.” (2) From that broader perspective, S&P is right that the industry should work toward a state of affairs that “minimizes the cost of unknown risks and ultimately reduces losses and related litigation.” (2) Given the spate of lawsuits over reps and warranties, we had fallen shy of that mark in the past (here, for example). It remains to be seen if the industry can get it better next time and if the incentives are aligned enough to do so.
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July 12, 2013 | Permalink | No Comments