Tag Archives: FIRREA

DoJ All FIRREA-ed Up With S&P Suit

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Law360 quoted me in a story, Prosecutors Unleashed As $5B S&P Action Rolls On (behind a paywall), about DoJ’s success in fending off S&P’s motion to dismiss its FIRREA case. It reads in part

While the latest ruling against S&P was lighter on substance, Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss called it “a very big deal.”

“It adds to a body of law that gives the government another powerful tool to go after alleged misdeeds by financial institutions,” he said.

The suit, launched in February to much fanfare, targets S&P’s top-notch ratings for complex mortgage-backed securities that later failed. As part of a controversial, widespread practice known as the “issuer pays” model, banks created the securities, paid S&P to rate them and then sold them to investors. The DOJ claims S&P mismarked the securities on purpose to keep clients happy and boost profits.

In its motion to dismiss, the firm argued its public statements touting the ratings as objective, based on solid data and unaffected by potential conflicts of interest amounted to “puffery” and therefore could not form the basis of a fraud suit against S&P and parent company McGraw-Hill Cos. Inc.

But Judge Carter ruled Tuesday that the DOJ had sufficiently alleged S&P’s statements were not general, subjective claims, but were based on specific policies and procedures governing how the firm “shall” or “must not” rate securities. The judge called the firm’s puffery argument “deeply and unavoidably troubling when you take a moment to consider its implications.”

“Despite defendants’ protestations to the contrary, the court cannot find that all of these ‘shalls’ and ‘must nots’ are the mere aspirational musings of a corporation setting out vague goals for its future,” the judge wrote in an 18-page order. “Rather, they are specific assertions of current and ongoing policies that stand in stark contrast to the behavior alleged by the government’s complaint.”

Judge Carter also found the DOJ had sufficiently claimed S&P defrauded investors who had relied upon the ratings in determining the credit risk of certain investments. And the judge ruled the government did not have to plead “with a high degree of particularity” that S&P intentionally issued false ratings because the suit was filed under FIRREA. Tougher pleading requirements set out in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which governs many securities suits, therefore do not apply, the judge ruled.

S&P spokesman Ed Sweeney noted Wednesday that the ruling did not address the merits of the case, as the judge was required to accept the government’s factual allegations as true during the early stages of litigation.

“We now welcome the opportunity to demonstrate the lack of merit to the Department of Justice’s complaint,” Sweeney said. “We firmly believe S&P’s ratings were and are independent, and expect to show just that in court.”

The decision followed a tentative July 8 ruling by Judge Carter. And indeed, given the sheer amount of resources the government has devoted to the case, the finding should have come as no surprise, according to Jacob Frenkel, an attorney at Shulman Rogers Gandal Pordy & Ecker PA who chairs the firm’s securities enforcement practice.

“When you have a deep-pocketed client that is willing to fight, a good lawyer will exhaust all options and remedies,” Frenkel said of S&P’s motion. “It would have been unreasonable to believe it stood any chance of success, but that does not mean you don’t try.”

Still, Judge Carter’s takedown should give the firm pause as it weighs whether to fight the claims or strike a settlement, according to Reiss, the Brooklyn professor.

“We now have a sense that the judge’s take on the guts of the case is pretty favorable to the government,” Reiss said. “And we’re now seeing the rating agencies start to crumble a little bit after their decades-long run of avoiding either settling or losing at trial.”

What Was S&P Puffing?

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I have been closely following DoJ’s suit against S&P since the complaint was filed in February (and see here, here and here).  DoJ alleges that S&P “issued or confirmed ratings that did not accurately reflect true credit risks” and seeks to obtain civil penalties pursuant to FIRREA. (4) Yesterday, Judge Carter issued a doozy of an order, denying S&P’s motion to dismiss the case.

Let’s remember that for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the judge takes as true all of the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint.  So, if a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, it means that the legal theory of the case is sound and that the plaintiff can win if the facts are as it alleges.

This should be the scariest passage in the order, as far as S&P is concerned:

Defendants lead off with a proposition that is deeply and unavoidably troubling when you take a moment to consider its implications.  They claim that, out of all the public statements that S&P made to investors, issuers, regulators, and legislators regarding the company’s procedures for providing objective, data-based credit ratings that were unaffected by potential conflicts of interest, not one statement should have been relied upon by investors, issuers, regulators, or legislators who needed to be able to count on objective, data-based credit ratings. (7-8)

This is repudiation of S&P’s “puffery” defense: their statements about their objectivity and rigorous methodology were merely “non-actionable puffery” along the lines of Charmin’s claim that it is the softest of all toilet papers. (8)

The Court follows this line of thought through to its logical conclusion:

if no investor believed in S&P’s objectivity, and every bank had access to the same information and models as S&P, is S&P asserting that, as a matter of law, the company’s credit ratings service added absolutely zero material value as a predictor of creditworthiness? (12)

One wonders how S&P executives responded to their lawyers when they proposed this argument — were they thinking about anything else other than winning this motion?  Did they consider how regulators might react to this argument?

And, while this goes beyond the matter at hand, the Court’s reaction to S&P’s argument is an implicit indictment of the business model of the major rating agencies: they are really in the business of selling licenses to access the capital markets more than they are in the business of issuing mini-editorials about the creditworthiness of securities, as they have successfully argued in previous cases challenging their ratings.

The Devil is in the Statute of Limitations

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NY Supreme Court Justice Kornreich (N.Y. County) issued an opinion ACE Securities Corp. v. DB Structured Products Inc., No. 650980/2012 (May 13, 2013) that diverges in approach from an earlier SDNY opinion as to whether the statute of limitations runs “from the execution of the contract.” (5) The case concerns allegations that an MBS securitizer made false representations about the loans that underlay the MBS.

Kornreich held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the MBS securitizer (a Deutsche Bank affiliate) “improperly rejected the Trustee’s repurchase demand” so long as the Trustee did not “wait an unreasonable time to make the demand.” (7) (On a side note, Kornreich also held that the plaintiff in such a case is not required “to set forth which of the specific loans are affected by false” representations in a breach of contract claim. (7))

This really opens up the statute of limitations under NY law. There has been a lot of speculation that the flood of lawsuits arising from the Subprime Boom would have to come to an end because the statute of limitations covering many of the claims was six years.  A variety of developments has extended the possibility of filing a suit.  There is FIRREA‘s ten year statute of limitations. There is NY’s Martin Act, with its lengthy statutes of limitation. And now there is this expansive reading of NY’s statute of limitations for breach of contract actions.

Although one might think that all of the good cases have been filed already, you never know. And with the ACE Securities Corp. case, we can see how a case can be filed more than six years after the contract was entered into, under certain circumstances.

 

Standard & Poor Puffery

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The Department of Justice filed its opposition to S&P’s Motion to Dismiss the federal government’s FIRREA lawsuit.  At this stage of the litigation, it appears as if the key issue is whether S&P’s alleged misrepresentations about its business practices are actionable false statements or are mere “puffery” as S&P’s lawyers describe them in their brief (passim).  Let’s put aside the fact that describing your professional standards, principles and guidelines as “puffery” seems like a very bad long-term strategy (imagine the line of questioning at a Congressional hearing about S&P’s role as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization).

But putting that cringer aside, S&P does raise a legitimate legal issue which relies heavily on Boca Raton Firefighters and Police Pension Fund v. Bahash, 12-1776-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2012). In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs-investors’ claims because S&P’s statements regarding the “integrity and credibility and the objectivity of” its ratings were “the type of mere ‘puffery’ that we have previously held to be not actionable.” (6)

DoJ responds that “S&P rests its “’puffery’ defense primarily on [Boca] an unpublished, out-of-circuit opinion addressing securities fraud claims by S&P shareholders.” (opposition brief at 7). These are not substantive critiques of the Boca opinion, of course, so the 9th Circuit could well find the reasoning compelling.

But DoJ further argues that “the focus of the action here is the effect of S&P’s statements not on S&P shareholders [as in Boca], but on investors in the RMBS and CDOs S&P rated.  This is a crucial difference.” (Id.)

Will Judge Carter agree?

FIRREA Flies

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Law360 interviewed me about the federal government’s continuing reliance on FIRREA in Prosecutors Get Last Laugh In $1B BofA Fraud Case (behind a paywall):

A controversial legal theory at the heart of a $1 billion mortgage fraud suit against Bank of America Corp. could become a go-to enforcement tool for civil prosecutors in the wake of a New York federal judge’s surprise ruling Wednesday, experts say.

U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff pared the suit in a two-page order, granting BofA’s motion to dismiss False Claims Act allegations but keeping alive claims under the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery Enforcement Act, an anti-fraud law passed in the wake of the 1980s savings-and-loan crisis.

FIRREA allows civil prosecutors to sue entities that negatively “affect” the stability of federally insured banks. Seizing on a broad interpretation of that term, prosecutors have launched several suits in recent years accusing firms of affecting themselves, prompting an outcry from Wall Street and the defense bar.

Judge Rakoff said during an April 29 hearing that he was “troubled” by the government’s use of FIRREA to sue BofA, prompting many in the securities bar to be taken by surprise by Wednesday’s ruling. It comes two weeks after U.S. District Judge Lewis Kaplan refused to dismiss FIRREA claims against Bank of New York Mellon Corp. in a suit alleging the bank defrauded forex customers.

The rulings by Judges Kaplan and Rakoff suggest a consensus is beginning to form within the judiciary that FIRREA may be interpreted broadly, according to David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School. That could pose challenges for financial institutions, he said.

“There seems to be a greater interest now in pursuing financial wrongdoing,” he said. “With FIRREA, it’s a whole new game.”

And the law’s generous 10-year statute of limitations could give new life to allegations of misconduct during the financial meltdown, Reiss said.

“If FIRREA continues to be interpreted broadly, it ensures the government will still have a tool to bring claims,” he said.

Reiss on FIRREA!

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Law360 quoted me in a story, Rakoff Ruling In $1B BofA Case May Halt DOJ Hot Streak, that reflects some judicial skepticism about the federal government’s broad reading of FIRREA:

Prosecutors have seized on an obscure 1989 law to launch a series of splashy cases against banks in recent years, but a prominent New York federal judge with a penchant for scrutinizing government actions could soon reverse the trend in a $1 billion mortgage fraud suit against Bank of America Corp.

The Financial Institutions Reform Recovery Enforcement Act, enacted in the wake of the savings and loan crisis, allows the government to sue entities that negatively “affect” the stability of federally insured banks. The law was used sparingly for decades, but it has been dusted off in a series of recent complaints that seek to hold firms liable for hurting their own stability. In the BofA case, for example, the bank is accused of putting its health at risk by selling shoddy loans that were later packaged into securities.

U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff is threatening to stem the tide. He said at an April 29 hearing that he was “troubled” by the government’s novel interpretation of FIRREA and vowed to issue a formal ruling on the issue by May 13.

*  *  *

“The federal government is searching for different theories of liability, and FIRREA is incredibly attractive right now,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School. “I have no doubt this issue will rise in the court of appeals, and potentially make its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.”

Judge Rakoff’s call is expected to have a ripple effect either way. A decision allowing the government to sue banks for self-inflicted wounds may embolden prosecutors to launch even more cases, experts say.

A ruling in favor of BofA would be a coup for financial institutions as they seek to limit legal exposure from the crisis, according to Reiss.

But if the government loses FIRREA as a fraud enforcement tool, it won’t be out of options. The BofA case and some other FIRREA actions also include claims under the federal False Claims Act, which allows prosecutors to collect treble damages and penalties.

“As Judge Rakoff seems to say, I don’t think this issue has been settled,” Reiss said.

FIRREA Factors for Determining Civil Penalties

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Andrew Schilling, Ross Morrison and Michelle Rogers wrote a short article (here, behind a paywall) about a recent case, U.S. v Menendez, No. C.V. 11-06313 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6., 2013) that sets forth the eight factors that are to govern the determination of civil penalties under FIRREA.  Menendez had defrauded HUD by lying on a form submitted to HUD as to the existence of any “hidden terms or special understandings” relating to the underlying short sale transaction. (3) The court stated that the relevant factors are

  1. the good or bad faith of the defendant and the degree of his or her scienter;
  2. the injury to the public and loss or risk of loss for other persons;
  3. the egregiousness of the violation;
  4. the isolated or repeated nature of the violation;
  5. the defendant’s financial condition and ability to pay;
  6. the criminal fine that could be levied for the conduct;
  7. the amount the defendant sought to profit through the fraud; and
  8. the penalty range available under FIRREA. (10-13)

The case is important because it provides guidance, which has been lacking, to courts as they apply this untested statute to civil fraud cases.  And given that this case arose in the same jurisdiction in which the DoJ sued S&P, alleging violations of FIRREA, this guidance may be particularly useful.  On the other hand, the facts of this case (dealing with one instance of fraud by one individual) are quite different from those that in the other cases that the government has brought pursuant to FIRREA, which typically involve allegations of fraud by large financial institutions.

As a side note, it is interesting that the federal government took full advantage of FIRREA’s ten year statute of limitations as it filed this suit in 2011 for actions that occurred in 2002.