Tag Archives: foreclosure

California Court Finds That Defendants Complied With Statutory Mandate That the Notice of Default Include Sufficient Contact Information

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The court in deciding Wagma Safi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147005 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) ultimately granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.

In her first cause of action, the plaintiff asked for declaratory relief in the form of a judicial declaration that the plaintiff had the right to reinstate the loan for which the deed of trust was collateral, and that the defendants were required to provide her with the information necessary to do so.

The court dismissed the plaintiff’s first cause of action for declaratory relief. Despite defendants’’ alleged refusal to provide plaintiff with information regarding the loan, their compliance with the notice requirements of section 2924c(b)(1) provided plaintiff with sufficient information to exercise her right to reinstate the loan.

In her second cause of action, plaintiff asked for declaratory relief, contending that “Bank of America was the sole beneficiary under the deed of trust and that MERS had no authority to transfer or assign any rights under the deed” Plaintiff alleged that MERS signed the deed of trust “solely as nominee” and thus lacked the authority to assign its interest to a third party.

The court found that plaintiff made no showing that would call into question the validity of MERS’ assignment. The court found that she failed to state a claim and the second cause of action was dismissed.

California Court Dismisses Show-Me-the-Note Claim

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The court in deciding Newman v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147562 (E.D. Cal. 2013) granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint.

Plaintiff (Newman) argued that he was not challenging the authorization to foreclose, nor was he requiring defendants to “produce the note.” Rather, he was challenging whether the correct entity is initiating foreclosure. He claimed that BONY did not have the right to enforce the mortgage because it did not own the loan, the note, or the mortgage.

Plaintiff alleged claims for declaratory relief, quasi-contract, California Civil Code § 2923.5, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et. seq.) (“FDCPA”),California Business & Professions Code § 17200 (“UCL”), and negligence.

Defendants argue that dismissal is appropriate for several reasons. First, Newman could not bring an action to determine whether the person initiating the foreclosure was authorized to do so. Second, Newman’s allegations that the assignments of the deed of trust involved illegible signatures and “robo-signers” were irrelevant. Third, Newman had no standing to challenge any violations of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”).

After reviewing the arguments the court found that the claims for declaratory relief, quasi-contract, under Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5, and under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) failed because any claims that were based on violation of the pooling and servicing agreement were not viable, the borrower was estopped from arguing that the assignment violated the automatic stay, and the allegations of fraudulent assignments were insufficient and implausible.

The negligence claim also failed. The claim under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (UCL) failed because the complaint did not state a claim for violation of the FDCPA, Cal. Penal Code § 532f(a)(4) could not have formed the basis of a UCL claim, and no violation of the Security First Rule was apparent.

Utah Court Dismisses HAMP, RICO, ECOA, RESPA & FDCPA Claims

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The court in deciding Cornia v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149592 (D. Utah 2013) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs’ claims based on securitization, assignment to MERs, or “robo-signing,” were dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiffs’ complaint sought to quiet title in the property in plaintiffs’ names. As the basis for this relief, plaintiffs claimed that defendant (1) engaged in predatory lending, mail fraud, and wire fraud, (2) violated the Real Estate Settlement  Procedures Act (“RESPA”), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), Homeowners Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”), Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act and other statutes, regulations and unspecified consent orders, (3) fraudulently “robosigned,” the deeds of trust, and (4) securitized the loan.

Defendant moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) and also pursuant to FRCP 8(a) and 9(a)(2) to dismiss all Plaintiffs’ claims. After considering both arguments, the court granted defendant’s motion.

Michigan Court Dismisses MCPA & HOEPA Claims

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The court in deciding Huff v. Fannie Mae, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148053 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 2013) granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff advanced a claim against defendants for quiet title (Count I) and alleged that defendants violated the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”) (Count II). In response plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Defendants asserted that all of the plaintiff’s claims should be barred either by res judicata or by the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Additionally, defendants argued that plaintiff’s quiet title claim; claims under the MCPA, and HOEPA lacked the factual allegations required for the court to find in plaintiff’s favor.

Plaintiff asserted that his complaint adequately plead claims against defendants for quiet title and violations of state and federal law. The court ultimately found that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Illinois Court Finds Statute of Limitation Barres TILA & Fraud Claims

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The court in deciding Gater v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149872 (N.D. Ill. 2013) granted Bank of America’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff alleged violations of Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, et seq. claim (Count I), and an Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Fraud Act), 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq. claim (Count II). Bank of America moved to dismiss the action.

The court found that the statute of limitations periods barred plaintiff’s claims, thus the court granted the motion to dismiss.

Washington Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s State Consumer Protection Act Claim

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The court in deciding Massey v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148402 (W.D. Wash. 2013) granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

Plaintiff Cindy T. Massey claimed that Northwest Trustee’s conduct in connection with the nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on her property violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”). Ms. Massey had not filed an opposition to Northwest Trustee’s motion for summary judgment. The court considered Northwest Trustee’s motion, all submissions filed in support, the applicable law, and the balance of the record. After considering the arguments, the court eventually granted Northwest Trustee’s motion.

A Shared Appreciation for Underwater Mortgages

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New York State’s Department of Financial Services has proposed a rule that would allow for “shared appreciation” of a property’s value if an underwater loan is refinanced. The Department states that this will provide a helpful option for underwater homeowners facing foreclosure. If a homeowner were to take a shared appreciation mortgage, he or she would get a principal reduction (and thus lower monthly payments) in exchange for giving up as much as fifty percent of the increase in the home’s value, payable when the property is sold or the mortgage is satisfied.

The precise formula for the holder of the mortgage is as follows:

The Holder’s share of the Appreciation in Market Value shall be limited to the lesser of:

1. The amount of the reduction in principal (deferred principal), plus interest on such amount calculated from the date of the Shared Appreciation       Agreement to the date of payment based on a rate that is applicable to the Modified Mortgage Loan; or

2. Fifty percent of the amount of Appreciation in Market Value. Section 82-2.6(b).

The principal balance of a shared appreciation mortgage “shall be no greater than: (i) an amount which when combined with other modification factors, such as lower interest rate or term extension, results in monthly payments that are 31% or less of the Mortgagor’s DTI; or (ii) 100% of the Appraised Value.” Section 82-2.11(i). The proposed regulation contains mandatory disclosures for the homeowner, including some examples of how a shared appreciation mortgage can work.

How does this all play out for the homeowner? We should note that similarly situated homeowners can be treated differently in a variety of ways. Here are a few examples. First, two similarly situated homeowners with different incomes can receive different principal balances because of the DTI limitation contained in section 82-2.11(i). Second, similarly situated homeowners can receive different principal balances because their houses appraise for different amounts. And third, different rates of appreciation of homes can make two similarly situated homeowners give up very different absolute dollars in appreciated value.

All of this is to say that homeowners will have to consider many variables in order to evaluate whether a share appreciation mortgage is a good option for them. They should also know that what is a good deal for one homeowner may not be a good deal for a similarly situated one. It is unlikely that the mandatory disclosures will be sufficient to explain this to them in all of its complexity. It is not even clear that loan counselors could do a great job with this either.

I am not arguing that the share appreciation mortgage is a bad innovation. But I do think that lenders will be able evaluate when offering one is a good deal for them while homeowners may have trouble evaluating when accepting one is a good deal on their end. I would guess that many may take one for non-economic reasons — I want to keep my home — and just take their chances as to how it all will play out financially.