Tag Archives: foreclosure

Alabama Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Insufficiently Plead Quiet Title Claim

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The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Western Division, in deciding Orton v. Matthews, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156870 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 1, 2013), granted [defendant] Bank of America’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the FRCP for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiff’s complaint represented an attempt to quiet title to the underlying property in the case. The theory behind plaintiff’s quiet title action was that, as a result of the separation of the note and the mortgage at the time of their execution, the defendant’s alleged security interest in the property was invalidated.

Defendant attacked the plaintiff’s complaint on multiple grounds, asserting that 1) it was devoid of the factual allegations necessary to maintain an action to quiet title, and 2) its only cause of action is almost wholly dependent on a theory of law, the so-called “split the note” theory, that contravenes established Alabama law.

Defendant successfully argued that such deficiencies prevented plaintiff’s complaint from meeting Rule 8’s pleading standard, and require dismissal of this action under Rule 12(b)(6). The court agreed.

Eastern District of California Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Claims of Federal Statutory Violations, Unlawful Foreclosure, Fraud, Equitable Estoppel & Accounting

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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California in deciding Herrejon v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157126 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2013) dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint as it failed to allege cognizable claims. The plaintiff’s complaint purported to allege claims for federal statutory violations, unlawful foreclosure, fraud, equitable estoppel and accounting.

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The plaintiffs (Ricardo G. Herrejon and Rosa E. Navarro-Herrejon) filed this action, which challenged the foreclosure of their property. The plaintiffs also sought to enjoin a November 4, 2013 property foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs’ complaint accused defendants of “unlawful foreclosure.” However, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s action in the absence of viable claims, the court also denied plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief, and entered judgment on dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims.

Central District of California Court Finds Plaintiff Lacks Standing as There Was No “Injury in Fact”

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The United States District Court for the Central District of California in deciding Ellis v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157173 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2013) concluded that plaintiff did not have standing to challenge defendants’ initiating foreclosure proceedings.

Plaintiff brought a complaint with a litany of claims. The claims included (1) dissemination of false advertising pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 52; (2) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA“), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; (3) violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA“), [2] 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; (4) violation of California Civil Code §§ 2923.5 et seq., 2924 et seq., 2932.5, and 1095; (5) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; (6) false advertising pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500; and (7) Quiet Title.

On September 12, 2013, MERS filed a motion to dismiss. The court, as an initial matter, noted that plaintiff failed to explain how she had been injured by defendants’ conduct. The court also noted that the previous foreclosures were rescinded, and plaintiff did not allege a pending foreclosure proceeding. Thus, to have standing to bring her claims, the court noted, “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact.'” Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims granting the defendant’s motion.

Michigan Court Concludes that the Servicer of the Loan Was Not in Violation of the Notice or Loan-Modification Requirements of Michigan’s Foreclosure-by-Advertisement Statute

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The Michigan court in deciding the home mortgage foreclosure case of Pettey v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22299, 2013 FED App. 0936N (6th Cir.), 2013 WL 5832535 (6th Cir. Mich. 2013), concluded that the servicer of the loan was not in violation of the notice or loan-modification requirements of Michigan’s foreclosure-by-advertisement statute, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204, because the mortgagors failed to take action under the statute that would have triggered the servicer’s notice and loan-modification obligations.

In doing so, the court affirmed the district court’s rejection of the mortgagors’ unjust-enrichment and deceptive acts and unfair practices claims. Moreover, the court was persuaded that the district court’s grant of the servicer’s motion to dismiss and denial of the mortgagors’ motion for reconsideration were proper. The court relied on the reasoning handed down by the lower court in their opinion, with the caveat that defects or irregularities in a foreclosure proceeding resulted in a foreclosure that was voidable, not void ab initio.

Washington Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Truth in Lending Act (TILA) Complaint

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The court in deciding Pruss v. Bank of Am. Na, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157286 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2013) found that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by time and or otherwise inadequately pleaded. Therefore, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Pruss, the plaintiff, alleged he had been injured financially by unfair and deceptive lending practices, and brought a complaint with five causes of action. The 5 causes included: (1) predatory lending; (2) violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”); (3) slander of title; (4) breach of duty; and (5) Consumer Protection Act violations. Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the court granted.

In regards to the plaintiff’s predatory lending claim, the court noted that the plaintiff failed to present any case law or Washington state statute recognizing a claim for “predatory lending.” Further, because all of plaintiff’s other claims were time-barred or were deemed by the court as failing to state a claim, the court granted the defendants’ motion, thus dismissing the plaintiff’s claims.

Eastern District of California Finds That MERS Was Not Required to Register to do Business in California

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The Eastern District of California in deciding Bogdan v. Countrywide Home Loans, CIV-F-09-1055 AWI SMS (E.D. Cal. 2010), found that MERS was not required to register to do business in California. Based off of this finding the court subsequently dismissed fraud and unfair competition claims against MERS.

Plaintiff brought a litany of claims; (1) violation of Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”) against Decision One; (2) violation of California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA”) against Countrywide, Select Portfolio, Decision One, and Recontrust; (3) negligence against all Defendants; (4) violation of Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) against Countrywide, Select Portfolio, and Decision One; (5) breach of fiduciary duty against Morales, Home Sweet, Decision One, and Roman; (6) fraud against all Defendants; (7) violation of California’s Business & Professions Code § 17200 (“UCL”) against all Defendants ; (8) breach of contract agains Countrywide and Decision One; (9) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Countrywide and Decision One; and (10) wrongful foreclosure against Countrywide, Select Portfolio, and Recontrust.

Upon review the court reviewed the claims and subsequently dismissed them, finding that MERS was not required to

Glaski Full of It?

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I had blogged about Glaski v. Bank of America, No. F064556 (7/31/13, Cal. 5th App. Dist.) soon after it was decided, arguing that it did not bode well for REMICs that did not comply with the rules governing REMICS that are contained in the Internal Revenue Code. The case is highly controversial. Indeed, the mere question of whether it should be a published opinion or not has been highly contested, with the trustee now asking that the case be depublished. The request for depublication is effectively a brief to the California Supreme Court that argues that Glaski was wrongly decided.

Because of its significance, there has been a lot of discussion about the case in the blogosphere. Here is Roger Bernhardt‘s (Golden Gate Law School) take on it, posted to the DIRT listserv and elsewhere:

If some lenders are reacting with shock and horror to this decision, that is probably only because they reacted too giddily to Gomes v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 CA4th 1149 (reported at 34 CEB RPLR 66 (Mar. 2011)) and similar decisions that they took to mean that their nonjudicial foreclosures were completely immune from judicial review. Because I think that Glaski simply holds that some borrower foreclosure challenges may warrant factual investigation (rather than outright dismissal at the pleading stage), I do not find this decision that earth-shaking.

Two of this plaintiff’s major contentions were in fact entirely rejected at the demurrer level:

-That the foreclosure was fraudulent because the statutory notices looked robosigned (“forged”); and

-That the loan documents were not truly transferred into the loan pool.

Only the borrower’s wrongful foreclosure count survived into the next round. If the bank can show that the documents were handled in proper fashion, it should be able to dispose of this last issue on summary judgment.

Bank of America appeared to not prevail on demurrer on this issue because the record did include two deed of trust assignments that had been recorded outside the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) period and did not include any evidence showing that the loan was put into the securitization pool within the proper REMIC period. The court’s ruling that a transfer into a trust that is made too late may constitute a void rather than voidable transfer (to not jeopardize the tax-exempt status of the other assets in the trust) seems like a sane conclusion. That ruling does no harm to securitization pools that were created with proper attention to the necessary timetables. (It probably also has only slight effect on loans that were improperly securitized, other than to require that a different procedure be followed for their foreclosure.)

In this case, the fact that two assignments of a deed of trust were recorded after trust closure proves almost nothing about when the loans themselves were actually transferred into the trust pool, it having been a common practice back then not to record assignments until some other development made recording appropriate. I suspect that it was only the combination of seeing two “belatedly” recorded assignments and also seeing no indication of any timely made document deposits into the trust pool that led to court to say that the borrower had sufficiently alleged an invalid (i.e., void) attempted transfer into the trust. Because that seemed to be a factual possibility, on remand, the court logically should ask whether the pool trustee was the rightful party to conduct the foreclosure of the deed of trust, or whether that should have been done by someone else.

While courts may not want to find their dockets cluttered with frivolous attacks on valid foreclosures, they are probably equally averse to allowing potentially meritorious challenges to wrongful foreclosures to be rejected out of hand.