Tag Archives: Freddie Mac

Fannie and Freddie Myth-Statement

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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s investors have sued the federal government in Washington Federal v. United States, No. 1:13-00385 (June 10, 2013), for how it bailed out the two companies and thereby the nation’s housing market at the expense of the two companies’ shareholders. Plaintiffs claim that they have been damaged to the tune of $41 billion.

The complaint contains one of my favorite myths about the two companies.  It states that its regulator “directed that, to support the economy, the Companies purchase subprime and other risky securities.” (1) Its evidence for this assertion is that in 2007 the two companies’ “lending standards were adjusted to allow them to purchase more subprime securities” and “Congress and regulators encourage” the companies to “buy subprime and other risky securities — products that did not meet either Company’s own prior lending standards.”(1-2) The misleading nature of these statements is two-fold. First, Fannie and Freddie had been investing in non-prime securities before 2007; and (2) being ‘allowed’ or ‘encouraged’ to invest is not the same as being ‘directed’ to invest.  This points to a fundamental myth about Fannie and Freddie — being allowed to do risky things is the same as being made to do so.

This myth has come up in discussions about their affordable housing goals as well.  When Congress increased these goals, the two companies would buy risky products not because they had to, but because they wanted to keep overall growing market share.  To the extent the goals were expressed as a proportion of their total portfolio, the companies could reduce the purchase of risky loan products by risking the overall size of their portfolios.  But no one ever considers this to be a legitimate option — of course growth is more important than managing credit risk!

More on this complaint anon.

Risky Business Model for Homeowners?

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The Mortgage Bankers Association issued a report, Up-Front Risk Sharing: Ensuring Private Capital Delivers for Consumers, intended to increase the role of the private sector in the portion of the mortgage market currently dominated by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The MBA argues that to “entice private capital into the mortgage market, FHFA should require the GSEs to offer risk sharing options to lenders at the “point of sale.” (1) The report notes that about “60 percent of new mortgage originations today are sold to the GSEs. This dynamic means that the GSEs’ credit pricing has effectively determined the cost of and access to credit for a wide majority of all new loans.” (5) The GSEs’ credit pricing is thus not set by the market.  The report continues, the GSEs

are now charging more than twice as much in guarantee fees as they did a few years ago, at the same time their acquisition profile shows they are taking on very little credit risk, even compared to pre-bubble credit standards. For example, average credit scores for GSE mortgage purchases prior to the crisis were about 720; today they are 760. Similarly, the weighted average LTV of loans outside of the HARP program are in the high 60% range, several percentage points lower than in the early 2000s. With this combination of high fees and ultra conservative underwriting, it is not surprising that the GSEs are seeing large, indeed record, profits — their revenues are up and their costs are down, not through their execution, but through government fiat and a privileged market position. (2)

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Without quibbling with some of these characterizations, I would note that I have long taken the position that the private sector should bear more of the risk of credit loss in the residential mortgage market. As a result, I welcome proposals for them to do so.  This particular proposal also reduces the role of the GSEs which, while just a partial reduction, is another welcome development.  So, this proposal appears to be good for the mortgage industry (particularly private mortgage insurers).  It is also good for taxpayers because the private sector would be taking on credit risk from the federal government.

The question that remains is whether this is the right solution for homeowners.  The MBA says that this proposal will increase access to credit.  It would be helpful if the industry could model this claim.  The lending industry has its own cycle of credit loosening and tightening, so it would make sense to understand how such a cycle would impact homeowners if we moved toward such a system and moved away from the Fannie/Freddie duopoly.