Tag Archives: HAMP

Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court Grants Assignee Bank’s Motion For Relief, Denies Debtor’s Assignment Challenges and Home Affordable Modification Program Claim

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Aurora, as an assignee of a Chapter 13 debtor’s mortgage, moved for relief from stay to exercise its rights in property, and debtor objected to assignee’s standing and on the ground that his post petition payment default was the result of an improper refusal to modify his mortgage under the government’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). After considering arguments, the court decided In re Lopez, 446 B.R. 12, 18–19 (Bkrptcy.D.Mass.2011) by granting Aurora’s motion for relief.

The Debtor raised a plethora of questions regarding Aurora’s standing to prosecute the motion for relief. First, he contended that an assignment of the mortgage, without the note, was void. Next, the Debtor argued that MERS, as nominee, could not assign the mortgage because it was merely a title holding entity. Further, he noted that the assignment could not assign the note because MERS never held it.

The Debtor also found fault with the note, complaining that the endorsements were undated, thus concealed the date of the transactions. He further questioned whether the signatory of two of the endorsements could have been an authorized officer as the final endorsement is in blank, the Debtor asserted that the current holder of the note was unknown, making it unclear who authorized MERS to assign the mortgage.

Further, the Debtor attacked the validity of the assignment on the basis that Aurora had not proven that the signatory was sufficiently authorized to execute the assignment.

With respect to HAMP eligibility, the Debtor argued that the monthly payment used to determine borrower eligibility included a monthly payment of principal regardless of whether the expense was included in the Debtor’s current mortgage payment. Furthermore, he contended that Aurora mischaracterized the interest rate as adjustable rather than fixed. As such, the provisions regarding rate resets relied on by Aurora are inapplicable.

In determining whether a creditor has a colorable claim to property of the estate, the court found that Aurora has established a colorable claim to the Property as Mortgagee.

First, the Debtor asserted that the assignment of the mortgage, without the note, was void, but under Massachusetts law, “where a mortgage and the obligation secured thereby are held by different persons, the mortgage is regarded as an incident to the obligation, and, therefore, held in trust for the benefit of the owner of the obligation.” Accordingly, even though MERS never had possession of the Note, it was legally holding the Mortgage in trust for the Note holder.

Second, the Debtor contended that MERS, due to its status as a nominee, could not assign the Mortgage to Aurora. The court rejected this argument as it misapprehended the meaning of “nominee.” Though MERS never held the Note, it could, by virtue of its nominee status, transfer the Mortgage on behalf of the Note holder.

The remainder of the Debtor’s arguments involved challenges to the assignment authorization. Specifically, whether the signatory was authorized to execute the assignment; whether MERS was authorized to assign the mortgage; whether the officers endorsing the note had authorization to do so; whether, given the absence of transaction dates, the endorsements were placed on the note only recently; and the fact that the final endorsement on the note is blank, rendering it a bearer instrument negotiable by transfer of possession alone.

The Court found that the Debtor did not affirmatively state that there were any defects in Aurora’s chain of title; rather he merely suggested that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to be sure. This, the court noted, was not the standard.

Having determined that Aurora is a party in interest, the court considered whether relief from stay was warranted. The court found that the Debtor had not articulated any theory through which he could have asserted standing to obtain the relief he sought.

NY Appellate Court Rules Modification Not Enforceable in Foreclosure

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The Appellate Division ruled in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Meyers, 2013 Slip Op. 03085 (2d Dep’t), that a failure to negotiate a loan modification in good faith, which is required under NY foreclosure law, does not support the unilateral imposition of a mortgage modification.

The uncontested facts in this case read like one of the well-publicized Alice-in-Wonderland tales of homeowners trying to negotiate a modification with a Red-Queen-like loan servicer:

  • Wells Fargo alleges that it is the holder of the note and mortgage but later says that Freddie Mac is
  • Wells Fargo tells the homeowners to default in order to get into the loan modification program and then forecloses, although the Wells Fargo representative states that they “had no idea” why the foreclosure had been initiated. (4)
  • Wells Fargo repeatedly loses documents sent by the homeowners
  • Wells Fargo changes the terms of its modification offer because of a “miscalculation” (4)

The Court upholds the finding that Wells Fargo did not negotiate in good faith.  One can only imagine how homeowners feel dealing with such a bureaucratic counter-party:  is it grossly incompetent or slyly malevolent?

The Appellate Division notes that the statute at issue provides, “Both the plaintiff and defendant shall negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, including a loan modification, if possible” (8, quoting CPLR 3408[f]).  This provision contains no remedies, however, for the failure to do so.  The Court then identifies a variety of sanctions that have been employed against mortgagees/servicers pursuant to this statute.  These include

  • barring them from “collecting interest, legal fee, and expenses” (10)
  • imposing exemplary damages
  • staying the foreclosure
  • imposing a monetary sanction

The Court also noted that it determined in another case that cancelling the mortgage and note was too severe a sanction, one that was not authorized by law.  The Court found that the remedy in this case, imposing a modification, was also inappropriate.  The court stated that to do so would be to rewrite a contract that had voluntarily been entered into in violation of the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution.  The court also states that such a unilateral action “is without any source for its authority” and appears inconsistent with CPLR 3408 itself. (12) It is is unclear to me whether the Court is reading the Contracts Clause properly, but I agree that the trial court’s remedy seems extreme on these facts.

 

(Hat tip Wilson Freyermuth)

Principled Forgiveness

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The Congressional Budget Office issued a report, Modifying Mortgages Involving Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Options for Principal Forgiveness, that reviews where we are with principal-forgiveness loan modifications. It notes that “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have not been allowed to implement principal forgiveness out of concerns about fairness, implementation costs, and the incentive that the approach could provide for people to become delinquent in order to obtain principal forgiveness.” (1)

The report examines how the GSEs could employ principal forgiveness. A key issue that the report addresses is how to deal with the moral hazard of homeowners “becoming delinquent in order to obtain principal forgiveness.” (3) This could result in large costs for the federal government and would be inequitable to those who are similarly situated who choose not to become delinquent.

The CBO analyzes three principal forgiveness options.  Each option would allow a GSE to choose between a standard HAMP modification or one that involved principal forgiveness, “depending on which one lowered the government’s expected costs more.” (3) CBO estimates that 1.2 million borrowers might be eligible for such a program, which would be about 40 percent of all underwater borrowers. CBO estimates that the federal government would save a modest amount of money with these options.

The CBO’s cost-benefit principle seems like a reasonable basis upon which to expand principal forgiveness loan modifications.  The FHFA should pursue these options even before its new leadership is in place.

Unhampered and HAMPered Mortgage Modifications

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The National Consumer Law Center has issued a thorough report, At a Crossroads:  Lessons from the Home Affordable Modification Program  (HAMP), which also provides some guidance for the way forward after we get past the foreclosure crisis.  The authors summarize their findings as follows:

The government’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) is our starting point. HAMP has reached more homeowners, and successfully modified more home loans, than any program in history. Created by the federal government in early 2009 as a temporary program in response to the foreclosure crisis, HAMP provided additional financial incentives to servicers and investors to modify mortgages at risk of ending in foreclosure. The result has been affordable, sustainable loan modifications that keep borrowers in their homes and maximize returns to investors. But HAMP fell short of its goals, which were inadequate to the scope of the crisis. HAMP has been justly criticized for its lack of transparency and its failure to provide for effective enforcement. (3)

Not pulling punches, the report squarely places responsibility for its failure on “one root cause: massive servicer noncompliance. Almost every official evaluation of HAMP has noted widespread servicer noncompliance and the concurrent failure of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to engage in meaningful enforcement.” (4)  Given that millions more foreclosures are on the horizon, this failure must be rooted out.

The report identifies five principles for effective loan modification standards:

  1. Loan modification evaluations should be standardized, universally applicable to all loans and servicers, and mandatory for all loans before the foreclosure process can go forward.
  2. Loan modification terms must be affordable, fair, and sustainable.
  3. Hardship must be defined to reflect the range of challenges homeowners face.
  4. Transparency and accountability throughout the loan modification process are essential.
  5. Homeowners must be protected from servicers’ noncompliance. Good rules on paper are not enough. (4)

I am intrigued by some of the particular proposals, although I am not sure how they actually work in practice.  For instance, the report states that “Provisions Must Be Made for Homeowners with Junior Liens and Others for Whom a Thirty-One Percent Monthly Mortgage Payment Is Not Affordable.” (58) At what point must we say that a particular situation is untenable?  The report also proposes that “A Servicer’s Violation of Servicing Standards Should Constitute a Defense to a Foreclosure.” (63) While this would no doubt be great for current homeowners, it would also be a radical role change for the foreclosure process.  If this idea gets any traction, it will be interesting to see the industry critique.