Tag Archives: lawful assignment

Michigan Court Finds Assignment From MERS to Bank of New York Was Valid

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The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Southern Division in Maslowski v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156299 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2013) granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.

The crux of plaintiff’s claim is that the state foreclosure proceedings should be invalidated because MERS lacked the capacity to assign the Mortgage and BONY could not accept the MERS’ Assignment of Mortgage. Defendants successfully sought dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

The court reasoned even if the assignment from MERS to BONY was invalid, thereby creating a defect in the foreclosure process under M.C.L. § 600.3204(1)(d), the plaintiff had not alleged that he was prejudiced.

While plaintiff claimed various damages, which arose from the alleged fraudulent assignment, plaintiff did not allege that he suffered any prejudice due to the alleged fraudulent assignment. Plaintiff failed to show that he would be subject to liability from someone other than BONY (i.e., double liability) or that he would have been in any better position to keep the Property absent the assignment Accordingly, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, Finds That Wells Fargo Had Standing to File Foreclosure Action

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The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in deciding Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Garner, 2013 N.J. Super. LEXIS 2648, 2013 WL 5827033 (App.Div. Oct. 31, 2013) affirmed the lower court’s decision and dismissed motions to vacate the judgment of foreclosure.

Defendant argued that plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., lacked standing to file the foreclosure action. The defendant claimed that Wells Fargo did not own the note and mortgage on the date it filed the complaint. For the same reason, the defendant maintained that plaintiff improperly issued the notice of intent to foreclose.

The court found defendant was not entitled to relief under any subsection of Rule 4:50-1, and subsequently dismissed her complaint.

Homeowners in Fifth Circuit Fail to Defeat Deutsche Bank Assignments

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In Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22133 (5th Cir. Tex. July 11, 2013), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the Texas district court’s decision to grant Deutsche Bank’s motion to dismiss the homeowners’ complaint alleging the loan assignments were invalid due to robo-signing. The Reinagels refinanced their property in 2006 with Argent Mortgage Company, LLC who sold the loan to Deutsche Bank where it was pooled and sold to investors. The sale of the loan to Deutsche Bank was not documented until 2008, when the assignment was executed. The first assignment of the deed of trust failed to reference the promissory note. A second assignment was executed in 2009, expressly naming the subject note.

After the homeowners defaulted on payments, the state court granted the order for foreclosure in 2010, naming Deutsche Bank as mortgagee with right to foreclose. The Reinagels brought this action for a temporary injunction alleging that the assignments were “robo-signed” and as such facially void. They further argued that the assignments violated the pooling and service agreement (“PSA”), which did not permit transfers into the Deutsche Bank trust after October 1, 2006. The case was removed to the district court on diversity grounds, where the court later granted Deutsche Bank’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The Fifth Circuit affirmed this decision on appeal, finding the Reingals’ challenge of the the assignments unconvincing. The court held that although a non-party to a contract cannot enforce said contract, the obligor may defend on any ground which renders the assignment void, giving homeowners standing as they assert the assignments are facially void. The first assignment was held valid, as the court notes “the transfer of a mortgage presumptively includes the note secured by the mortgage” even if it doesn’t expressly reference the note; the validity of the second assignment is irrelevant here. Additionally, the Reinagels cited no precedent to support invalidating the assignments solely on account of robo-signing, or that violations of the PSA would invalidate the assignments. Further, the court did not find sufficient evidence of robo-signing in regard to either assignment. The court is careful to note that its decision is a narrow one, and provides a warning to banks: “we merely reaffirm that under Texas law facially valid assignments cannot be challenged for want of authority except by the defrauded assignor. We do not condone ‘robo-signing’ more broadly and remind that bank employees or contractors who commit forgery or prepare false affidavits subject themselves and their supervisors to civil and criminal liability.” Id at 12.

Rhode Island Court Rules That under State law, Only Parties to a Contract May Seek to Have Rights Declared Under a Contract

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The Rhode Island court in deciding Fryzel v. MERS, No. CA 10-352 (D.Ri., 2011) decided that under Rhode Island law, only parties to a contract may seek to have rights declared under a contract. The court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the transfer of the promissory note or assignment of mortgage granted by Plaintiff.

The plaintiff’s complaint disputed AHMSI’s ability to foreclose by challenging the validity of the assignments of their mortgage. The plaintiff further claimed that AHMSI was not entitled to foreclose under the terms of the ‘Pooling and Servicing Agreement’. However, the court found that it was undisputed that plaintiffs were not parties to the assignment agreements or to the PSA. Thus, plaintiffs did not have standing to assert legal rights based on the specified documents.

Court Holds That Mortgagor Lacks Standing to Challenge the Propriety of Mortgage Assignments Under Rhode Island Law

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The Rhode Island magistrate judge in Cosajay v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., C.A. No. 10-442-M (D.R.I. June 23, 2011) issued “Reports and Recommendations,” holding that according to Rhode Island law a mortgagor “lacks standing to challenge the propriety of mortgage assignments and the effect those assignments, if any, could have on the underlying obligation.”

The Plaintiff challenged the validity of the assignments on multiple grounds, including MERS’ authority to execute the assignment. The magistrate however determined that under Rhode Island law, only parties to a contract may seek to have rights declared under a contract.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Finds That MERS Was the Beneficiary and Did Not Breach Duty of Care

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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California in deciding Knowledge Hardy v. IndyMac Federal Bank, et al, No. CV F 09-935 (E.D. Cal. 2009) found that MERS was the beneficiary and did not breach a duty of care.

The court found that MERS did not breach duty of care owed to the borrower by acting as the beneficiary and assigning the deed of trust to IndyMac. The court found that MERS participation in the foreclosure failed to amount to a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

United States District Court Rules That MERS Had The Power to Assign the Deed of Trust

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The United States District Court of the Eastern District of California in deciding Coburn v. Bank of New York Mellon, N.A., 2:10-CV-03080 (2010) granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court also handed down the ruling that the plaintiff’s claim of deceit was without merit.

The plaintiff argued that MERS simply lacked the power to assign the deed of trust to The Bank of New York Mellon since MERS was neither the owner of the mortgage nor holder of the note. The court rejected this assertion.

The court held that MERS had the authority to assign its beneficial interest to another party. The court also held that MERS did not violate California Civil Code §1095 in assigning the deed of trust to the bank.